

THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

MARITIME HISTORY & ARTS



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SUMMER 1998

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THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF MARITIME HISTORY AND ARTS

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ON THE COVER

Chinese Junk, 1868–1872
John Thomson
Albumen Print

Many hazards can impede the maritime photographer. This instance involved an unwilling crew. When Thomson climbed aboard the junk to take this photograph, "they forsook their work, confronted us with angry gestures and threatened to bar our advance." Eventually, the crew relented and assisted with the photograph.

The album containing this photograph was originally owned by Henry Upham Jeffries, a partner in Russell, Sturgis and Company. It appears in *Capturing Poseidon: Photographic Encounters with the Sea*, an exhibit on view at the Peabody Essex Museum through April 11, 1999.

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BRITON C. BUSCH

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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S NOTE

How has flight, or aviation, changed the character of maritime history?

The question has often been raised in my wildest imaginings. Purists might like to think that aviation history and maritime or marine history are really quite distinct subjects. Even in the pages of this journal we see very few articles on maritime aspects of aviation history or aviation aspects of maritime history. True, we do see the occasional piece on dirigibles, or airships (blimps to some), and we do have the pleasure of seeing essays on naval aviation.

I do wish that we had more. Let me paint a broad canvas.

Seventy-two years ago, the first solo transatlantic flight changed the course of history — and of historical studies. When Charles Augustus Lindbergh, Jr. touched down on French soil 21 May 1927, after 33½ hours in the air, and a 3,600 mile flight in the *Spirit of St. Louis* between Roosevelt Field, New York, and Le Bourget, near Paris, he paved the way for great airliners, the Comet and the Concord among others. He became an instant celebrity. President Calvin Coolidge dispatched a cruiser to bring him home. Six men had died in previous attempts, but the courageous Lindbergh was first to succeed. On other accounts Lindbergh was less popular, and his pro-fascist views and admiration for the new Luftwaffe (he accepted a decoration from Hermann Goering) put him out of favor with American government and citizenry alike. He spent most of World War II in an aircraft factory in design and test work. He flew a few strictly unofficial combat missions in the Pacific. He died of lymphatic cancer 26 August 1974.

Lindbergh's flight heralded the prospects of commercial transatlantic aviation. Many years passed before this occurred, however. Not until 1939 did airliners carry paying passengers on the Atlantic route. The terrible, tragic loss of the Graf Zeppelin *Hindenburg* (at 800 feet, the biggest flying machine the world has known) in May 1937 ended the reign of dirigibles and airships. Flying boats, such as Pan Am's *Dixie Clipper*, that made first commercial flights across the Atlantic opened up a new era — and brought air power and sea capabilities into conjunction. Apparently, some of the first naval aviators in US naval history had been in the Yale University rowing crew. Air power had advantages over sea power, and could reach inland. Thus "landplanes" such as the DC-3 and DC-4 — which could project military power inland where a seaplane could not venture very far — ended the brief, glorious era of marine-based aircraft. Pan Am's Clippers soon gave way to long distance land craft and a new set of imperial and national rivalries in which newly-formed British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), forerunner of British Airways, was never reluctant to enlarge its world wide markets.

American supremacy in world-circling activities faced many challenges, and in 1959 Pan Am inaugurated a circumnavigation with Boeing's remarkable, radical 707. Its *Clipper Windward* could circle the globe in two days. Air power had shrunk the world for those who could afford to pay the freight.

Not least in the equation was the loss of subsidies to national steamship lines and transatlantic oceanic carriers. Cutbacks in service, reductions in quality of shipboard life, and the seeming end of romance at sea for passengers put the transatlantic cruise into a dark age. Perhaps it will return some day.

Meanwhile, we ponder how aircraft design and development — and the heroic dealings of Lindbergh and *The Spirit of St. Louis* — changed the face of maritime history.

In this issue, we open with something entirely new and exceedingly important. Robert Campbell's article is about Zanzibar, that remarkable doorway to East Africa which played such an important role in commercial, political, and geostrategic doings in Africa and the Indian Ocean. Based on fresh research and good insights, this essay is sure to have a prominent role in the historiography of Africa and of empires. It is followed by William Wells II's account of those Coast Guard vessels that fell prey to British men-of-war during the famous 1812 adventure. With painstaking recreation, Wells has searched out the captures — and eventual histories — of many vessels. The new materials found in Mark Danley's essay on the Colombian Navy and the war in Korea tell us that being in a sea war can be important for

nations anxious to demonstrate their abilities in the international arena. Told here, with care, are the experiences of some ex-US Navy vessels. The "forgotten war" was a testing ground in so many ways. We complete our prominent articles with a reproduction of an excellent narrative, first published a century ago, on the brig *Mexican* of Salem. Piracy and privateering has a long history, of which this is only one (but nonetheless remarkable) instance. This one tells first of capture by pirates and then of escape.

Besides a full complement of reviews, short notices and various pieces of intelligence and news, readers will find herein a personal memoir of crossing the Pacific by J. W. Dunlavey, and an up-to-date inventory of military history websites.

We continue to strive to produce a top-quality journal, and hope that our readers are satisfied with the results. We always welcome responses and inquiries. We aim to publish a variety of articles on prominent and new themes of inquiry. They must demonstrate original research and new findings. As is customary to say, we are interested in all aspects of seafaring, ships and maritime societies.

Please tell your friends and acquaintances about *The American Neptune* and help us maintain our healthy list of loyal, satisfied subscribers.

BARRY M. GOUGH
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, Ontario

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THE KILLING OF SHABET:

A NARRATIVE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS, ZANZIBAR, 1846–1851

ROBERT CAMPBELL

The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies within the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical (if his propensity to spin yarns be excepted), and to him the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze...

Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*¹

On the seventh day of Ramadan, 1262, an American sailor murdered a man at prayer on the beach in Zanzibar, East Africa. A crew member from the bark *Ann Parry*, a whaler ten months out of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, killed the man — a Muslim named Shabet. The ship had anchored four days earlier, its captain stricken with fever, the crew desiring shore leave to relieve the boredom of shipboard life and an unproductive whaling cruise.

If ships could speak, what stories they would tell. What had the weather-worn, blubber-smearred decks of the whaler *Ann Parry* seen and heard during her thirty-five years at sea? The soles of perhaps hundreds of mariners would have offered up whole worlds of experi-

ence,² but we must content ourselves with scraps from the archives — journal entries, a ship's log, customs' accounts, correspondence, and government records. One contact amongst a thousand, one sailor's transit across the beach at Zanzibar, left a trail. A whaler, in his transience less inclined to consider the cost of his casual violence, killed a man. Alongside the story of the *Ann Parry*'s later purchase by Salem gold-seekers and her sail around Cape Horn to California in 1849, this narrative of cross-cultural violence might seem insignificant, but Shabet's death touched upon larger affairs at mid-century. In the trajectory of events that emerged from the killing of a Zanzibar man by a rogue American seaman, we may examine the particular acts of individuals that led circuitously to the threat of naval bombardment and the conflict of nations across this maritime frontier in 1851.³

There is a danger in trying to find the world in a grain of sand. By claiming too much, one may end up claiming nothing at all. As Greg Denning writes about another isolated death on a Pacific beach, "By any measure of events that change the course of human development or exemplify great movement in human thought, the death... was and is of no great importance."⁴ He also reminds us that on the sands of distant beaches men wandering between the restraints of ship and port felt free: "They did their violence easily."⁵

Whalemen, in their comings and goings, bound to their wooden islands, little noticed the shore-wise results of their aggressions. Shabet's death had consequences. Although the murdered man remains as only a name, his demise, like a stone cast into a pool, rippled outward,

Robert Campbell is a doctoral candidate in history at Yale University. He has studied and worked in East Africa for several years.

I am grateful for the support of the Armin E. Elsaesser, III Fellowship from the Sea Education Association, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, as well as the critical support of Professors John Mack Faragher and Robert Forbes, and colleagues Michelle Anderson and Allegra Hogan.



ZANZIBAR FROM THE SEA.

"Zanzibar from the Sea" from Richard F. Burton, *Zanzibar City*, vol. 1 (1872). Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.

influencing larger events. The meaning of the story, like "the yarns of seamen," may be found first in its particulars — murder, mistranslated letters, perceived insults to a flag, and threats of bombardment. In narrating the events that emanate from this killing, our story touches on nineteenth century ideas about race, on American Orientalism, the labor history of maritime work, diplomatic history, the role of consuls, American chauvinism, and Zanzibar's resistance to foreign domination. In its telling, our story mirrors the messiness of human experience and history. The terrible beauty of this history lies in the chain of events which links the causes of an international episode to the contingency of a single death. As Joseph Conrad insists, our narratives move from the particular to the general; only then may we recognize the truth of his observation that "the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel, but outside," that the story itself possesses a struc-

ture that has meaning. In the 1840s and 1850s, three-months sail from New England, on the East Coast of Africa, we may glimpse the beginnings of American imperial practice — the articulation of extraterritoriality — exempting Americans from foreign legal jurisdiction — and the use of naval force to secure free trade and punish insult.⁶ On the beach at Zanzibar there was a murder and a beginning.

On Sunday, 30 August 1846, the starboard watch had come ashore for "refreshments."⁷ That evening, several Zanzibari men — an Omani customs official and at least two African sailors — performed their ablutions at the waterside before *salah*, or congregational prayer. Reciting in Arabic, "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful," they washed their hands up to the wrists three times, then rinsed their mouths with the salt water

three times, washed their faces, right arms, heads from forehead to the back of the necks ears, and feet — each three times.⁸ Once the *taharah* was complete — respecting the Koran's words that "Truly Allah loves those who turn to Him and those who care for cleanliness" — the men would recite their prayers.⁹

These men, both Arab and African, prepared for the *Maghrib*, or sunset prayer. Perhaps they washed prior to walking the short distance to the El-Jami mosque in the nearby Malindi district.¹⁰ Rebuilt in 1841, the mosque, the largest in Zanzibar and capable of accommodating 2,000 worshipers, drew the faithful down the sea front past the thatched-roofed customs house and the Sultan's palace.¹¹ The men on the beach most likely conducted their prayers at the water side, laying their palm mats on the sand, kneeling in supplication. They turned northward toward Mecca, the sun setting off to their left over the Mrima coast of East Africa some twenty-five miles across the water.¹² Their *Maghrib* prayers would be interrupted.

The crews of the various foreign vessels in port had joined in the narrow streets of the old city to carouse — drinking and fighting amongst themselves.¹³ Perhaps they "went up the streets arm in arm, as many abreast as the street would hold, with a second rank behind," as did the sailing companions of another American whaler a few years later.¹⁴ Seamen had long insisted captains grant a generous shore leave on Sundays.¹⁵ The crews of the *Ann Parry* and the Salem brig *Cherokee*, also recently in port, took full advantage of this opportunity to indulge in local "refreshments." For these sailors, the island offered a paradise of fresh food, sex, and rum, and the Muslim community cautiously tolerated the heathen intrusions.

"One of the finest spots that dots the ocean," heralded one sailor of Zanzibar. "I should think that this might surely be called the land of good living."¹⁶ "Fruits of the most delicious kinds we saw in abundance. The cocoa nut and the orange tree were laden with these rich treasures, and almost sunk beneath

there burthen," wrote a *Cherokee* crew member on a later visit. The cheapness and abundance of these fruits posed an almost irresistible temptation to the seafarer "who for months had whetted his appetite on hard biscuit and salt junk." Cautioned by their nineteenth century medical lore against overindulgence, these sailors, while drinking to excess, likely avoided the pineapples. An earlier Zanzibar visitor and itinerant whaler, J. Ross Browne, warned against excessive pineapple consumption: "The pineapple is the most dangerous of all tropical fruits. I have known two or three cases of death caused by the pineapple alone... in many cases death seizes the victim without apparent cause."¹⁷

Despite such insidious hazards, sailors found real respite on Zanzibar. "The air was fresh and cool; which being sented with the rich perfumes of the shore or land made it truly an acceptable treat to the mariner who had not seen the least particle of vegetable life for 70 days.... None who has not been in the same situation can imagine the pleasure with which he beholds such scenes as these. And especially to me who for the first time beheld foreign land there was new interest attached to it."¹⁸

Closer inspection left some visiting sailors with a less pleasing impression. "The horrid smells that sometimes fill the air are enough to turn the stomach of one unaccustomed to the like Efluvia."¹⁹ Seamen breathed in "A sickening stench from decayed vegetable and animal matter, rendered peculiarly offensive from the intense heat of the climate."²⁰ This pungent odor so affected missionary and explorer David Livingstone that he dubbed the city "Stinkabar." Zanzibar challenged the sensibilities of its western visitors in other ways as well.

As the principal entrepot for the slave trade in the western Indian Ocean region, the spectacle of human bondage posed a disturbing scene to visiting New Englanders as they straggled about the streets of Zanzibar. Salem merchant Michael Shepard observed in 1844:

Arriving ashore the place presents a very different aspect. When [slaves] arrive in Zanzibar they are discharged

in the same manner as a lot of sheep would be, the dead ones thrown over board to drift down with the tide and if in their course they strike the beach and ground the natives come with a pole and push them from the beach and thus their bodies drift until another stoppage when they are served in a similar manner....²¹

Those who survived the forced march from the African interior, followed by the torrid sail to the island stacked in the cramped hull of a leaky sewn-boat *mtepe*, joined "the gaunt forms of men rotting with fever, leprosy, and ulcers, ...staggering from street to street... slaves crawling about on their knees and hands... half-naked skeletons tottering about with sunken eyes."²² If the sailors paid much attention to this human misery, they did not much mention it. After all, it was a rare seaman that scribed his impressions of the wider world that was home.

The merchant visitors wrote more prolifically of their impressions (they also had the connections and funds to finance a printing of their reminiscences):

The Town of Zanzibar, is the most filthy, ill-laid out-place, I ever was in. It contains about 4,000 houses & huts, and has a population of about 20,000, including slaves.²³

The streets are narrow, crooked, and uneven, having no drains to carry off the water. During the rains in that season it is almost impossible to get along, the mud being almost ankle deep.²⁴

Heards of Slaves were continually going about the streets with there drivers following in there rear urging them to the market where they to be sold like cattle.²⁵

When in a saleable condition of body they are besmeared with oil, decorated with gold and silver trinkets, and taken to the slave bazaar, an open square

about three fourths of a mile from town, where they are offered for sale by auction.... At this human cattle-show, these dull pictures of despair are lashed and goaded into a transient show of life....²⁶

While these American observers leveled harsh critiques upon Zanzibar and its economy, occasionally one of them would recognize the difficulty of condemning this place too blithely. One of these observers, Richard Waters, reflected that the sights "called up unpleasant feelings. What can I say to those engaged in this trade, when I remember the millions of Slaves which exist in my own country?"²⁷ The contradictions of economic life were writ large in the odorous streets of the town. American merchants and sailors moved easily within these contradictions.²⁸

Since 1825, American merchant and whale ships had come to Zanzibar to trade and resupply with food and water. Omani Arabs preceded these American traders. Oman had a long history of trade with the region, reaching back at least two centuries. During the 1830s, the Omani, under the leadership of the Busaidi Sultan Seyyid Said, moved their capital from Muscat, near the Persian Gulf, in order to control the trade in slaves, ivory, and spices from Zanzibar Island, lying just off the present-day Tanzanian coast.²⁹

The malarial coasts of Africa had long proven fatal to Europeans. Offshore islands such as Zanzibar offered safer alternatives (although "the fever" certainly took its toll there as well) to the more deadly coastal harbors. A vigorous trade in ivory, gum copal, cloves, and hides, largely monopolized by the Massachusetts' port of Salem, prompted the United States government to establish a consulate to the Omani Sultan in order to protect rising American commercial interests in the region. In 1837, the United States became the first western government to appoint a consul in the region. This move helped secure American dominance of the trade, a dominance the US



“Zanzibar from the Consulate” from Richard F. Burton, *Zanzibar City*, vol. 1 (1872). Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.

would hold tenuously through their own Civil War until the trade’s eventual demise with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and expanded British influence in the region.³⁰

American commercial operators based their success on the exchange of cotton calico, brass wire, gunpowder and muskets for African resources. American Consul Charles Ward noted that the value of trade amounted to “about 1,000,000 dollars” in 1850.³¹ The Zanzibaris recognized in their local language the Americans’ control of this trade. The Swahili named the durable and much desired cotton sheeting *amerikani*. The explorer Richard Burton dubbed this calico “the silver of the country.”³² Zanzibar thus served as the commercial intermediary between the raw suppliers in the African interior and American and European traders.

American interests in the region, led by merchant shippers, were almost exclusively

commercial. On this trade frontier, the business-minded Yankees recognized their status as “guests” and the need to cooperate with their hosts. Their private correspondence revealed the frequent frustrations borne of this cross-cultural trade. Commercial agent Benjamin F. Fabens, representing the interests of Michael Shepard, reported on his meeting with the Sultan in August 1844: “His highness made many professions of amity. But amity and enmity are often synonymous terms here. ‘Sweet talk’ cost but little and it is consequently dealt out most liberally.”³³ These private frictions rarely surfaced. Despite episodes of murder and diplomatic conflict, these New Englanders carried on a successful trade for nearly half a century. But there were occasions that strained relations, at times to the breaking point, and this is the story of one such instance.

On their Sabbath day excursion, the *Ann Parry*’s sailors evidenced little of the piety of

their Islamic counterparts, who had just completed their seventh day of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. Abstaining from food or drink from dawn to dusk for an entire month drained the Muslim men's physical energies even as it strengthened their spirits.

Ramadan attracted the attention of visiting Americans. Captain Sandwith Drinker, describing the preparations for the evening prayers, noted:

A few moments previous to sunset, you will see everyone on the lookout for [the sun] to dip below the Horizon... awaiting the signal, that the time of fasting is past. Before his last rays are dissipated a rush is made, and they are soon up to their elbows in grease and rice, making amends for their involuntary fast.... The Arabs much resemble the Pharisees, selecting the most conspicuous place... to perform their devotions, putting on every outward appearance of sanctity, whilst the heart is wholly destitute of the vital spirit of religion. I shall be glad when the month is past....³⁴

Captain Drinker was not prepared to accept the spectacle of so many people coming together to pray to some "strange" god.

As the Muslim men on the beach looked toward Allah and to breaking the day's fast in the evening celebrations, the seamen looked drunkenly toward an end to their liberty, returning to a long night standing the dog watch, and many more days and nights at sea. At least six men — three from the brig *Cherokee* and three from the *Ann Parry* — stumbled onto the beach to meet a longboat from the *Cherokee*. Passing the customs house "which fronts the sea, and is a low miserable shed, unfit for a place of business,"³⁵ the whalemens saw the men at prayer. The prayer scene may have struck them as strange. Certainly, the muezzins' call to prayer from the city's many mosques filled the sailors muddled heads with "exotic" sounds.

"*Allah-u Akbar!*" (Allah is greater) echoed eerily, filling the sunset sky. Horace Putnam, a sailor visiting Zanzibar, recognized such piety, although without much sympathy, noting that "they are very devout in there worship, as one would suppose by their Hellish noises when going to prayers."³⁶

The "hellish noise," the dilapidated customs house, and the scene of white-robed African-Arabs kneeling in the sand exaggerated the differences between "us" and "them." As Melville noted, "Of all men seamen have strong prejudices, particularly in the matter of race... when a creature of inferior race lives among them,... there seems no bound to their disdain..."³⁷ In the last moments of "liberty" before returning to the institutional discipline of the ship, the American sailors could easily find rationale enough in their assumed racial and cultural superiority.³⁸

We cannot know the motives for what happened next. The sailors confronted the Muslims on the beach. A babel of words — Kiswahili, Arabic, and sailor English — no doubt charged the scene with confused challenges. A man named Wright and two others, all sailors from the *Ann Parry*, "all drunk," attacked the men at prayer. A Portuguese sailor named Phales, also on the beach at the time of the attack, later testified that one of the Americans "threw a stone which struck a man on the head, and afterwards struck him two blows with his fist." This Zanzibari,³⁹ an African named Casombe, survived the attack, but the "old man" Shabet was not so lucky. According to Casombe, although it was dark and he could not confirm the man's identity, a white man ran to a nearby dhow, grabbed a club, and ran up to Shabet, striking him in the head, "splitting his scull."⁴⁰

Pelted with coral rag stones thrown by Zanzibaris drawn to the attack, the sailors fled. They retreated into the shallows as a man named Augustus from the *Cherokee* pulled a launch up to the beach. The sailors piled into the launch and "pulled for their lives" straining at the oars. "Pull, pull hard!" Augustus might have urged the whalemens, accustomed to drawing powerfully up on the back of a whale. Backs arching, they now sped the launch into

the harbor, toward the safety of the anchored *Cherokee*.⁴¹ Stones rained down upon them until they pulled out of range. It would have been just dark by now; the twin masts of the brig etched on the skyline, an oil anchor light hung from the foremast, flickering in the cooling southwest breeze.⁴²

It was eight o'clock in the evening when the customs master and head man, Jeram bin Sewji, arrived at the American Consul Charles Ward's residence to inform him of the attack.⁴³ The *Mzee* (headman), Shabet, had been carried to a nearby residence. He lingered, administered to by a doctor who could do nothing but call for an attendant to quell the indoor humid heat with a palm fan. He died shortly after midnight. The *Cherokee's* captain, John Lambert, happened to be visiting onshore at the consul's residence. Lambert left to investigate, escorted by some of Jeram's soldiers, Balluchi guards, dressed sharply in red uniforms and carrying spears and swords of Damascus steel. In Ward's words, "the excitement was tremendous and the Arabs threatened vengeance against any white man." Lambert soon related to the American consul that an American sailor "killed a native on the beach," and "that his skull had been broken." Only then did "the natives on the beach [commence] hitting them with stones."⁴⁴

Consul Ward, on the basis of the captain's findings, sent word to the ship's officers to put the assailants "in irons." After investigating the attack, Captain Lambert returned to his vessel and "told his mate to order the men up out of the forecastle when the boat came from the whaleship."⁴⁵ The whalemens had taken refuge aboard the *Cherokee*. Mr. Perry, the *Ann Parry's* mate, came on board to retrieve his crew members from the temporary safety of the forecastle, "a narrow, small and contemptable thing but eight feet wide and twelve long, and not heigh enough to stand up straight in.... Would to Heaven that every ship owner was obliged to live in these unhealthy holes and to breath its impure air..."⁴⁶ Too many days spent cramped in such sleeping quarters had no doubt contributed to the crews' exuberant violence ashore. Perry returned three of his crew to the whaler and questioned the men, whereupon one

of them by the name of Wright "confessed to the horrid deed."⁴⁷

The whalemens had a different perspective on the beachside altercation. "There was a little disturbance between [the crew] and the Arabs, the latter tried to drive them off aboard with clubs and stones the former on defending themselves killed one of the Arabs, served him right [underlining in original]," Ezra Good-nough, a crew member aboard the *Ann Parry*, wrote in his journal that night. His depiction of the incident described the Arabs as attacking *en masse*, wielding clubs, flinging stones, and driving the crew into their launch. In the ensuing melee one of the Arabs died. "The Sultan tried to find out who it was that struck the Arab but could not, if he had he would have put him to death by inches."⁴⁸ With the locking up of the apparent confessor and his two accomplices, these crewmen likely feared Ward's probity and possible acquiescence to the Sultan's demands. According to Briton Busch, "These whalemens probably believed that they suffered more than they gained at the hands of American consuls abroad."⁴⁹

On Monday, from the deck of the *Ann Parry*, a scene of sylvan enchantment belied the growing tension ashore. "The thick Mangroves, which line the shore to the south were succeeded by groves of the stately cocoanut trees, and forest trees of quite respectable size, and the low swampy rice fields, by well-cultivated plantations. Numerous small craft were standing out of the Harbour, some to engage in their daily occupation of fishing, others bound to Pemba, and the numerous small ports, which line the coast of Africa..."⁵⁰ The sailors knew well that the island now held a dangerous attraction; so close and alluring, but offering no safe refuge from the confines of their own wooden island.

The day after the murder, US Consul Ward appeared perfectly willing to placate the Sultan's demand for the perpetrator. He accepted Perry's report of the confession as fact, and in a letter to Sultan Seyyid Said, expounded: "The undersigned cannot protect a murderer."⁵¹ He



"Imaum's Harem, Zanzibar," from J. Ross Browne, *Enchings of a Whaling Cruise, with notes of a Sojourn on the Island of Zanzibar* (1846). Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.

called for an inquiry by the Sultan's judges. After all, it was not as if the Sultan's government lacked formal judicial institutions. Salem merchant Joseph Osgood observed in the 1840s, even while noting their alleged predilection for accepting bribes:

For the equal administration of justice, the *Imaum* has appointed ten or twelve *cadi*, or judges, one of whom presides at the trial of each case. The rich Arabesque dress of these ministers of the law is highly becoming, and their solemn looks and dignified deportment on the bench would impress one's mind most favorably.... Bribery is thus secretly allowed to press its ponderous finger upon the scale of justice.⁵²

With little formal income and in a society accustomed to gift giving as a means to main-

tain social hierarchies, the *qadi* (Islamic judges) often relied on gifts received from petitioners and defendants in court. In turn, these judges were accused of bribery by Westerners who failed to understand the dynamics of Swahili-Arab society.⁵³

While aware of this propensity toward "gifting," Ward, nevertheless, entrusted the case's prosecution to the Sultan: "The undersigned most respectfully awaits your Majesty's commands while it is a most painful duty." The consul must have shared the favorable impression of the Islamic court, as he allowed the Sultan's judges to hear the case of Shabet. Perhaps he shared Osgood's characterization of Sultan Seyyid Said: "His probity, tolerance, impartiality, and humanity are worthy of imitation, though the rigid manner in which he enforces the criminal code shows but little lenience."⁵⁴

Ward also felt compelled to adhere to the

strict letter of the treaty. "During the intercourse of the Americans with this people, this is the first occurrence of the kind, which has taken place with either party... as our treaty did not provide for cases of this kind, the Sultan must act his own pleasure, that I could not interfere in the matter."⁵⁵ This conclusion could only stand as remarkable alongside the characterizations of Zanzibaris given by the Consul's contemporaries, such as J. Ross Browne, who judged, "they have fallen low indeed, and now little better than semi-barbarians... having slowly retrograded, till they now stand beyond the pale of civilization."⁵⁶

Ward began to recognize the incompatibility of American and Islamic codes of law with respect to this murder. Besides, he had risen to his present position as consul through the ranks of New England's maritime merchant community. Together with other mid-nineteenth century consular representatives, Ward received a salary from his association with an American merchant concern. The bulk of his income derived from the creative exercise of his office to gather as much money through fees and other charges as allowed by the often short term of such political appointments.⁵⁷ He was not selected for his legal training. Chosen for his Democratic party allegiance, the Polk administration used this political appointee to shore up northern support for the party. Untrained for these official duties, Ward acted on his own with little guidance, according to his own instinct.⁵⁸

Having already consented to a hearing by the Sultan's judge, Ward allowed the Sultan's court of inquiry to proceed. He hosted the court in his quarters with the *qadi* (judge), Captain Lambert of the *Cherokee*, Mr. Perry, Shabet's relatives, and several witnesses, including three Portuguese sailors on the beach at the time, and the three members of the whaleship's crew in chains. The *qadi* examined the dead man's sons, the Portuguese witnesses, and the Zanzibaris who had been on the beach. The Islamic law procedures, however, did not meet Consul Ward's expectations. Several witnesses were not questioned, and the *qadi* placed more weight on the complaints of the dead man's

relations. The judge — likely Sheikh Muhammed bin Ali el-Mendhri, the Sultan's principal *Ibadhi qadi* and a legal scholar who had written on *Tawhid* (Islamic law practice) — recognized that a Muslim's word carried more weight than that of a nonbeliever.⁵⁹

At the outset, Ward claimed "it was my earnest desire in this affair to secure a fair & impartial investigation & in the event of the guilty individual being discovered to give him no protection under the Consular influence."⁶⁰ However, he was incensed that the judge did not question the validity of his first note to the Sultan indicating that the guilty party had confessed. Ward no doubt recognized that his hasty note had been a mistake. It served as confirmation of the supposed confession and the man's guilt. This information, coming directly from the consul, carried all the respect due to the prestige of the consul's office.

Consul Ward did not recognize, of course, that religious integrity (*adili* in Kiswahili) factored in the acceptance of testimony, and that an individual's dignity (*heshima* in Kiswahili) determined a particular witness' veracity.⁶¹ Nor did he realize that under Muslim law, a nonbeliever could not testify against a Muslim. Consul Ward interjected during the trial, requesting the *qadi* to examine First Mate Perry; however, no amount of questioning could have removed the relationship between social hierarchy and the evidence. The consul's *heshima* stood above that of the mate. Such *ex parte* investigation fell entirely within the realm of the Islamic court, bound as it was to rules of social hierarchy and the divide between believer and nonbeliever. Ward's hasty note asserted that the killer's confession would stand. The Sultan assumed that the American consul would turn the man over to his officers, or that a fine would be paid, as was the custom. According to Islamic law, the Sultan observed that "if a man is found murdered and it is not proved upon any one, then all the people in the district where he is found are held responsible."⁶² At the least, Seyyid Said suggested that if the man's guilt was not proven, then at the

least, his community, specifically the American whaleship captain and the consul, should bear the responsibility of financial indemnity.

"Being disappointed in the examination, I began to inquire what more I could do — if the murderer was an American I had no desire that he should escape, but as the offence was committed on shore, I concluded I had no right to hold an investigation, even if the Sultan should hold me responsible for stating the report of the mate," concluded Ward.⁶³ He made no claims to extraterritorial judicial claims and, in fact, rejected any authority whatsoever, even though the treaty permitted some measure of American influence over local civil matters. The treaty with the Sultan was commercial in outlook, and Ward was correct; it made no arrangements for criminal entanglements between the nation's citizens. Meanwhile, the Sultan maintained that the case was "returned" to the consul to decide. The Sultan expected some resolution in his favor, as this much was clear — an American sailor had killed Shabet. The consul, after first reporting that the confessed murderer, Seaman Wright, had been "put in irons," soon recanted. On Tuesday, he had changed his mind. "I made the most particular inquiries... but cannot find any one who saw the murder committed," he concluded.⁶⁴ "Which party commenced the attack I do not know. I do not know if it would be considered a justifiable homicide in civilized countries," he explained later.⁶⁵

The Sultan and Ward, speaking different languages and professing different faiths, spoke past one another. Perhaps the consul had thought better of turning an American sailor over to local justice. "The rule, or custom seems to be, that the nearest relative shall be the executioner [in the case of murder] & the guilty individual shall suffer death in the same manner as the murder was perpetrated... barbarous and cruel..."⁶⁶ I understand that the killing of a man under any circumstances is here regarded as murder, and the plea of self-defence is never admitted."

In later correspondence to the United States Secretary of State, Ward tried to represent the

local situation so as to cast favorable light on his actions: "So far as I have been able to ascertain Zanzibar is not governed by any municipal laws, neither does it contain a Police corps."⁶⁷ While local law enforcement may not have met Ward's expectations, the town garrison consisted of approximately two hundred "miserable looking soldiers, armed with a dagger, long sword, and spear, and on their shoulders is slung a shield of Rhinoceros hide... these troops are employed as a police, patrol the streets night and day. It is perfectly safe to walk abroad at any hour of the night..."⁶⁸ In his correspondence to the US State Department, Ward chose to ignore these institutions; instead, portraying these "Mohammedans" as ruling beyond the pale of civilized discourse. Despite his diminution of local governance and judicial administration, American visitors recognized that often "the heaviest purse carries the day. When a case comes before his Highness, personally, strict justice is rendered. The Town is divided into districts, each having its Judge; every one having a case before either of these, and considering his decision unjust, has the privilege of appealing to the Governor... Capital punishment is inflicted for murder..."⁶⁹

It was perhaps this last fact that weighed most heavily on Ward's mind as he mulled over the decision of what to do with Shabet's attacker. He understood that consuls "are in their official capacity authorized to protect the interests of her citizens generally."⁷⁰ Incidents in Zanzibar did not occur in isolation. The Consul was no doubt familiar with the history of American consular relations in other world ports. The furor that erupted over an incident in Canton more than two decades earlier likely had made him aware of the repercussions that individual decisions at isolated ports could have at the centers of power in Washington. In 1821, a sailor aboard the American opium trader *Emily*, out of Baltimore, threw an object at a boat of Chinese traders. The missile struck a woman, killing her. Cantonese officials demanded the sailor be turned over to local justice. Initially, the Americans refused. When the Chinese threatened to cease trade with Ameri-



"Zanzibar," from J. Ross Browne, *Enchings of a Whaling Cruise, with notes of a Sojourn on the Island of Zanzibar* (1846). Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.

cans, the merchants relented. The American seaman was tried aboard his ship by a Chinese court, which promptly found him guilty. The Chinese guards took the sailor ashore and garroted him.⁷¹

Salem merchants traded actively in Chinese ports as well as in Zanzibar. They were careful observers of the political scene that could affect trade relations. Did Consul Ward two decades later weigh the significance of this execution of an American with that of Shabet's murder? Was he aware of the more recent attack in Canton in 1844 in which Americans had killed a Chinese man during a riot? Visiting Massachusetts Congressman Caleb Cushing and the Chinese governor agreed to allow the American who had fired the fatal shot to be tried by an American jury under American law.⁷² The jury found the American not guilty, ruling that he had killed in self defense. Not only was this part of an early repudiation of the common law "duty to re-

treat," but the trial served as an early precedent establishing extraterritorial rule, effectively extending American "territory," and hence law, into Chinese ports.⁷³

Perhaps Consul Ward would have agreed with his contemporary Alexis de Tocqueville who wrote, "It is a permanent and universal interest of mankind that men should not kill each other; but the particular and momentary interests of a nation or class may in certain cases make homicide excusable or even honorable."⁷⁴ Charles Ward had little in common with the whaleman Wright's social class, but he was obliged to protect the interests of the United States and its citizens, including its sailors. It would have been difficult to deliver Wright over to another system of justice which routinely meted out very public punishments, such as that noted by Horace Putnam, a sailor, visiting Zanzibar a year later:

There was a murder committed here a few days since, the author of which deed was punished in the following way. A rope was attached to his armes by which he was drawn through every nook and aley in the city until his senses were gone... then cast into the sea.⁷⁵

While the Sultan and the consul exchanged angry letters, the sailors on board the *Ann Parry* focused on an entirely different set of priorities. On Wednesday, Ward came aboard the whaler, and instructed her officers to weigh anchor and leave the port for their own safety. The *Cherokee* was then making preparations to get under way. "Mr. Ward the American consul came on board and told us that Capt. Dennet⁷⁶ was not able to proceed on the voyage and he should give the 1st mate Mr. Perry charge of the ship on which part of the crew refused duty." (Den-nett lasted two months longer before dying of "the fever." When Goodnough learned of the former Captain's death six months later, he noted in his journal: "There is the end of as fine a man as ever wiled a ship's deck.")⁷⁷

One might suspect that the crew disliked Perry and took advantage of this transition in shipboard power to protest the change in command. The "tactic of work stoppage, a form of collective disobedience that often shaded into the more ominous crime of mutiny,"⁷⁸ posed an outright challenge to Ward's authority. It was his duty to prosecute violations of Admiralty Law like "refusal of duty" (workers adopted the word "strike" to describe their labor actions from the sailors' practice of striking or lowering a ship's sails as a symbol of their refusal to go to sea).⁷⁹ As such, the ship presented a pre-industrial equivalent to the factory, with its tight maintenance of workers' behavior under the authority of the manager-captain. Sailors were quite capable of carefully exercised resistance to authority. Maritime laborers' collective actions against their employers offered early models for their landed brethren's own contests with capital. The *Ann Parry*'s sailors constructed their own world when given the opportunity, exploiting the contradictions of American and Zanzibari law in order to redefine the

rules of their domination.⁸⁰

The crew gambled that Ward, given the difficulties ashore, and having exonerated Wright, would not now arrest these men. Goodnough wrote in his journal:

The consul dare not take them ashore if he had some of them would been killed for the Arabs were determined to have life for life. But the men refused to heave up anchor unless Capt. Perry would take the ship to Isle of France which he agreed to.⁸¹

Despite the threat of capital punishment ashore, the crew refused to sail out of Zanzibar until the newly appointed captain agreed to sail directly to Ile de France (Mauritius). The audaciousness of this work stoppage suggests that the crew was not preoccupied with the murder. Having escaped the Sultan's punishment, they were little concerned with the diplomatic repercussions resulting from Shabet's death. They recognized that they held a strong position from which to negotiate their demands. They knew Ward could ill afford to punish them for their refusal to work, in the face of their absolution for the greater crime of murder. This mutinous behavior did not result in any retribution on the part of the new captain or consul. Instead, captain and consul acquiesced to the crew's demands.

An incident aboard another whaleship in port at Zanzibar more than a year later indicated the severity of the crime of "refusal of duty," as work stoppages were called. In this case, Captain Hussey of the New Bedford whaler *Emma* entered a complaint with Consul Ward on 5 January 1848 against eleven seamen: "That this morning at 5 o'clock the mate ordered the men to turn to and heave up anchor, + these eleven men refused to do any further duty — the grounds of refusal was that they had not had any liberty in port...."⁸² Ward found the crew members guilty of the crime of refusing duty. He ordered "that they receive two dozen lashes with a piece of twelve thread ratlin rope, after which if they still refuse, to confine them

in the fort and renew the flogging every day or as often as they can bear it until they submit.”⁸³ Ward’s punishments adhered to Admiralty law, which defined protest as mutiny and prescribed cruel penalties for infractions.⁸⁴

Sailors expected little sympathy in their complaints to consuls in foreign ports, but when they saw an opening for forcing their desires into the open, as was the case with the *Ann Parry*’s crew, they seized the opportunity. Consul Ward did not welcome the possibility of punishing these men for a work stoppage, when by all appearances, he had just absolved one of them from responsibility for a murder.

The new captain was not completely dominated by his rebellious crew. The day after their arrival at Ile de France, “nine men refused duty.” Perry resisted such wholesale insurrection, and once anchored in a port with both a sympathetic port authority and relative safety, “Capt. Perry went ashore and reported them to Mr. Griffith, the American Consul — a superfine villain. He sent two policemen aboard and took the men ashore and put them in the lock up.”⁸⁵ These sailors might have agreed with sailor-lawyer Richard Henry Dana, who wrote with respect to the harsh rule of sailing masters: “What is there for the sailors to do? If they resist it is mutiny, if they succeed and take the vessel it is piracy.... If a sailor resists his commander, he resists the law, and piracy and submission are his only alternatives.”⁸⁶

These sailors, however, soon availed themselves of one final alternative. On 27 October, the men were taken out of the lockup. The rebellious sailors, nearly a third of the whaler’s crew, consented to return to duty. They came down to the beach, got in the launch, and shoved off from the landing, but they had to land again for something. “As soon as the bow struck they all started on a run... you could not see their heels for dust,” Ezra Goodnough observed from the ship’s deck. The *Ann Parry* lost a third of its crew as they took advantage of that all-important alternative left open to distressed sailors — flight.

A sailor’s contract bound him to the vessel

for the duration of the cruise (three and four years for the average whaler), unless he secured a negotiated dismissal. With desertion, what historian Marcus Rediker calls the final tactic in the struggle over the control of work, negotiation with authority ended in its rejection altogether.⁸⁷ Admiralty law meted out severe penalties for desertion: “19th century shipmasters were given legal license to pursue, punish, and imprison men for desertion.” As Joseph Blunt advised in *The Shipmaster’s Assistant and Commercial Digest*, published in 1837, the shipmaster’s authority was “necessarily summary and absolute.”⁸⁸

What inspired the sudden desertion of nine crewmen from the *Ann Parry*? Perhaps the sight of some fifty vessels lying in the inner harbor promised other work opportunities. Their earlier strike, which had secured their demand to land at Mauritius, was not a casual test of power. These sailors, in their quest to secure decent wages, knew well the advantages of desertion. To be sure, refuge might be found in this port, where desertion in Zanzibar might have meant death at the hands of an angry mob.

They deserted none too soon, as the *Ann Parry* proceeded to spend much of the following two years in various ports of call before returning to New England with few whales taken. Captain Perry spent his days selling various wares from the ship’s stores and his nights entertaining local women in his cabin. Since the seamen earned their pay as a percentage of the ship’s final take in whale oil and bone, poor hunting or too much time in port reduced their already low wages, termed lays. The lay system shifted the economic risk of the voyage onto the seamen, who could least afford it. Sometimes, the common sailor found a way out from under shipboard domination.⁸⁹ Not unexpectedly, one of the deserting sailors was the sailor, improvidentially named Wright, who had been implicated in the murder of Shabet.

American whalers were a constant presence in the world’s ports. In the 1840s, more than seven hundred whalers sailed each year from New England ports on voyages lasting three and four years. By 1846, the year of the *Ann Parry*’s inauspicious arrival in Zanzibar, the “Wha-

very unpleasantly situated, and am often obliged to pay sums of money for injuries inflicted upon the natives....⁹⁶

In fact, this was not the first outbreak of serious violence in the port. In 1843, American sailors shot two Zanzibaris; an incident leading to the outlawing of carrying firearms on shore, and crews were required to return to their vessels at sundown.⁹⁷ The British paid \$800 after one of their seamen murdered a Zanzibari in 1842.⁹⁸ Perhaps it should come as no surprise that American sailors killed a man on the beach in Zanzibar. As Denning insists:

...the beach was neither port nor ship.... A sailor in port was not liberated though he was beyond the control of the ship: he was only in another place with other rules. A sailor on the beach was free: he belonged in no category; he had status in his own person; he could bargain....⁹⁹

If we are to judge by the *Ann Parry*'s sailor's example, he could also kill.

The Sultan, nevertheless, responded angrily to Ward's actions, or rather inaction, in the case of Shabet's murder. Seyyid Said promptly sent a letter to President Polk criticizing the US government's envoy. "I sent our judges to [Ward] and he, the US consul, [has] done nothing. The US consul gave orders for the departure of the barque *Ann Parry*."¹⁰⁰ So it was that Ward and the local American merchant commercial community faced the dilemma of repairing their relations with the Sultan. After all, they had to live and carry on their trade, while ships like the *Ann Parry* came and went, and, in their transience, ignored the shoreside costs of their violence.

To understand this story, one must recognize that it is, in fact, several stories. While attempting to regain these multiple perspectives, one runs the risk of delivering a perfect muddle. It must be admitted that there can be no perfect symmetry. A single narrative perspective would render a pulseless record of this pluralistic world. The sailors saw the incident

from the viewpoint of a long cruise, one that for them, aboard the *Ann Parry*, had proven to be increasingly onerous and unprofitable.¹⁰¹ The Salem merchants who organized the buying and selling of cargoes of ivory and cotton sought to preserve the stability of the local political climate, and would have likely sacrificed the sailor to local justice. In fact, the American merchants declined to give Ward official statements regarding Shabet's murder for fear that such action would alienate their Zanzibari business associates. Ward found himself poised uncomfortably between representing the commercial interests that paid his salary and defending the interests of American citizens and their government. Finally, the Zanzibari community perceived these foreign guests, these *wageni*, as unbelievers and possibly thought the seamen as something worse, perhaps *wanyika* (barbarians). They were tolerated, but only barely in the wake of this killing.

A number of historians have characterized the Europeans who settled or traded in foreign lands as having brought their own law with them, rather than let themselves be subjected to alien laws. "Above all they could not be prosecuted according to any other law than their own," according to legal historian W. J. Mammesen. "This was particularly important in Islamic countries, in as much as the Islamic religion in principle demanded the prosecution of all nonbelievers without mercy."¹⁰² Mammesen argues that a system of "unequal bargains," or capitulations, arose between representatives of Western powers and indigenous elites. These bargains placed foreigners under the legal norms and institutions that were Western in origin, effectively introducing a tradition of consular jurisdiction and extraterritoriality.

Another historian of these so-called capitulations, Jorg Fisch, paints a different picture of extraterritoriality: "This was not seen as an infringement on the sovereignty of the local ruler, but rather as a means of attracting commerce without losing control over it."¹⁰³ In the traditional system of consular jurisdiction, according to Fisch, "mixed cases were either

decided by the local authorities or by mixed courts, not by the foreign consul. There was a tendency, throughout the colonial period, to encroach upon mixed cases."¹⁰⁴

The court of inquiry into the killing of Shabet poses a quandary with respect to those views. In part, the Sultan capitulated to Ward, but he had not conceded to the "unequal bargain." He gave responsibility to the consul because he fully expected the consul to accept the obligation incumbent upon him to deliver the murderer. It would be wrong to see an intentioned conscription of Western legal practice over that of the *Shari'a*. Nevertheless, this case was decided, in effect, by the consul's inaction. Doing nothing served as an infringement on local sovereignty. "Doing nothing" set precedent, and the imperial practice of extraterritoriality emerged haphazardly and somewhat unintentionally out of this case. The Sultan and the consul attempted to work out the custom of judicial relations between the two nations. Neither man could act or conduct himself in a manner predictable to the other. It would have been difficult to reconcile the judgments of one with the expectations of the other. Law, as a part of social reality and as a part of a moral order, was conceived of in utterly different ways by two cultural world views.

The traveler Joseph Osgood observed that, "the devil, or Shatan, as they call him, is a continued source of annoyance. His appearance in private intercourse has been noted by at least nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Zanzibar. Of course, to the optice of a negro his skin is white."¹⁰⁵ Osgood's inclusion of this observation in his travel log suggests something of the dilemma of cross-cultural relations on this early trade frontier. Given the circumstances — an African-Arab murdered while at prayer during the holy month of Ramadan by a drunken American sailor — the racial and religious differences of the Zanzibaris likely played some role in this killing. Beyond the circumstances of the murder itself, Americans and Zanzibaris in general — and Ward and the Sultan in particular — continued to misunder-

stand each other; where one saw black, the other likely saw white, if we may extend Osgood's observation. Through Zanzibari eyes, the devil appeared white and swaggering boisterously in the form of an American whalerman.¹⁰⁶

At the far reach of the US trade frontier, Charles Ward tried to smooth out these rifts in cross-cultural relations. He recognized that his role required a careful balance of maintaining happy diplomatic ties while simultaneously serving American commercial interests. The two realms of responsibility were not necessarily incompatible. "Ever since I came to Zanzibar my aim has been to use my official capacity so far as it can be done, without losing the confidence & respect of his Highness, to promote the welfare of American trade," admitted Ward.¹⁰⁷

Ward evidenced little of the piety of his predecessor Richard P. Waters who, on taking on consular duties in Zanzibar, offered "that my going to dwell with them for a season, may be the means of introducing the gospel of Christ to them... I desire to be made instrumental of good to that people. May the Lord increase this desire...."¹⁰⁸ Consul Waters made little complaint with the economic opportunities afforded him by his position: "I want money for my own sake, for my dear Mothers, Sisters & Brothers sake, and to do good with."¹⁰⁹ A Member of the Essex County [Massachusetts] Anti-slavery Society, the abolitionist Waters returned to Salem and served as director of the Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company.

Waters appeared little concerned with the inconsistencies in his life and ideological beliefs. His mill depended on the cheap supply of cotton from southern slave labor. While in Zanzibar, he carried on a vigorous proselytizing, handing out Arabic translations of the Bible and urging his Christian belief on the Zanzibaris. He seemed little bothered by the contradictory beliefs. This behavior earned him the antipathy of the locals and prompted the Sultan to write the US President, requesting his recall. Even the Salem merchants in residence in Zanzibar protested Waters' presence. "Our flag has been stoned while flying at the Consul-



"East Coast of Africa." Sterling Memorial Library, Map Collection, Yale University.

ate, Mr. Waters himself has been stoned in the street and flogged by slaves... This is a picture of our Consul, and what a picture," wrote merchant Edgar Botsford.¹¹⁰

When Ward took over the consulate four years later, he inherited a position already fraught with controversy. He served as a suitable counterpart to his puritan predecessor. He was staunchly anti-abolitionist, a Maine Democrat acceptable to the Polk Administration, and unlikely to agitate the slave issue in Zanzibar, where the trade underpinned the regional economy. However, while Ward did not mix his personal beliefs with his role as consul, he did face the challenge of reconciling the sometimes conflicting roles as commercial representative and government emissary. On the cutting edge of commercial Western expansion, he struggled to overcome his predecessor's example and to please two masters — the American merchants and his government.¹¹¹ Conflicts arising from different judicial practices exacerbated the

tensions.

The difficulty of language barriers also tested the relationship of the Sultan and consul. At this most basic level, the two officials failed to communicate. Working through interpreters and translators, the nuance of intonation, emphasis, and meaning was lost. This barrier frustrated the efforts by both parties to come to some accord regarding Shabet's case. Ward summarized the situation in a letter to the Secretary of State soon after the incident

Mr. S. R. Masury¹¹² an Am. Merchant took my notes to the Secretary of the Sultan to have them translated, & when he brought the last one back said, he had a good deal of difficulty in making him understand the meaning of some words, which was very important to a right understanding of the letter, & he very much doubted if any of my notes had been translated correctly...¹¹³

These confusions would mount in the years following the murder of Shabet. The memory of the unrequited killing lingered and heaped additional difficulties on American and Zanzibari relations during Consul Ward's four-year term.

Perhaps the "horrid deed" — Shabet's murder — was no more than the blind act of a drunken seaman on "liberty" after many months at sea. The story, however, did not end with Shabet's death. The aftermath of his killing suggests something more. Four years later, on 4 July 1850, the Sultan refused to salute publicly the US flag as promised. "The authorities here showed a contemptuous spirit towards the american government," merchant sailor Horace Putnam observed at the time.¹¹⁴ Failing to honor this pledge amounted to a public snubbing of the consul and the US mission there. After all, as Consul Ward complained, the Sultan had saluted the British and French on their national holidays. Ward demanded a written apology:

I considered that the sleight shown to our Government in so public a manner, and the bad impression it has given of our Government to the natives, ... constituted an offence, which justified me in hauling down the Flag....¹¹⁵

When the Sultan offered no formal apology, Ward angrily closed the consulate and left Zanzibar. Upon his return to Salem, he recommended to the Secretary of State that the government force an apology from the intransigent Zanzibaris and recover American honor.

The refusal to salute on the anniversary of American Independence stood as an anomaly in the otherwise uninterrupted tradition of salutes that formed an important aspect of national recognition and honor. Years earlier, the Sultan had not been so ungenerous with respect to firing salutes. Upon being informed of President Harrison's death in August 1841, the Sultan responded that he would "notice the solemn event on the following day by having his national ensign hoisted at half mast on

board of all ships of war in the harbor and that sixty eight minute guns (corresponding to the age of the illustrious dead) would be fired." Then-consul Richard Waters noted in a letter to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, "I feel it is my duty to say that these arrangements were executed in a manner highly grateful to American feeling."¹¹⁶ When the USS *John Adams* visited Zanzibar in September 1838, the commander ordered a twenty-one gun salute to the Sultan's flag, "which was returned with 20 guns." The logbook notes tersely, "Sent on board the [Sultan's] flagship to know the reason why it was not returned gun for gun. The commanding officer said he had fired 21 guns," one having misfired.¹¹⁷ The rules and customs of official salute drew meticulous attention. Omissions and mistakes in these customs carried an ominous significance and were almost always viewed as a public derision. When the Sultan failed to salute the American flag on 4 July 1850, Ward felt compelled to challenge this official slight. American chauvinism could not ignore such insult.

Had the refused salute arisen from the dispute over the reprieved murder four years earlier? Was this merely a "petty affair"?¹¹⁸ Participants in this drama constructed their own narrative; their story began with the killing of Shabet. Salem merchant Michael Shepard, writing to Charles Ward in October 1850 about the controversy surrounding the July 4 failure to salute the American flag, wrote, "We deeply lament that you should have thought it worthy of a representation to our government. It, in our view, makes too serious a matter of what appears to us a very trifling affair..."¹¹⁹ Shepard's direct interests lay in the preservation of trade relations. Disputes between governments over the recognition of flags seemed secondary to him. However, Ward, in his dual role representing both the interests of the merchants (as the agent of Shepard and Bertram) and the United States government, could not ignore so easily such "petty" slights. In his resignation letter, he emphasized this tension, suggesting that the United States "would greatly benefit by appointing a Consul with a salary, and prevent him from engaging in Mercantile business..."¹²⁰

Charles Ward, on his return to Salem, urged in a letter to the consular bureau of the State Department that "there is nothing so convincing to Mohamedans & Asiatics as a display of physical force...."¹²¹ Our Ships of War have been so seldom seen in the Sultan's dominions, that the natives think that we have no naval force." His language had begun to take on rather imperialistic dimensions, arguing to secure free trade through the threat or actual use of force.¹²² Ironically, such positions resulted not from a clearly articulated policy of intervention and gunboat diplomacy, but rather from a curious confusion of incidents — a murder, mistranslated letters, and a failed salute.

Ward's words also betray a latent racial theory, an "orientalism" that perceived these peoples to be particularly susceptible to displays of physical force. Such latent "orientalism" drew succor from a long culture of opposition between Christians and Muslims.¹²³ It gained strength from the perceived "backwardness" of the Arab-African "character." Ward's analysis, such as it was, shared an emergent understanding of "oriental" society with a more formal organization — the founding in 1842 of the American Oriental Society. Charles Pickering, related to the Society's first president John Pickering, visited Zanzibar in 1844, collecting information for his 1848 publication, *The Races of Man and their Geographic Distribution*.¹²⁴ Pickering decided that eleven separate races could be observed worldwide. Importantly, he insisted that these races existed separate from climate. His work left open the possibility that these races might constitute separate species. The fullest articulation of this theory was still a decade away.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, Ward's experience had led him to broach conclusions similar to those of his contemporaries. His thoughts on informal empire could hardly claim any rigid theoretical underpinning — racial or otherwise. His urgings to send a "ship of war" to the region arose from a mix of emotion and apparently petty disagreements.

One should not dismiss the grave importance attached to disrespect for the American flag. As Tocqueville observed of Americans

abroad, "Democratic institutions generally give men a grandiose opinion of their country and themselves.... The American leaves his country with a heart swollen with pride."¹²⁶ The antagonisms over the flag may have had as much to do with the peculiar American national psychology as with the enforcement of a clear imperial dictate.¹²⁷ While the Americans were no doubt keen on maintaining their exercise of free trade in the region, their notions of informal empire had hardly received careful articulation.

The controversy over the insult to the American flag, while it took on pretensions of a public and international drama, was rooted in the personal interactions between Ward and Seyyid Said. The visiting Salem merchant, Ephraim Emmerton, found Ward "a pleasant, sociable man in company & have been treated very politely by him during my stay, but I find that the natives dislike him very much & I think from what I gathered from them he would find it difficult to procure cargoes for his vessels if there was another house established there. They say he is watching them continually & has spies at the Custom House all the time taking account of all the imports."¹²⁸ The Sultan's son, Khalid, noted that Zanzibar was not responsible for the conflict: "I assure you we never treated him badly, but Mr. Ward by his hot feeling, he did this."¹²⁹ The merchants believed that "we think that the first cause of the difficulty between His Highness and Mr. Ward arose from a misunderstanding of the message sent by His Highness to Mr. Ward. His Highness protests, that no intentional insult was offered... from long personal acquaintance with His Highness, We believe him incapable of ever offering an intentional insult to our Country's flag."¹³⁰ They stopped short of open criticism of the consul's deportment, but the letter suggested that Ward's "hot feeling" and overreaction lay at the heart of the matter.

Horace Putnam wrote in his journal at this time that the Sultan's difficulties with Ward were personal, and not leveled at Americans in general. Describing an American whaleship that "struck fast a shole abreast of the King's



"Africa." Sterling Memorial Library, Map Collection, Yale University.

house," he noted that the Sultan, "saw her in this perilous situation and went aboard of her in person and offered what assistance he could... I note this to show what good feeling exist between him and the Americans...."¹³¹

The short history of Charles Ward's tenure as consul, the accumulation of particular and troubling incidents suggest a chronology of unintentional conflict. Each incident compounded the difficulties and commingled in diverse ways to render a situation that became increasingly intractable. Ward, recovering in New England after his four year stint in Zanzibar, pushed for some resolution. The United States gave him satisfaction on this request.

In December 1851, the sidewheel steamer USS *Susquehanna*, en route to opening trade relations with Japan — one of Commodore Perry's "black ships" — steamed into Zanzibar harbor, running against the north flowing current, "as strong as a tide in a river."¹³² Zanzibar is on the waterfront, well acquainted with the

rule of the wind, would have been struck as much by the fact of a vessel moving against the wind and current as by the tremendous size of the American man-of-war, belching huge puffs of black smoke and churning white water with its great paddewheels amidships. Once at anchor, the frigate refused to salute the red Arab flag according to custom, "but maintained a dogged silence."¹³³ "The natives," according to one observer, "began to look frightened, and expected from her a "broadside." Commander John Aulick "insisted upon his [the Sultan's] saluting first as an atonement for past omissions to fire salutes when they were due to our flag." Aulick stated, "I made these terms my *sine qua non*."¹³⁴

Four months earlier, sloop-of-war USS *Dale* bombarded the fort at the nearby port of Johanna. John Webb, then in Zanzibar, wrote to Ward of this attack: "I hear the US Ship *Dale* has been to Johanna & blown an old fort down & told the King he must be a good boy." The

Zanzibaris certainly weighed this action when considering the threatening *Susquehanna*, 250 feet in length, displacing 3,824 tons (the Sultan's largest vessel displaced only 1,000 tons),¹³⁵ with 31-foot paddlewheels fixed amidships, and twelve nine-inch cannons.¹³⁶ Andrew Foote, lieutenant commander of another vessel in the Africa Squadron, noting "the sensitiveness with which the rights of the flag are regarded," wrote on the usefulness of gunboats to secure this respect. "Cruisers are the nation's fortresses abroad, employed for the benefit of her citizens and the security of their commerce..."¹³⁷ While the *Susquehanna* lay in port, Aulick allowed Zanzibaris to visit the ship. The Salem merchants in Zanzibar believed that Aulick "had extraordinary powers granted to him and he would have liked to have bombarded the town right well."

Aulick's specific instructions suggest a considerable degree of latitude with respect to achieving the mission's goals: "The President trusts that no unfriendly measures may be necessary; and that the Sultan will give such assurances as this Government justly demands and will insist on receiving."¹³⁸ Given the situation, the merchants felt "there was no alternative for him [the Sultan's governor] to fire the salute of 21 guns, or have the town fired upon."¹³⁹ Although the town was fortified "by a large towery castle, which faces the harbor. A parapet, mounted with a row of good artillery"... "So ruinously conditioned, however, is the fort, that a few well directed broadsides from a ship of war would destroy the whole structure."¹⁴⁰ The *Liwali* (presiding governor) — the Sultan was then visiting Oman — acceded to the US commander's wishes and fired the required salute.

Following the twenty-one gun salute, Aulick appointed a new consul. Two days later, 7 December, the Sultan's governor resisted the Americans' request for a second round of salutes. When the "American ensign was run up [at the consulate], he [the Sultan's governor] was told to salute it with 12 guns!" at this demand, he manifested a disposition not to comply; but the commodore was determined, and it had to be done. He told him that if he did

not salute the consulate he should 'salute him with a broadside of shell and round shot.' By this time the Arabs began to think the Yankees were somebody and acted accordingly..."¹⁴¹ Consul Ward's brother Francis, then in residence in Zanzibar, wrote to his brother, "I think the sending of the Frigate here has had a salutary effect upon the natives. She was crowded with people from the time of her arrival to her departure. They say that it must be a very strong government that can own such vessels and run at such great expense and all for the purpose of protecting the commerce of the Americans."¹⁴² The gunboat had the desired affect, threatening violence without having to deliver.

It might appear to be making something of a stretch to connect two separate incidents — Shabet's murder and the visit and threatened bombardment by the *Susquehanna*. Such a neat tie would be entirely unwarranted if the participants had not made such a connection themselves. In the minds of the American merchants and the Sultan, Shabet's killing lingered. The Salem merchants, writing in thanks to Commander Aulick, cited the murder in their letter: "The trial of the American sailor for the murder was not considered a fair one by his highness: the man having admitted his guilt, and this being considered sufficient to condemn him by the Mohamedan law."¹⁴³ Secretary of State Daniel Webster's brief letter of instruction to Aulick referred specifically to the "alleged murder of an Arab," directing Aulick that "You will inform his Highness, that under no circumstances the President cannot for a moment admit that he [the Sultan] has any claim whatever..."¹⁴⁴ Shabet's murder and the failed salute were part of the same narrative. The participants in this drama gave their actions meaning by building a story around the visit of the *Susquehanna*.

What then are we to make of this narrative? We might understand this conflict between different "races" as simply racial conflict. In the year 1846, one could imagine American racism as inevitably dominant, undergirded by

a scientific racial ideology. By the 1840s and 1850s, according to historian George Fredrickson, the accepted view in scientific and intellectual circles was "that races of mankind had been separately created as distinct and unequal species."¹⁴⁵ The narrative of murder and threatened bombardment might support such a conclusion. On the other side of the world, however, outside the accustomed power alignments of antebellum America, race was not the ultimate arbiter of Americans' behavior. American sailors, merchants and consuls — neither scientific nor intellectual, and working daily in racially-mixed environments — lived in a more complicated world in which "race" clearly played a role, but was not decisive.

Should we then recognize in this trajectory from a single murder to gunboat diplomacy the expression of American imperialism?¹⁴⁶ To be sure, the cruise of the *Susquehanna*, with a later lengthy cruise up the Yangtze River to Nanking and culminating with Perry's steaming into Tokyo Bay in 1853, revealed the clear intentions of American interests abroad; however, it would be wrong to assume that the warship's enforcement of American honor evolved out of clear intentions and carefully laid imperial designs. After all, Commander Aulick's demands emerged out of a complicated set of relations, beginning with the murder by a rogue seaman. Consul Ward acted initially to placate the Sultan's demand for justice, turning the affair over to an Islamic court. Ward's response to this situation revealed a complicated and often confused mix of motives and emotions, where conflicts between "races" and nations may be seen outside the blinders of racial conflict or imperial destiny.

The issue of extraterritoriality, the extension of US sovereignty over its citizens in Zanzibar, may help us to recognize this contingency. Extraterritoriality has been raised traditionally as a prime example of Western imperialism. As early as January 1842, the Sultan had posed stipulations in the treatment of Americans under local law. In correspondence to the Secretary of State at that time, the Sultan ex-

pressed his "wishes that in cases when disputes or disagreements take place between one of his subjects and an American, that it be settled by his own laws (the *Shari'a*, or Islamic law), in the presence of the American consul."¹⁴⁷ This was precisely the course of action that Consul Charles Ward followed four years later, when confronting the murder of Shabet. The Sultan had likely misinterpreted the terms of the treaty — which guaranteed to the United States authority over disputes *between* Americans and immunity of the Consul and "his house" from prosecution under local law.¹⁴⁸

Confusion and misinterpretation reigned. The Omani translator of the 1833 treaty altered the Arabic text to give local courts absolute jurisdiction. Thus, during the years of dispute between the first US consuls and the Sultan, the disputants contested their positions from the language of two *different* treaties. Seyyid Said's Arabic copy of the treaty read, "If there shall be a dispute between them [the Americans] and the Arabs, judgment shall be given by the Arabs."¹⁴⁹ With the killing of Shabet and in the absence of a clear precedent, Seyyid Said determined that, "what has taken place has never happened before — now whatever *you* [the consul] *may agree upon* shall be established as custom."¹⁵⁰ As a diplomatic courtesy, the Sultan gave Ward the freedom to choose. He likely thought that the consul would follow the treaty. So it was that in 1846, with the protection of the American sailor, the United States established *de facto* extraterritorial rights in criminal cases involving disputes between Americans and Zanzibaris.

These rights would become *de jure* after 1861, when Muscat and Zanzibar split, each becoming separate nations.¹⁵¹ In the Consular Act of 1860, the US Congress sought to extend the right of extraterritoriality without qualification to China, Japan, Siam, and to all other countries "not inhabited by any civilized people...." (In fact, the US already enjoyed substantial extraterritorial protections in these countries.)¹⁵² The Zanzibar treaty underwent review in 1864 and 1879, remaining unchanged until in 1886 when the two nations agreed on a new treaty granting the United States the rights

of most favored nation.¹⁵³ The United States had, of course enjoyed most favored nation status since the visit of the *Susquehanna*.¹⁵⁴ Not until 1907 did the US end its extraterritorial rights in Zanzibar.¹⁵⁵

In fact, the difference between the two treaties went unrecognized until 1910, when a US State Department linguist compared the English and Arabic versions of the treaties. The extraterritoriality provisions of the original treaty (which still maintained relations with Oman) were finally removed in 1959, "abdicating the last extra-territorial rights enjoyed by the US anywhere in the world."¹⁵⁶ Given these confusions, there seems little wonder that the relationship between the Sultan and the consul was fraught with tension.

This curious treaty, made with a minor trading partner in an area of the world which would diminish in US diplomatic importance during the late nineteenth century, might seem unimportant alongside other events.¹⁵⁷ However, the treaty with Zanzibar, first negotiated by Edmund Roberts in 1833, stood as an outline for much of the treaty writing that followed — British and later French treaties insisted on extraterritorial provisions and Americans used the 1833 treaty when drafting later agreements with China and Japan.¹⁵⁸ Secretary of State Daniel Webster's letter of instruction to Commander John Aulick, Special Agent to Japan, granted the commodore the "full power to negotiate and sign a treaty of Amity and Commerce," with Japan. Webster recognized the value of the earlier treaties: "I transmit... copies of the treaty between the United States and China, with Siam and with Muscat [Zanzibar], which may to a certain extent, be of use to you as precedents..." Aulick did not have the opportunity to put these precedents to work in the opening of relations with Japan; he was replaced by Commodore Perry. When Perry steamed the *Susquehanna* into Japanese waters, he certainly carried his flagship's history with him. The incidents in Zanzibar, though mere ripples in the wider influence of US interests abroad, nonetheless affected changes almost imperceptibly.

The practice of extraterritoriality was

scripted most clearly not in the original treaty, but in practice, and specifically in the judgments emerging out of the murder of Shabet. If we follow this narrative carefully, we may see that this practice emerged out of a circuitous and in many ways unintentional pattern of actions. As the story moves from the level of individual conflict with Shabet's murder to the level of international conflict, we can witness the relationship between small events and their sometimes larger consequences. By following the various threads of this narrative, we may observe more precisely the contingency that often governs events, where individuals often act in response to a number of motives.

How, then, does such a reading of actual contingency mesh with the interpretation privileged by knowledge of the eventual outcome of overt imperialism, if not in Zanzibar and East Africa, then certainly elsewhere? But if we begin our analyses by assuming the presence of imperial ideologies, then we threaten to circumscribe our understanding with a pre-formed essentialism. I do not dispute imperialist intentions; they certainly existed. One would be hard pressed to suggest that in the year 1846, while engaged in a war of expansion against Mexico, the United States was anything less than imperialist in its continental territorial designs. In this case of Shabet, however, these intentions were not as ironclad and "intentional" as the eventual outcomes suggest. Contingency ruled where ideology had yet to chart the waters. In this story's trajectory, there can be no simple retelling of the control by Westerners over others. Instead, we may see multiple and overlapping contests, where the historical actors refuse containment within any one analytic frame. The consul, the Sultan, and the sailors were neither completely free and rational actors nor puppeted products of social forces that they only dimly understood. They strode, flesh and bone, across the beach at Zanzibar, somewhere in between, illuminating history's haze with the glow of their stories. Reconstructing this history we may observe the entangled allegiances of class, nation, race,

religion, culture, and personality that commingled and produced particular outcomes. By focusing on the particulars, we may recognize how an imperialist form like extraterritoriality

emerged out of the contingent play of historical opportunities, amongst diverse groups of sailors, diplomats, merchants, customs agents, and governments.¹⁵⁹



NOTES

1. Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness and The Secret Sharer* (1910, New York: Signet, 1983), 68.
2. Ray Brighton, *Port of Portsmouth Ships and the Cotton Trade, 1783–1829* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1986), 169–175.
3. Gaddis Smith writes of the potential for the maritime perspective: “there is not a single or predominant theme for maritime history.” “Agricultural Roots of Maritime History,” *American Neptune* 44:1, Winter 1984, 5. “The Sea Connects All Things,” writes Smith of the promise of maritime history to overcome the blinkers of landbound national history writing and narrow historical specialization.
4. Greg Dening, *History’s Anthropology: The Death of William Gooch* (New York: University Press of America, 1988), 5.
5. Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches: Discourses on a Silent Land, Marquesas, 1774–1880* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 159.
6. According to Michael Doyle, “Empire is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire.” *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 45.
7. Record Group 59 (Records of the United States State Department), Microfilm 468 — Despatches from United States Consuls, Zanzibar, National Archives, Wash. DC.; *The Journal of Ezra Goodnough*, Ann Parry, 1845–48, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Massachusetts; manuscript collections/correspondence of Charles Ward and Michael Shepard at the Peabody provide the principal source material for a reconstruction of the events.
8. Ritual repetition asserts a certain timelessness. The Islamic prayer recitation and ritual posture has changed little since the seventh century.
9. *Third Primer of Islam, Salah* (Nairobi, Kenya: Islamic Foundation, 1985), 6–11; Kenneth Cragg, *The House of Islam* (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub., 1975, 57–64.
10. The ethnic character of this society requires more explanation than is possible here. A long historical tradition attributed East African commercial and urban cultural expansion to Arab influences, while diminishing the role of African resource production and Swahili African roots. This tradition has been overturned by revisionists who have stressed the African cultural roots of coastal society. For persuasive treatments of the polyglot character of this region’s history see the work of James de Vere Allen; Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, *The Swahili: Reconstructing the History and Language of an African Society* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); Jonathon Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1995), especially 32–38.
11. Geoffrey Henry Shelwell-White, *A Guide to Zanzibar; A Detailed Account of Zanzibar, Town and Island, including general information about the Protectorate, and a Description of Itineraries for the Use of Visitors* (Zanzibar: Government Printer, 1949), 40.
12. Abdul Sheriff, ed., *The History and Conservation of Zanzibar Stone Town* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995).
13. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Deposition: Zanzibar, John Lambert, Master of the Brig *Cherokee*, 1 September 1846; Deposition: Zanzibar, Consul Charles Ward, 5 September 1846, National Archives, Washington, DC.
14. William John Hopkins, *She Blows! And Sparm at That* (Boston: 1922), 229.
15. Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 97.
16. Horace Putnam, *Journal, Zanzibar*, 6 July 1847, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.
17. J. Ross Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise, with notes of a Sojourn on the Island of Zanzibar* (1846, Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 380.

18. Horace Putnam, *Journal*, 6 July 1847.
19. Michael Shepard, *Account of a visit to Zanzibar, 1844*; Ms bound in the log of the bark *Starr*, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.
20. Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise*, 368.
21. Shepard, 1844, *Logbook Starr*.
22. Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise*, 369.
23. Joseph Barlow Felt Osgood, *Notes of Travel or Recollections of Majunga, Zanzibar, Muscat, Aden, Mocha, and Other Eastern Ports* (Salem: Ives and Pease, 1854), 21.
24. Sandwith Drinker, *A Private Journal of Events and Scenes at Sea and in India* (Boston: Private publication by Suzanne Drinker Moran, 1990), 14 December 1840, 99.
25. Putnam, *Journal*, *Zanzibar*, 6 July 1847.
26. Osgood, *Notes of Travel*, 50.
27. Richard P. Waters, *Journal*, 22 February 1837, printed in Norman R. Bennett and George E. Brooks, *New England Merchants in Africa: A History through Documents, 1802–1865* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1965) 192. While Waters was reflecting on the loading of a slave dhow in Mozambique at the time, the question held for his later experience as consul in Zanzibar.
28. When the “class-dressing” whaleman J. Ross Browne grew tired of the harsh regime of shipboard life, he jumped ship in Zanzibar and paid for a substitution. Browne had spent pages criticizing the racial and ethnic character of his shipmates and shoreside peers. When it came time to find a replacement, he turned to a black man with little thought to the irony and contradiction posed by replacing his white self with his black other.
29. Abdul Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987).
30. British intervention in the successional dispute amongst Seyyid’s sons following his death in 1856 led to stronger Busaidi-British ties.
31. RG 59, Charles Ward to Secretary of State J. M. Clayton, July 1850.
32. Richard F. Burton, *Zanzibar City* 1 (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872), 484.
33. Letter, B. F. Fabens to Michael Shepard, 29 August 1844; Michael Shepard papers, MH 23, MSS 12, folder 7.
34. *Drinker, A Private Journal*, 14 November 1840, 88–89.
35. *Drinker, A Private Journal*, 14 December 1840, 100.
36. Horace Putnam, *Journal*, “Notes from a visit to Zanzibar aboard the Cherokee from Salem,” MS M656, 1847C3, 6 July 1847, Peabody Essex Museum.
37. Herman Melville, “The ‘Gees’,” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*, 12:7, March 1856. Published anonymously. One must be careful with this essay. In it Melville satirizes scientific racism.
38. Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches: Discourses on a Silent Land, Marquesas, 1774–1880* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 159. I rely upon Dening’s compelling analysis of the violence of sailors: “In an institution such as a ship, where all was depersonalized, violence was easy and constant. The boundary around all on the ship also made violence easy against an outsider. The careless violence of seamen to islanders was consistent with their violence towards one another, but it was magnified by the sense of ‘we’ and ‘they’ that all the systems of conformity of a ship created. Seamen might rationalize their violence towards the islanders in terms of racial and cultural superiority...”
39. Given the racial epithet — “the ‘Gees’” — satirized by Melville, it should come as no surprise that it was a Portuguese sailor who testified against his shipboard peers. Melville noted that the term “‘Gee’” was “an abbreviation... the corrupt form of Portuguese. As the name is a curtailment, so the race is a residuum.”
40. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Deposition of Charles Ward, 5 September 1846, National Archives Washington, DC.
41. Willits D. Ansel, *The Whaleboat: A Study of Design, Construction, and Use from 1850 to 1970* (Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1983), 16–29.
42. Nightfall in the tropics comes quickly and the *Maghrib* prayers were timed with the sunset. The anchorage in Zanzibar harbor would position vessels with the setting sun directly behind. It was typical to raise a light while at anchor. These practices are followed to this day. August came at the end of the southwest monsoon (*kusi* in Kiswahili), which blows consistently from April through October. Richard Burton, in *Zanzibar City*, notes the seasonal variations in wind and temperature for 1858 (427–428, 449).
43. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Deposition: Captain John Lambert, 2 September 1846.
44. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, John Lambert to Charles Ward, 1 September 1846.
45. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Deposition: Captain John Lambert, 1 September 1846.
46. Putnam, *Journal*, 25 April 1847.
47. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Deposition: Abel Perry, 2 September 1846.
48. Ezra Goodnough, *Journal*, bark *Ann Parry*, 30 August 1845, no. 51, Catalog no. 140, Reel 4, Peabody Essex Museum.
49. Briton Cooper Busch, “*Whaling Will Never Do for Me*”: *The American Whaleman in the Nine-*

- teenth Century (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 85.
50. *Drinker, A Private Journal*, 7 December 1840, 94.
 51. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Letter, Charles Ward to Sultan Seyyid Said, 1 September 1846.
 52. Osgood, *Notes of Travel*, 41; Randall Pouwels in his study of Islam on the East African coast, *Horn and Crescent: Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800–1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) writes: “qadis who lived off gifts received in deciding cases usually were accused of bribery by European observers who failed to understand the dynamics of town social structure and how they bore on the implementation of religious law (81).”
 53. Pouwels, *Horn and Crescent*, 82.
 54. Osgood, *Notes of Travel*, 41.
 55. Letter, Charles Ward to US Secretary of State James Buchanan, 14 September 1846, Ward Papers, Peabody Essex Museum.
 56. Browne, *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise*, 406.
 57. Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1941), 669–672.
 58. Charles Stuart Kennedy, *The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776–1914* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990), viii.
 59. Pouwels, *Horn and Crescent*, 81.
 60. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Ward to Buchanan, September 14, 1846.
 61. Pouwels, *Horn and Crescent*, 81–82.
 62. RG 59, M 468, R 1, Letter, Ward to Buchanan, 6 March 1847.
 63. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Ward to Buchanan, 14 September 1846.
 64. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Charles Ward to Sultan Seyyid Said, 2 September 1846.
 65. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Ward to Buchanan, 14 September 1846.
 66. RG 59, M 468, R 1, Ward to Buchanan, 14 September 1846.
 67. RG 59, M 468, R 1, Ward to Buchanan, 14 September 1846.
 68. *Drinker, A Private Journal*, 14 December 1840, 101.
 69. Ibid.
 70. RG 59, Ward to Buchanan, 15 May 1846.
 71. Charles Stuart Kennedy, *The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776–1914* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990), 107–8; Foster Rhea Dulles, *China and America: The Story of their Relations Since 1784* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), 15.
 72. Kennedy, *The American Consul*, 110; Dulles, *China and America*, 28.
 73. On the nineteenth century legality of self defense, see Richard Maxwell Brown’s *No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
 74. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, J. P. Mayer, ed. (1848, New York: Harper-Perennial, 1988), 617.
 75. Horace B. Putnam, *Journal*, bark Emily Wilder, June 1847, Peabody Essex Museum, M 91, Reel 34.
 76. Dennett is the correct spelling of this Portsmouth, New Hampshire, captain’s name.
 77. Ezra Goodnough, *Journal*, 2 March 1847.
 78. Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, 106.
 79. Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 89; Robert K. Barnhart, *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1995).
 80. “Seamen were sometimes willing to extend their protests beyond slowdowns or false efforts, to outright refusals to work. Mutinous work stoppages were not uncommon on whalers, and they often led to arbitration that was handled quickly and informally.” Margaret Creighton, *Rites and Passages: The Experience of American Whaling, 1830–1870* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 130.
 81. Goodnough, *Journal*, 3 September 1846.
 82. R G59, M 468, Reel 1, Trail transcript, 5 January 1848.
 83. Planters in the southern United States “instructed their overseers to give twenty lashes for ordinary offenses and thirty-nine for the more serious ones....” Eugene Genovese, *Roll Jordan Roll* (New York: Vintage Books, 1976) 65.
 84. Creighton, *Rites and Passages*, 132.
 85. Goodnough, *Journal*, 19 October 1846.
 86. Richard Henry Dana, *The Seaman’s Friend* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1844). Quoted in Creighton (133) from Bruce Nelson, *Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 12–13.
 87. Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, 101.
 88. Joseph Blunt, *The Shipmaster’s Assistant and Commercial Digest* (New York: E. & G. W. Blunt, 1837).
 89. Dening, *Islands and Beaches*, 158–159.
 90. Elmo Paul Hohman, *The American Whalemen: A Study of Life and Labor in the Whaling Industry* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928), 5; Busch, *Whaling Will Never Do for Me*, 3.
 91. Richard Burton’s observations, noted in John Gray, *History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 1856* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) 197; Maury Whaling Chart, Series F,

- 1850, Map Reference Room, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.
92. Browne, *Etchings from a Whaling Cruise*, 556.
 93. Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or, The Whale* (1851, New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 205.
 94. Peter Duignan, *The United States and Africa: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 59.
 95. *Journal of Ezra Goodnough*, Ann Parry, no. 51, catalog 140, reel 4, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.
 96. RG 59, William McMullan to William L. Marcy, 21 January 1854.
 97. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, R. P. Waters, Circular, 16 March 1843.
 98. Bennett, *New England Merchants in Africa: A History through Documents, 1802–1865*, 371.
 99. Dening, *Islands and Beaches*, 158.
 100. RG 59, M 468, T 100, R 1, Sultan Seyyid Said to the President of the United States, 9 August 1846.
 101. Goodnough, *Journal*.
 102. W. J. Mammsen and J. A. de Moor, *European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in the 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia* (New York: Berg Publishers, 1992), 3.
 103. Jorg Fisch, "Law as a Means and as an End: Some Remarks on the function of European and Non-European Law in the Process of European Expansion," in Mammsen and de Moor, *European Expansion and Law*, 22.
 104. Fisch, *European Expansion and Law*, 23.
 105. Osgood, *Notes of Travel*, 28.
 106. It should be noted that Africans and African-Americans served aboard American vessels. The nineteenth century records invariably documented the "race" of individuals of African heritage. Neither seaman Wright nor his comrades were identified as "black."
 107. Charles Ward to Michael Shepard, 13 June 1846, Ward Papers, Peabody Essex Museum.
 108. Richard P. Waters, *Journal*, 1 January 1837, reprinted in Bennett, 189.
 109. Waters, *Journal*, 10 June 1837, reprinted in Bennett, 199.
 110. RG 59, M 468, R 1, Edgar Botsford to Henry P. Marshall, 24 September 1842.
 111. Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-cultural Trade in World History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 245.
 112. Salem merchant Samuel Masury published *A Vocabulary of the Soahli Language*, the earliest of its kind, in 1845.
 113. RG 59, Ward to Buchanan, 14 September 1846.
 114. Putnam, *Journal*, ms 656.
 115. RG 59, Charles Ward to Secretary of State John M. Clayton, 13 July 1850.
 116. RG 59, Consul Richard Waters to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, 26 August 1841.
 117. Log, USS *John Adams*, 12 September 1838, National Archives, Washington, DC.
 118. Reginald Coupland, in *East Africa and Its Invaders*(381), dismisses the incident as insignificant.
 119. Michael Shepard to Charles Ward, 31 October 1850, Michael Shepard Papers.
 120. RG 59, Ward to Clayton, 13 July 1850.
 121. RG 59, Charles Ward to George Abbot, 13 March 1851.
 122. John Gallagher and Roger Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 6, 1953, 1–15.
 123. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 201–208.
 124. Charles Pickering, *The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution* (1849).
 125. Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 330.
 126. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 569.
 127. The Americans were by no means particularly susceptible to presumed insults to the flag. British treaty writing often assumed "the British colours to be sacred." The Maori attacks on British colonial holdings in New Zealand in 1845 were directed specifically at the Union Jack. Hono Heke, the Maori leader, certainly recognized the symbolic importance of the flag and the first British act upon reestablishing control was "to hoist the Union Jack on the beach." Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 60–62.
 128. Ephraim A. Emmerton, *Journal, A Visit to East Africa*, ms M 656 1848S4, Peabody Essex Museum.
 129. Gray, *History of Zanzibar*, 223.
 130. RG 89, M 89, R 1, Vol. 6, Squadron Letters, East India Squadron, Resident merchants in Zanzibar: Webb, Jelly, and Masury to John Aulick, 5 December 1851.
 131. Putnam, *Journal, Zanzibar*, December 1847.
 132. Log of the USS *Susquehanna*, 5 December 1851, National Archive, Wash. DC; Sandwith Drinker, *Journal*, 7 December 1840.
 133. Horace Putnam, *Journal*, "A visit to Eastern Africa on the Salem Bark Emily Wilder," M656, E1849, Peabody Essex Museum.
 134. RG 49, M 89, R 6, Vol. 6, 237, *Squadron Letters*, John Aulick, 8 December 1851, National Archives, Washington, DC.
 135. Horace Putnam, *Journal*, "Notes from a visit to Zanzibar aboard the Cherokee from Salem," MS M 656 1847C3, Peabody Essex Museum.
 136. Logbook, USS *Dale*, 6 August 1851, National Archives, Washington, DC.; John F. Webb to

- Charles Ward, 27 September 1851 (in Bennett, 487).
137. Andrew H. Foote, *Africa and the American Flag* (New York: 1854), 379.
 138. RG 59, *Consular Instructions* 14, Webster to Aulick, 9 May 1851, 159.
 139. Francis Ward to Charles Ward, 18 December 1851; Ward Papers, reprinted in Bennett, 291; Frank M. Bennett, *The Steam Navy of the United States* (1896, reprint Westport, Conn., 1974).
 140. Osgood, *Notes of Travel*, 27.
 141. Log, USS Steam Frigate *Susquehanna*, 5–7 December 1851; *Journal*, Horace Putnam, M 656.
 142. Francis Ward to Charles Ward, 18 December 1851, reprinted in Bennett, 490.
 143. RG 89, Squadron Letters, Webb, Jelly and Masury to John Aulick, Letter dated 5 December 1851.
 144. RG 59, Consular Correspondence, 1785–1906, *Instructions to Consular Officers*, Consular Instructions, Vol. 14, 157, Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to John Aulick, 9 May 1851, National Archives, Washington, DC.
 145. George Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971; Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1987 (paper)), 74.
 146. In using the term “imperialism,” I want to be quite clear about the meaning implied, for, as Patrick Wolfe wrote recently, “Imperialism resembles Darwinism, in that many use the term but few can say what it really means (Patrick Wolfe, “History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism,” *American Historical Review*, 102:2, April 1997).” See footnote 6 on page 2 of this essay for Michael Doyle’s definition of imperial practice, upon which I rely.
 147. RG 59 M 468, T 100, R 1, Andrew Ward correspondence.
 148. Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and other International Acts of the United States of America*, Washington: 1931–1948, III, 789–810.
 149. Miller, *Treaties*, 789–810.
 150. RG 59, M 468, R 1, Letter, Seyyid Said to Charles Ward, 3 September 1846.
 151. “U.S. Yields Sultanate Right,” *New York Times*, Monday, 4 May 1959. The article noted that the Senate confirmed a new treaty with Muscat and Oman, replacing the 1833 treaty, “one of the oldest still in effect, and abdicated the last extra-territorial rights enjoyed by US anywhere in the world.”
 152. Chester Lloyd Jones, “The Consular Service of the United States: Its History and Activities,” *Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Series in Political Economy and Public Law* 18 (Philadelphia, 1906) 54.
 153. Jones, “*The Consular Service of the United States*,” 54–56.
 154. Francis N. Ward to Charles Ward, 18 December 1851; Francis Ward elaborated, “Commodore Aulick demanded and received from Said Khalid a letter in which he pledged his word, that the American Consul should receive all the honors and privileges which are granted to England and France...”
 155. Norman R. Bennett, “Americans in Zanzibar: 1865–1915,” *Essex Institute Historical Collections* 15, 61.
 156. See comparison of the English and Arabic text of the treaty with Seyyid Said of Muscat and Zanzibar in David Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* III, Document 77, 789–810; “U.S. Yields Sultanate Right,” *New York Times*, Monday, 4 May 1959. The article noted that the Senate had just confirmed a new treaty with Muscat and Oman, replacing the 1833 treaty.
 157. Even at its peak, trade with Zanzibar amounted to no more than two percent of the US total. Cyrus Townsend Brady, Jr., *Conquest and Commerce in East Africa* (Salem, Mass.: Essex Institute, 1950), 116.
 158. RG 59, M 77, R 152, Special Missions 1, 10 June, 1851, 321, National Archives, Washington, DC.
 159. “...Western thought struggles to comprehend the history of contingent events that it makes for itself by invoking underlying forces or structures, such as those of production or mentalite....” Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 58. Eric Wolf emphasizes this point in *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982): “By turning names into things we create false models of reality. By endowing nations, societies, or cultures with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded objects, we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls... In this way a quintessential West is counterposed to an equally quintessential East, where life was cheap and slavish multitudes groveled under a variety of despotisms...(6).”

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US REVENUE CUTTERS CAPTURED IN THE WAR OF 1812

WILLIAM R. WELLS, II

United States Revenue Cutter Service participation in the War of 1812 has been portrayed as a series of briefly cited, romanticized, and largely incomplete recitations. In general, all previous works on this subject present a largely erroneous and imbalanced image of the service, especially of the captured cutters, that perpetuates errors and inaccuracies into future text.

Two years before Theodore Roosevelt published his book on the War of 1812, Captain (then First Lieutenant) Horatio D. Smith, USRCS, wrote articles about the USRCS for *United Service Magazine*.¹ In 1932, Rear Admiral Elliot Snow, US Navy (CC),² compiled Smith's surviving notes into a single book that became the guidon for all future study of the RCS. Smith encouraged further research into Revenue Cutter Service history "to obtain the weather gauge down to the moment of the enemy striking his colors." However, he did not expect or wish his initial work to be perpetuated deep into the next century, nor to become the final authority. He expected the future to produce a historian who would take his work and expand it. Nevertheless, successive works continue to echo Smith's brief descriptions of the actions and vessels.

The first captured in the war was the tops'le schooner revenue cutter *Commodore Barry*, the most unheralded of all the captured cutters. By chance of geography, she was the first captured,

but not necessarily the easiest. She cost more in British lives than all the other captured revenue cutters combined. Although the defense of the *Commodore Barry* ranks among the most heroic defenses of the war, it remains an elusive subject.

Captured 3 August 1812 near Eastport, Maine, the *Commodore Barry* was caught up in a British naval campaign to clean out the American privateers that British citizens complained were "swarming around our coast, and in the Bay of Fundy; hardly a day passes but hear of captures made by them."³ The British fleet struck hard at the Americans, sweeping the Maine coast in a series of easy "victories."

Two days before *Commodore Barry*'s capture, the HMS *Spartan*, and possibly HMS sloop *Indian*, sent one boat of about forty men to seize two American privateers lying in Haycock's Harbor (perhaps the current Johnson Cove) near Quoddy [Village], Maine.⁴ The privateers, *Mars* and *Morning Star*, alerted to the attack, fired into the British barges, killing or wounding an estimated twenty men.⁵ The Hallowell, Maine, *American Advocate* reported a letter from Eastport loosely describing the action. The *American Advocate* initially doubted the letter's depiction because of its vagueness, as well as the statement "allowance must be made for customary exaggeration." A Royal Marine deserter, still allowing for exaggeration, claimed that British casualties numbered thirty killed or wounded, at least partially confirming British losses. Whatever the true number, HMS *Spartan* learned a powerful lesson, then sent ten boats with an estimated two hundred men to take and burn the same privateers.

Two miles west of this battle, four and a

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QW 280 Commodore Barry. This English watercolor by Louis Bevan shows the revenue cutter *Commodore Barry* being assaulted by boats from the Maidstone. It appears that Bevan mistakenly painted the cutter as a sloop rig. The cutter was actually drawn up on shore, and it is doubtful if the crewmen remaining on board put up any resistance to the British boarding party. Illustrations courtesy of The Mariners' Museum, Newport News, Virginia.

half miles from Eastport, the *Commodore Barry*, Captain Daniel Elliot,⁶ and the Gloucester privateer *Madison*, Captain Elwell, as well as the privateers *Olive* and *Spruce* lay at anchor in the Little River. Both captains received news of captures. Having no escape route, they hauled their respective vessels on shore (or into the shallows), removed what guns they could, and hastily built a "battery of cord wood" on shore.⁷

The British attacked the three privateers, the revenue cutter, and the temporary fort with five barges containing about 250 men from HMS *Indian*, *Plumper*, *Spartan*, and *Maidstone*.⁸ The local community heard heavy gunfire for about two hours before the British overwhelmed the Americans, who had probably run short of ammunition. Although unlisted, British casualties occurred. The Americans

"took to the woods" to avoid capture; however, not all of the *Commodore Barry*'s men escaped. Presumably remaining on board *Commodore Barry* were seamen Daniel Marshall, Charles Woodward, and William Babson. They remained prisoners until paroled in June 1813. During September 1812, Marshall and Woodward served as part of the crew "to navigate" the captured schooner *Fortune*.⁹

Following the American's flight, Captain Jaheel Brenton of the *Spartan* sent "a detachment of 10 Marines" to secure the cutter. He returned, bringing out the "Commodore Berry Revenue Cutter of 6 Guns,"¹⁰ although pierced for ten guns. There was no mention of capturing any of the guns taken ashore. In all, it was a busy summer for the British fleet. From 18 June to 14 August 1812, it captured the United States brig *Nautilus*, thirteen privateers, one Revenue

cutter, fifteen ships, four brigs, ten schooners, and one sloop.

Although the details of her capture are virtually unnoticed in contemporary Coast Guard histories, the *Commodore Barry* has caused some confusion in previous accounts. Howard I. Chapelle, in *The History of American Sailing Ships*, incorrectly refers to the cutter as the *Commodore Hull* and *Commodore Barney* as well as giving a capture date of 3 August 1813. The Treasury Department purchased *Commodore Barry* at New York in March or April 1812, more than eight months before the US schooner *Commodore Hull* was placed in commission.¹¹ The schooner *Commodore Barney* was a privateer from Baltimore.¹² Chapelle also mistakenly claims that, on 16 January 1813, the American privateer *Anaconda* accidentally fired on the *Commodore Barry* — some five months after the British captured her. Similarly in 1989, Coast Guard Academy history professor Irving H. King refers to the cutter as the *Commodore Hull*, and repeats the January 1813 incident. He cites the capture date as August 1814, a full two years later. H. D. Smith makes no mention of the *Commodore Barry*'s capture in his original work, other than to say that it existed on the list of cutters in service.

There are also conflicting accounts of the cutter's disposition. Some claim she was used as a tender by the British, while others claim she was dismantled at St. John, New Brunswick. The latter appears to be correct. Captain Pierce, of the captured privateer *Sally*, spent seven days at St. John, where he saw "3 small privateers and the revenue cutter Com Barry, Elliot, hauled up and stripped." The St. John press also noted: "The Indian and Plumper have sent in three prizes among them is a U. S. Revenue Cutter and two privateers." Although she had a short and unnoticed career, the heroic defense of the *Commodore Barry* is one of the finest in the service's history.

The schooner *James Madison* was the next revenue cutter captured. Although claimed to be the most successful revenue cutter of the war,

there has been no in-depth research into these claims, nor into the circumstances surrounding her capture and disposition. All published accounts credit *James Madison* with three victories. In interpreting H. D. Smith's notes in 1932, Rear Admiral Elliot Snow, USN (CC), appears to have confused *James Madison*'s 1812 capture of the *Snow* rather than seizing a snow.¹³ Perhaps a coincidence of spelling caused an unintentional clouding of Snow's editorial processes — or Smith's notes created the error. In his nineteenth century article on this subject, he wrote "The 'Madison' [revenue cutter] (a snow) sent into Savannah, mounting 6 guns, loaded with ammunition, also the brig 'Shamrock,' of 300 tons, 6 guns and 16 men." Nearly every author of Coast Guard history to the present makes this same misinterpretation.

Smith's sentence could be interpreted three ways, but in reality there was only one capture. The snow and the brig *Shamrock* are the same vessel. Captain George Brooks of the *Madison* reported the capture of the Brig *Shamrock* that "mounts Six 6 & 9 Pounders,"¹⁴ which mirrors the 25 July 1812 report in the *Savannah Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger* describing the vessel as a snow. United States Marshal prisoner-of-war records at Savannah list the vessel as the *Snow Shamrock*, with a capture date of 23 July 1812. The responsibility for the confusion rests in competing versions of two Savannah newspapers. *Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger* reported a snow was brought into Savannah on 24 July. That same day, the *Savannah Museum* listed the vessel as "the British brig *Shamrock*" captured after an eight-hour chase between Tybee and Cumberland Islands.

Official American records of British prisoners add to the misunderstanding by citing Francis Kellog as *Shamrock*'s master when both the *Savannah Museum* and Brooks' report lists a Captain May as her master.¹⁵ Conceivably, Kellog was the sailing master or first officer. The US Marshal at Savannah sent Kellog and nine others to Nassau on the cartel sloop *Delight* on 1 November 1812. The only other prize

claimed by the *James Madison* was the schooner *Wade* from New Providence, which fell, accidentally, to the cutter at Amelia Island, Georgia.

This naval war was more than tactics and strategy or national pride. It was about profits; it could be, and was, very profitable for some. This motive certainly drove the privateers and probably caused the ultimate defeat of Captain Brooks and the loss of the *James Madison*. Brooks put the cutter's loss in motion as early as 13 July 1812, when he notified Archibald S. Bulloch, Collector of Customs at Savannah, Georgia, of the near impossibility of finding small arms sufficient to arm his expanded crew.¹⁶ Brooks probably expanded his crew at Charleston, one that would ultimately consist of sixty-five seamen, four officers, and a surgeon. He also needed increased numbers of arms, but found the growing number of privateers had depleted Charleston of the ready arms market. He informed Bulloch he had to "imploy [a] Blacksmith to make Cutlasses."

Brooks then solicited Simeon Theus, the Customs Collector at Charleston, to purchase pistols but the collector refused because the cutter was not his responsibility. In desperation, he turned to a local factor who loaned him an unspecified amount to buy the arms. This was a highly unorthodox method for Brooks to arm his crew unless he made arrangements to repay the loan from his next cruise. That probably did not include protecting the revenue.

In the 13 July letter to Bulloch, Brooks reminded him, "the old saying is there is no loss without someone all gain," and alluded to potential profit, "I have information of six merchantmen unprotected with full cargoes [and I] shall be after them tomorrow morning." Brooks received his information from arriving merchant vessels and the Charleston newspaper *The Times*, which proclaimed "Privateer look out !!!" announcing that 150 merchant vessels under convoy departed Tortola on 27 June.¹⁷ Brooks planned a cutting out expedition, but no records have been uncovered to indicate whether or not he made the attempt. In mid-July, in

a brief encounter, he chased the armed British ship *Rising Empire* off the Savannah bar, but failed to make the capture. The only other encounter before his last cruise was on August 1 when the *James Madison* escorted the Spanish brig *Santa Anna* to Savannah for adjudication.

Sailing from Savannah on 15 August 1812 in company with the privateers *Paul Jones*, *Hazard*, and the *Spencer*, Morse Brooks began his last cruise. While he cruised south and eastward, well out of his authorized cruising grounds, HMS *Barbadoes* and HMS *Polyphemous* escorted "47 Sail of Convoy" of the Jamaican July Convoy.

On 20 August, Captain Peter John Douglas, commanding *Polyphemous*, logged, "At 4 [P.M.] Saw a strange sail on the Lee quarter. *Barbadoes* in chase." The *Barbadoes* successfully chased the *James Madison* from the convoy, but Brooks, determined to cut out at least one, stayed on the convoy's skirts, waiting for an opportunity to strike. On 22 August, Douglas matter-of-factly noted in his log:

at day light Saw a strange Schooner in the fleet.

at 8 *Barbadoes* in chase

at noon hove to the *Barbadoes* in company with chase

3.30 joined company [with] the *Barbadoes* with American

Schooner *James Madison* Prize.

at 6 received on Board 50 prisoners from the *Barbadoes*.¹⁸

The next day, Douglas detailed a lieutenant (one of eight on board), a midshipman, and twenty men from *Polyphemus*, in addition to about fifteen of the *James Madison*'s men, to fit her out for convoy protection and sail her as a prize to England.

Captain Thomas Huskisson of the *Barbadoes* reported his part in the capture.¹⁹ In "Latitude 31°N Longitude 75°W," he chased *James Madison* for seven hours before capturing her. All contemporary sources record the capture was near Savannah. None report just how near, although the actual distance was about "250

miles southward and eastward of Savannah.”²⁰ *Polyphemus*’ log indicates the chase lasted only four hours but Huskisson may have begun his chase at first light. He described the schooner pierced for fourteen guns but carried only ten, “armed with 6 guns of 6 lbs. 4 carronades of 12 lbs” and “two [6 pounders] of which were thrown overboard in the chase.” Impressed with the cutter, he noted, “She is coppered and copper fastened is two years old and sails remarkably fast.”

This official account stands in sharp contrast to that printed in the Boston press a month later. Captain Morgan, a parolee on board the Salem cartel schooner *Hero*, arrived at New York on 10 September 1812. He related a version of the capture from *James Madison*’s surgeon, John Gre[e]ndree, also a parolee on board *Hero*.²¹ No explanation was given why the surgeon did not give the story directly to the press, nor why, later, none of the *James Madison*’s officers published their personal accounts.

Morgan repeated that the *James Madison* carried ten guns and seventy-five men on the night before, and that the capture ran into the convoy and cut out two vessels that Brooks ordered to the United States. The following night, the cutter again attacked the convoy and mistook the *Barbadoes* for a large merchantman. Brooks fired several guns and attempted to board the 260-man, 38-gun frigate before discovering his mistake.


The disparities in the versions are evident, but the accounts of Captains Douglas and Huskisson have more credibility on several points. None of the “captures” claimed in Morgan’s account have been located in adjudication records, confirming Huskisson’s report that the cutter “has made no captures.” In addition, logs indicate the cutter got no closer than the “skirts of the convoy.” All factors seem to indicate the capture was more than the revenue cutter merely bumping into the frigate in the night.

Huskisson’s notation that the revenue cutter was but two years old contrasts with other

references that offer an 1807–1808 construction period. He may have misunderstood the actual cutter’s age. He had none of the cutter’s officers on board to interrogate and most likely questioned the crew, nearly all of whom were new to the revenue cutter. The *James Madison* had received extensive repairs in 1811. On 9 January 1811, the Collector at New York, David Gelston, wrote Bulloch that Captain Worthington Gale (then the commander) received \$10,647.34 for repairs. The extensive repairs could be considered a rebuilding, making the cutter essentially new. It was also common to place a revenue schooner in a shipyard and rebuild it when appropriations were not available for a new one. However, the repairs appear not extensive enough. A Royal Navy survey held at the Portsmouth Navy Yard on 17 April 1813 shows the schooner a “slight vessel, the fore part of the keelson and some of the timbers in a state of decay,” and not recommended for purchase into the Royal Navy.

On 13 June 1813, the Second Earl of Belmore, Enniskillen, Ireland [Northern] purchased this “slight vessel” for privateer work. He had her rerigged as a brig and installed fourteen carronades. The bill of sale shows the schooner, renamed *Osprey*, to be “burthen 172 tons & 79/94... foreign built, 1 deck, 2 masts, length from forepart of stem to after part of the taffrail aloft is 86' 3", Breath 22' 10" half her height in the hold 7' 11"... square sterned schooner, no galle[r]y, no head.”²² Following the war, *Osprey* became Lord Belmore’s private yacht. She was used on a two-year trip to the Mediterranean, and ultimately sold to the King of Naples in 1819.

Of all the elements of the story, the cutter’s crew size is the most interesting. With a complement of sixty-five seamen and boys, she was about three times larger than the size authorized by the Treasury Department for any revenue vessel. The frugality of the Treasury Department allowed only just enough men on board cutters to work them. The only exception was in the hiring of boys. A captain was allowed to hire two boys in the place of one able seaman.



James Madison, by renown marine artist C. J. A. Wilson. Incorrectly titled *James Madison*, 1813. Scanned copy from 1858 US Coast Guard pamphlet *Coast Guard History*. (CG-213), USCG Public Information Office, GPO, Washington.

Average crew size for a revenue cutter of this era numbered twenty-five men and boys, or less. The *James Madison*'s enlarged crew size and location at time of capture lends credibility to a hypothesis that Brooks turned the cutter from revenue to privateer work. The question remains as to just who authorized this greatly expanded crew and its changed mission. Perhaps no one but Brooks and Bulloch. The presence of Bulloch family members' names found in the *James Madison*'s crew lead to this conclusion. It was not uncommon for members

of the customs collector's family, as well as the cutter's officers, to find employment on the local revenue cutter.

However expanded or for what purpose, details of the disposition of the crew were largely unknown. This is surprising, considering this was the largest capture of men from a revenue or a Coast Guard cutter in American history. Following capture, the cutter's officers remained on *Barbadoes*. Fortunately for them, a hurricane badly damaged the *Barbadoes* frigate and dispersed the convoy. With a broken mainmast, she put into Bermuda for repairs and for regrouping the convoy's stragglers. The storm also saved the American officers from a continued voyage to England and imprisonment.

In all previous writings, George Brooks, the captain, was the only known officer on board. However, prisoner records reveal the remaining officers as First Lieutenant John Emerus, Second Lieutenant Richard Cole, and Third Lieutenant William Lucas who, with two unidentified crewmen, left Bermuda on board the cartel brig *Diamond* for the eighteen-day voyage to New York.²³

The majority of the crew were not so fortunate. Nine seamen, sent on board HMS *Shannon*, landed at Melville Island. They were exchanged at New York in November; four others "navigated" the *Aneline* to Boston.²⁴ On 4 October 1812, forty others landed at Ports-

mouth, England, and were sent to prison at Chatham. Among this group was the service's youngest prisoner of war, Beloner Pault, a fifteen-year-old from Savannah.²⁵ They remained in prison at Chatham or in other prisons until their releases between February and June 1813. One seaman, John Bearbere, died of pneumonia on 28 May 1813, and three others joined the East India Company.

Ironically, only one man petitioned for a pension for service aboard the revenue cutter. Seaman William Palms requested a pension for his service in 1840, but the Treasury Department rejected it claiming it had no record of him ever serving on the *James Madison*. This may be true. Brooks probably never informed the Treasury Department of his expanded crew. Treasury regulations required a listing of all on board at the end of the each month. In addition, a series of fires at the Treasury following the war may have destroyed the records.

There were four others neither imprisoned nor released, four unidentified black seamen in the cutter's crew who the British claimed were slaves. Treasury Department regulations forbade, although the cutter did not appear to be following regulations, the hiring of blacks. If Brooks was filling out a privateer crew, he took what men he could find, and if the experienced seamen happened to be black, it was of no concern to him. Whatever on-board positions these men filled, this documents one of the earliest uses of free black men on board a US revenue cutter, dispelling a popular theory that blacks could serve only in positions of personal servitude on board revenue cutters.

Following the capture, the British separated the supposed slaves and sent them on board HMS *Shannon*, where the British commander "emancipated" them — but not immediately. The "slaves" spent time in the British prison ship *Centurion* at Halifax until transferred to HMS *Tartarus*, presumably working as seamen, and supposedly were set free at Barbados on 27 March 1813. Three other seamen classified as "Mulatto," who were considered freemen, Beloner Pault and Zephir Gasseyr of Savannah,

and Oliver Gale from New York, remained at Chatham Prison until they were exchanged in February 1813. The capture of the supposed slaves from the revenue cutter set a precedent for the remainder of the war.

In 1816, the British asked for the release of the twenty-two slave crewmen captured during 1813–1814 from the British privateers *Caledonia* and *Dash*, schooners *Hassar* and *Fame*, and brig *President*, held at Savannah. The United States released the British slaves to the British Vice-Consul at Savannah in June 1816, but the dispute over a bounty for them lasted into 1818. The capturers claimed the property value of the slaves as prize money, and from there the dispute arose why they had been held so long after the war. All free men of color were repatriated at the close of the war. However, the issue about slaves was not clear. The US government used the supposed slaves captured from the *James Madison* as the criterion. The British would not consider them prisoners of war but, according to General John Mason, kept them for work on board British vessels or transports to British territories. Ultimately, those claiming prize money for the slaves received a \$100 bounty for each slave. The supposed slaves from *James Madison* were never repatriated, and no official accounting made of their whereabouts. They remain among the nation's longest held prisoners of war.

Understandably, these views of the *James Madison*'s actions and loss are less heroic than depicted in previous accounts. Captain Brooks' cupidious personality probably drove him to overman and set his command well out of its authorized cruising grounds, placing both cutter and crew in greater jeopardy. Had he succeeded in his exploits he would have graced the era's popular press and Coast Guard history. Instead, he and the *James Madison* drifted into obscurity.

Obscurity will not be a problem for the tale of the capture of the revenue cutter *Surveyor*. The 12 June 1813 defense and ultimate capture of the *Surveyor* ranks second in popular romantic RCS history only to the later capture of the

revenue cutter *Eagle*. Heroism permeates the writings on this short action, but unfortunately, sentimentality has clouded objective inquiry. H. D. Smith, especially enamored with the heroics, wrote an 1892 article in which he provided verbatim dialogue between the cutter's officers as well as numerous other undocumented details. Oddly, this unindexed article escaped modern bibliographies and overlooked by contemporary researchers. Most modern authors find it sufficient to make Captain Samuel Travis the hero of the day and leave the remainder to anonymity. However, the post-action difficulties experienced by the officers and men provide a larger understanding of the Treasury Department's outlook toward its Revenue Cutter Service personnel than previously known.

Surveyor's officers and men indeed heroically defended their vessel. The return of Captain Samuel Travis' sword by the British was the historical high point of the incident, but far too much has been made of what was not an unusual event. Captain Broke of HMS *Shannon* returned the sword of Captain Crane of the US Brig *Nautilus* "in consequence of his good conduct in endeavoring to save his vessel." The British respected, and expected, officers in the heroic efforts; however, the losing crew and junior officers usually suffered for presenting the same stubbornness. Unfortunately, in part because of Travis' perceived heroism, the details of remaining *Surveyor* crewmen and officers are forgotten.

The action began on 13 June 1813, literally a rainy and foggy night. The cutter lay anchored off Point Fort on the Gloucester side in the York River, having moved there from Queen's Creek to get out of the range of the British cannoners at York. The British remarked her position and continued to fire artillery pieces at her from the Gloucester shore.

Captured that evening by four barges from the HMS *Narcissus*, the brevity of this battle should have produced a fairly consistent historical representation. Nonetheless, numerous inconsistencies may be found in descriptions of some authors. Naval history enthusiast John H.

Robertson provides the most complete analysis of the *Surveyor* capture.²⁶ He points out that many contemporary authors continue to draw on Elliot Snow's editing and Smith's account rather than visiting the growing availability of primary sources.

The major differences are the cutter's physical description, number of guns, and how attacked, with each author basing his description on a predecessor's work. Smith began, because he was unsure, with a generic vessel of 125 tons with six to ten light guns; Chapelle listed six 12-pounders; Irving King appears to have confused the 1807 *Virginia* with the *Surveyor*, and the *Surveyor* with the *James Madison*, but follows Chapelle's lead with the same number and type of cannon. Russell R. Waesche added to the fray in 1929, stating the *Surveyor's* eight guns were 12-pound carronades and presumed, "this was typical armament for cutters of that class." William James, stating the captured revenue cutters were of "little value," gave six guns and 100 tons. Smith later expanded, in another article, on his description of the cutter to that of a "small, well-modeled craft, with low bulwarks and square stern, topsail schooner rigged, mounting six 12-pounder iron carronades."²⁷ The cutter in truth was probably nearer 75 tons and carried only six small guns.

Baltimore Customs Collector James McCulloch wrote on 19 June 1813 that the cutter was "an old vessel, scarcely worth repairing. Carried six guns of small caliber."²⁸ Four of these guns were probably the same ones the navy agent at Baltimore asked to be returned in 1810. The navy agent loaned four six-pounders to *Surveyor*, which promoted McCulloch to write to Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin asking to keep the Navy's guns.²⁹ They probably remained on board. Just sixty days prior to the capture, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Parker, Westmoreland County Militia, Virginia, reported to Governor James Barbour that the cutter had been "cooperating" with the militia and carried four iron six-pounders and two brass four-pounders.³⁰ The Treasury Depart-



QW 328 Surveyor. Another watercolor by Louis Bevan depicts the assault in a manner which did not occur. Cutting out expeditions were usually coordinated to prevent one boat from taking the brunt of the resistance. In addition, Bevan was unaware that revenue cutters did not fly the national ensign, but the vertically striped revenue ensign, until 1896. The schooner should also be pointing up river and be closer to the northern (left) bank. Illustrations courtesy of The Mariners' Museum, Newport News, Virginia.

ment's renowned stinginess would not allow expenditures to update or improve this, or any other, cutter's armaments.

Contradictions about the fight for the cutter are as numerous as those of the guns, including the number of British barges attacking the cutter. Captain J. R. Lumley, commanding HMS *Narcissus*, clearly reported sending "four of the Boats" to take the "Enemys Armed Schooner laying in York River." Drawing on Snow's edited version, King and Bell note two barges, Evans does not give an exact number, and Chapelle records three barges in total.³¹ In his 1892 article, Smith wrote, "three dark, indistinct masses suddenly loomed up through the fog... one large, double-banked barge was seen to diverge from its course." He probably based his conclusion, in part, on a 14 June letter

written by Third Lieutenant William L. Travis, explaining his part and period press accounts.³² Professor John Tilley, writing for the US Coast Guard's Historical Painting Project, follows King and Bell in depicting the scene.³³

Primary and secondary references indicate that the British barges were too close for the cutter to bring its cannon to bear. This sounds reasonable, if the boats made a surprise attack. All references demonstrate that Captain Travis anticipated the attack and reported seeing the barges at about one hundred fifty yards range, well within effective cannon range. The accounts indicate he had the guns run out and loaded. The cutter's cannon were just a few feet above the water. The line of fire, even with solid shot, would have been an acceptable action if for nothing else than to terrorize the

attackers. Smith wrote that during the attack a crewman accidentally fired one gun "in the excitement of the attack... its contents passing harmlessly overhead." Apparently Travis and the crew expected to use their cannon. They had linstock lit and cannon primed.

Tilley adds a possible explanation as to why the cutter's cannon were not used. First Lieutenant John Crie, ³² commanding the British expedition, probably split up his boat force and attacked from forward and astern. This was a common tactic to prevent the use of the great guns. Captain Lumley reported the cutter's crew "were fully prepared for the attack, having all their small Arms loaded and laying by them on deck waiting until our boats got alongside when they fired directly into them." Lumley's "alongside" remark may not be literal. Smith's 1892 narrative indicates Travis, in standard battle preparation, had the "boarding-netting triced up." An illustration of this type of attack is the capture of the slaver *Borboleta* by HM Brig *Pantaloön* in 1845 off Lagos, West Africa. This painting shows attacking boats staggered to split the usually smaller defending crew, forcing the *Borboleta* to repel boarders at different locations. Similarly, the British barges probably attacked *Surveyor* from both sides, which would account for the few casualties.

Although the small arms' fire from the cutter was terrific, probably about eighty rounds, the British quickly gained the deck. Captured first were Second Lieutenant Pippen and five men protecting the forward section. Within ten minutes, the attackers beat Captain Travis, his executive officer First Lieutenant John Hebb, and the remainder of the crew onto the quarterdeck. Reportedly Travis, armed with a musket and two pistols, killed a British seaman and Captain Thomas Ford of the Royal Marine. Although it was a brief fight, the casualties for the seventy-seven British attackers were three killed and six wounded, three seriously. The revenue cutter suffered but six wounded crewman, one seriously.

As the battle ended, so did historical in-

quiry. As with *James Madison*, authors have ignored the disposition of *Surveyor*'s crew. Nearly all previous references cite sixteen captured officers and men, but they were estimates. Collector McCulloch reported sixteen men and three officers captured, lifting the total to nineteen. He also expanded the total number of personnel attached to the revenue cutter. Apart from the nineteen on board, five men and Third Lieutenant William L. Travis escaped in the guard boat and four others were ashore.

The British put the *Surveyor*'s officers, except for Captain Travis, and men on board the *Junon* for eventual transfer to prison. Travis remained on board *Junon* until early August, when he was paroled at Washington, North Carolina. Some of the officers and men went to confinement at Halifax or England [Chatham or Dartmoor], while others were released.

The British released or paroled the Americans among the *Surveyor*'s force over the next year. On 17 December 1813, First Lieutenant Hebb was exchanged by way of *Annabaston* cartel. Seaman Peter Williams was exchanged on 2 February 1814 on board the cartel vessel *Boslock*. On 14 July 1813, Seaman (listed as Master) John Allman and his son, John Allman, Jr., arrived home on board the *Agnes* cartel. One other seaman, Antonio May, is listed with no notation. Second Lieutenant William Phippen [Pippen], listed as William Pepper, and seamen John McCarty (perhaps McCarlie), James Hall, James Marmer (aka Alarmon or Marmion), and John Lynch were sent to Boston from Halifax by the *Mary* cartel on 23 July 1814.

Seven other seamen were not so fortunate. On 19 January 1814, seaman John Bowden, aged seventeen, George Randolph, Nicholas Pimkins (or Pikins, Perkins), Andrew Peterson, William Prices (alias Penitfor Pruitt), Zachary Cole and Samuel Berry, all were found to be British subjects, despite listing American places of birth, and sent on board *Malabar* to an English prison.

Ironically, had the attack occurred ten days later there would have been no revenue cutter to

seize. On 21 June 1813, R. C. Jones, Acting Treasury Secretary, wrote James McCulloch that “during the continuance of the present state of things,” the cutter “can be of no use” because of the British blockade and control of the Chesapeake Bay. Jones told McCulloch to inform the officers and crew “they are to consider themselves as being no longer in the service of the United States.” This notification set an adverse stage for the *Surveyor*’s officers and crew alike.

Released from Halifax, Lieutenant Phippen arrived at Boston about 5 August, with the four seamen, and asked for transportation funds to Baltimore. Boston Collector Henry Dearborn, using the authority of General James Mason’s prisoner of war department, advanced Phippen two hundred dollars from the “Marine Hospital” accounts, assuming Baltimore Collector McCulloch would reimburse him. McCulloch responded to Dearborn’s request on 12 August, claiming, “It is not in my power to send at present the amount of the Bill, so much not being due to Mr. Peppins.”

McCulloch claimed he paid all the wages due Phippen and the others to Captain Travis, presumably at their requests, for transfer to their families. According to McCulloch, these men received their full pay because of “a decision at the Treasury, their right to Wages exists only to that time [of capture], or the time at which they *are informed* of their discharge” (author emphasis).

In other words, the 21 June 1813 letter informing McCulloch to lay off the *Surveyor*’s crew stood as notification, although they were already prisoners. He also acknowledged a technical point that none of the captured men received “their being out of service” notice and asked that the officers be allowed to retain a pay status until they were released from prison. Continuing in his letter to Dearborn, “We shall try to get an allowance for the Officers on this principle, but the rule seems absolute to the Men.”

Dearborn, not pleased with McCulloch’s answer or lack of reimbursement, retorted, “I

did expect it would have been fully paid by you, as the Money was advanced to the officer on the belief that you would pay the sum back at sight [presentation of draft].” Dearborn claimed he advanced Phippen the amount “as an act of courtesy toward you, as I was under no obligations to afford relief to the officers & Men,” and asked for repayment to him and to “settle the same with the Treasury.”

Three days later, McCulloch had his deputy, John Brice, write Travis at Williamsburg, Virginia, and ask him to have the \$21.50 advanced to each of the four seamen at Boston collected from the men’s families and returned to the collector’s office. By 15 December, Brice informed Dearborn that McCulloch, recovering from wounds received in the British attack on Baltimore, heard nothing from Captain Travis, and recommended the amount be charged to the hospital accounts. The payment issue had now gone full circle. No records have surfaced to indicate whether or not Dearborn ever received reimbursement. In all likelihood, he did not. This was not McCulloch’s first incident with pay problems for the *Surveyor*’s officers and men.

During May 1814, both Captain Travis and First Lieutenant Hebb visited Baltimore to settle accounts. McCulloch, unsure how to handle the situation, asked for direction from Treasury Secretary George W. Campbell. Campbell, interim treasury secretary from February to October 1814, did not know the case’s history and gave McCulloch an ambiguous response. Campbell told him to follow the rule of the 21 June 1813 letter dismissing the officers and crew, but altered his stand toward the seamen. He would be satisfied if McCulloch paid them “by such equitable rule as after inquiry made [by] you shall find to have been adopted in similar cases.”³⁵

This was no answer, but McCulloch, Captain Travis, and John Hebb attempted to locate parallel cases. They found it customary for the Navy to continue the pay the officers and men until they personally reported their return. There was a catch. The officers and men had to

report immediately upon their return. If they delayed, such as visiting their families first or through personal neglect, the government was under no obligation to pay them.

McCulloch recommended this treatment for the officers and men of the *Surveyor*. In theory, while on parole they remained technically prisoners, and thereby were entitled to continued pay. However, the treasury department's opinion differed. Once the officers and men were released and paid off, they were no longer entitled to continued pay. Countering, the officers claimed a different status from their men.

They claimed their commissions entitled them to full pay and allowances until the President dismissed them. He referred to the revenue cutter *Jefferson* at Norfolk, Captain Ham, which was laid up about February 1813. Her crew was dismissed, but her officers remained in the service at full pay. Captain Travis thought this treatment unfair, considering his command fought the enemy and spent time as prisoners. Touting his ten years as a revenue officer, he rebutted such treatment as unconscionable. He claimed he and his officers worked solely at the pleasure of the President and could not be dismissed on the word of a collector of customs.

Travis had a personal reason for wanting the President, rather than the collector, to dismiss him and his officers. He worried about the public perception of their personal characters. He worried that dismissal by the collector would "bring the public to conclude unfavorably respecting them, and adding loss of character to other hardship." He had good reason to feel this way. Apart from his years of revenue service, his father-in-law was Captain Francis Bright, USRCS, who was the past commander of the revenue cutters *Surveyor* and *Jefferson*, and was an influential person in the Virginia tide water area.³⁶

The treasury secretary did not agree. On 25 June 1814, he wrote that they were "officers of the Customs and as such, are removable from office at any time without trial and without

receiving anymore pay than was due." This attitude and procedure of the treasury department remained in effect for the next century. Captain Travis and officers lost their attempt to remain in the service, yet all, including the men, received or were allowed to keep the wages due them for their respective periods of captivity. However, none received pensions under the 18 April 1814 law, yet allowing those injured while serving with the Navy to receive it. Their service was, technically, not with the US Navy and occurred before the law went into effect.

The fight was not yet over. In 1816, Travis, now the Representative of Williamsburg in the Virginia House of Burgesses, filed a petition with the Naval Committee in the US House of Representatives. It was an impassioned appeal:

Your petitioners cannot bring to their aid much logic but they feel if the government select the moment of imprisonment to abandon those in their service that their conduct be deplorable indeed.

Travis took his case to Virginia Representative Burwick Bassett who, in turn, queried Treasury Secretary A. J. Dallas. Dallas sidestepped the issue, stating that he could not second guess the decisions of his predecessor and relied on the written record. Collector McCulloch continued to claim that the officers and men were informed they were no longer in service and were not entitled to any more pay and allowances. The point was fairness. McCulloch claimed, but could not prove, that Travis was informed that he was out of service because he never acknowledged McCulloch's original letter. In March 1816, the Naval Committee agreed with Travis. They allowed the claim of the officers to the time of their release and of the crew when they were released. It was a victory, but it took Travis' political influence to gain what was honorably due them.

Like an unexploded shell, the 21 June 1813 letter lingered in the Treasury Department files. In March 1840, Hopewell Hebb, the widow of John Hebb, applied for a pension based on her husband's service in the war. The Treasury

Department used the letter against Hebb's widow, noting her husband was notified he was no longer in service, ignoring the decision of the 1816 Naval Committee. This link to war service with the Navy and pensions remained for the Revenue Cutter Service and US Coast Guard until after World War I.

The primary sources provide a more realistic view of the *Surveyor*, its capture, and the postwar treatment of its crew than has been given by all previous written historical accounts. John Tilley provides an excellent description about the *Surveyor*'s action that seems to have been the formula for the majority of research of revenue cutters during the War of 1812. He advised there was enough information to "create a generic revenue cutter deck scene — if it's cluttered up with lots of people and a fair amount of smoke" then essentially no one will know the difference. Seemingly some authors took this advice and cluttered the historical decks with overused material without consulting the original sources.

The events around the most famous capture are as equally cluttered. The revenue cutter *Eagle* receives the most attention in Coast Guard history. It was a notable defense, but the gratuitous attention given her probably has more to do with geography than deed. The eastern seaboard, from Boston to Baltimore, is the heartland of the US Coast Guard. Following the Civil War, over seventy-five percent of the service's officers were from the northeast. With them came this region's perception of history and service.

The Connecticut home port of the revenue cutter *Eagle* (no. 2) was in close proximity to the current location of the US Coast Guard Academy, giving the 1814 *Eagle* a local recognition advantage in current history over all other captured cutters. The current training sailing barque is also named *Eagle*.

Because of the attention given her, the *Eagle*'s tale remains fairly consistent in published works. However, the connection that the same British commander who orchestrated *Eagle*'s capture took the *Surveyor* the year

before has been overlooked. Captain J. R. Lumley, HMS *Narcissus*, gave his account of the *Eagle* to the *London Gazette*, Lumley reported "off Negro Head, the 13th of October... the boats of the *Narcissus* and *Dispatch*, under Lieutenant Scott, of the former, brought out under fire of a battery, and a number of militia, the American revenue Schooner *Eagle*, pierced for ten guns, but only two mounted."³⁷

Lumley's description illustrates some differences from other published works in date of capture and armaments. H. D. Smith records 17 October, the date of press notification, Evans indicates only "late in the month of October," Melvin H. Jackson, claims 11 October, and Chapelle and King settle for a generic "in October 1814."³⁸ A letter in the October 14 issue of the *New York Evening Post*, which Jackson called "uncorroborated," appears to confirm Lumley's report. Although seemingly an unimportant detail, the exact date will give the base data to calculate the rise and fall of the tide at Long Island.

Smith's account indicates that the *Eagle*'s captain tried to enter "the creek [Wading River], there not being sufficient depth of water." Evidently, Captain Frederick Lee's first — and prudent — reaction after encountering the main British force was to run. He counted on the safety of Wading Creek, which may have prevented his capture.

The number of cannon cited by every modern account has been six. However, Lumley made it clear that although pierced for ten only two remained on board. Chapelle is silent on this issue, but Jackson, who quotes the cutter "pierced for six guns" along with Smith, Bell, and King, claims two 2-pounders and two 4-pounders. Evans and the US Coast Guard's *Record of Movements* indicate two 2-pounders and four 4-pounders.³⁹ This may be one of those historical occurrences when all are correct despite the differences in numbers.

When Lee departed New Haven, he asked for assistance from the local militia company. Captain John Davis, the militia company commander, probably knew the cutter's deficiency of cannon and took along two of his company's as supplements. Davis added about thirty men



The Defense of the Eagle, from a mural at the US Coast Guard Academy. This is a highly romanticized view of the action. It is doubtful that the crewmen wore these uniforms; the service had no stated uniforms for the cuttermen. This scene shows no member of the militia who assisted in the action. USCG photo.

from his company to the cutter's force of twenty-three. If Captain Lee decided to leave two cannon on board, it would have been an understandable decision. The six-foot-long 4-pounder, without carriage, powder, shot, and equipment, weighed approximately 1,200 pounds. This material, in addition to food, water, and any other equipment was heavy. His crew and the militia volunteers manhandled the guns up the approximate 200-foot bluff to the safety of "Negro Head" [Friar's Head]. Both Smith and Jackson noted Lee probably had assistance from local villagers. King, following Smith, answered the discrepancy in the actual number of guns. He noted the cutter crew and militia "manhandled" two 2-pounders and two of the 4-pounders up the bluff.

Ammunition was probably another reason to leave the guns behind. Throughout the war, the Treasury Department did not consider

prosecution of the war its responsibility unless it effected collection of the revenue. It did not make expenditures for non-Treasury related items such as extra gunpowder, and the US Navy would not supply vessels it did not control. Lee probably kept just enough ammunition on board to satisfy the minimum needs, whatever they may be. Records do show that between January and October 1814, the *Eagle* received one full cask and seven quarter casks of powder amounting to about 150 pounds. Evidently, the cutter had little powder on board. Her inventory on return to New Haven on board the Sloop *Lutor* listed none. The inventory of items returned also indicated twenty-three muskets, seventeen bayonets, thirteen pistols, nineteen cartridge boxes (of twenty-four cartridges each), four powder horns, "Two — 4.lb. Cannon, Two — 2.lb. —do [ditto]." Presumably the two 2-pounders belonged to the militia. The

other material returned, direfully termed “the remains of Cutter *Eagle*,” were “All the sails. — most of the rigging, blocks.... Spars—all but masts,” which implies Captain Lee had ample time to strip the cutter and save both his long-boat and yawl. This stripping may also account for the destroyed look mentioned by the British from offshore.

Out of ammunition and unable to assist any further, the militia company packed up their kits and made their way back to New London. Evidently, Lee knew that the *Eagle* was lost before the battle began. He was out-gunned by the firepower of the brig [cruiser] *Dispatch* [*Despatch*], mounting sixteen 32-pounders and two 6-pounders and the frigate *Narcissus*, mounting twenty-six 18-pounders, four 6-pounders, six or eight 24-pounders, and two 6-pounders, by more than ten to one.

Lee made a prudent decision that saved his crew from death, injury, and capture, but the excessive attention to heroism appears misplaced. Once ashore, the cutter crew’s safety was assured. The topography and sound British tactical reasoning made the prize, that was eventually secured, not worth putting men in danger. In comparison, the defense of the *Eagle* pales next to the other cutters lost. The crew did not have to meet the enemy face-to-face, nor did they experience any great risk of capture, as did other, less chronicled cutters.

There is another possible captured cutter that remains a mystery. The revenue cutter *Polly* or *Poly* is mentioned only by H. D. Smith. She was in service in 1809, but to date no information as to its home port, officers, or crew has surfaced. Why place her with the list of captured revenue cutters? The answer is simple: British prisoner-of-war records show a revenue cutter *Polly* captured between 18 and 27 July 1813 near Newfoundland at position 46N 56W. The dates are not clear, nor are the capturing vessels. The records show the HMS *Maidstone*, *Ringdove*, *Plover*, and *Prize* [*Surprise*] as capturing the cutter on different days. In addition, the prisoner-of-war records for Halifax indicate that at least three seamen

shown on the cutter’s crew were captured by the HMS *Statura* and *Martin*, whereas another crewman is shown as being captured on 10 July 1813 by HM Schooner *Picton*. The discrepancy in dates could be from the date of transfer, the vessel transferred upon of prisoners and simple clerical error.

British records indicate a schooner *Polly* was recaptured on 13 August. This may account for the names of two men being shown on several prisoner lists. Seaman Chris Babbridge captured by both *Plover* and *Statura* and Seaman William Dorrisson, captured by both *Maidstone* and *Statura*. An explanation for the dual captures may be that *Polly* escaped and was recaptured, or these men were part of a prize crew. The number of men, eighteen, without an accompanying officer appears large for a prize crew. Then again, it was common to transfer prisoners and list each receiving vessel.

The mystery is compounded by the loss of the logs for the British vessels for this period. What is known is that there was an England-bound convoy within the same area of the *Polly* capture which was guarded by the same vessels. All told, eighteen men from the *Polly* were interred, including three sixteen-year-old boys. This capture will surely need more research and offers an intriguing mystery. It also makes all aware that the historical record is incomplete.

So what is learned from the capture of relatively unknown revenue cutters? In July 1812, Captain Broke on board HMS *Shannon* wrote Sir John Wilson Croker, “our Squadron is in excellent service order and confident of destroying our Enemy’s little Navy if we are fortunate enough to meet them.”⁴⁰ This overconfidence cost lives. The same form of overconfidence skews the events and perceptions of Revenue Cutter Service’s participation in the war. Many former researchers assumed the truth and validity of the events and allowed some academic overconfidence that there was no more to learn cloud and hamper further research. In fairness, every capture of a revenue cutter became a publicity victim to some major Naval battle whether victory or defeat. These

Naval battles involving USS *Wasp*, *Constitution*, and *Hornet*, as well as numerous famous privateers, overshadowed the seemingly insignificant losses of revenue cutters.

Unfortunately, all accounts of losses ignored the basic premise of historical inquiry to explain what happened and why. The personalities of the cutters' officers made the situations what they were, and a more complete portrayal of the events and men involved will serve as models for future officers. The RCS and Coast Guard were, and are, services made of the actions and adventures (or misadventures) of their officer corps. The vessels were only stages for these characters and personalities. Ironi-

cally, future generations should be grateful that these cutters were captured. Their captures provide us with a larger historical record than had they not been captured.

The revenue cutters in the War of 1812 were minor vessels. Their use, or misuse, made little difference to the war's outcome. Although previous historical works about them followed the heroic model, their obvious incomplete research raises curiosity and interest for further study. Despite renewed interest, the decks of the Revenue Cutter Service historical interpretation remain cluttered and smoke filled.




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2. Horatio Davis Smith, *Early History of the United States Revenue Marine Service* or (United States Revenue Cutter Service 1789–1849, Elliot Snow, ed., Naval Historical Foundation, 1932. (Reprint, US Coast Guard Historians Office: Washington, DC, 1989).
3. *The New-Brunswick Courier*, Saint John, New Brunswick, 23 July 1812, 2, col. 3.
4. *Courier* "Ship News," 24 August 1812, 2, col. 4. [From Boston, 9 August] This article gives credit of capture to HMS *Plumper*. The present location of Haycock's Harbor is different from 1812; it is now on the coast of Maine, south of Jim's Head.
5. *Advocate*, August 20, 1812, 3, col. 1.
6. Except for Elliot, the *Commodore Barry*'s officers are unknown. Elliot was commissioned on 13 April 1812. A review of the officer lists show two other April appointments from Massachusetts: First Lieutenant Charles S. Woodward, 13 April, and Second Lieutenant James S. Carmon, 10 April.
7. National Archives, RG 26, Coast Guard, "Extraordinary Events of the Revenue Marine."
8. Public Records Office Kew, Richmond, Surrey, England. Hereafter PRO Kew. ADM 1/502 Promiscuous Letters, North America 1812.
9. PRO Kew: ADM 103/167, Halifax 1812–1814 and ADM 103/171 Halifax Exchanges 1812–1815.
10. PRO Kew, ADM 51/2812, *Spartan*, Captain's Logs, 3 August 1812.
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18. King, *The Coast Guard Under Sail*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 57, lists the capture date as 12 August.
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20. Prize Case. HCA32/1289 case 1253, 6 February 1813.
21. PRO Kew: ADM 103/26, POW Registers, Bermuda. The Coast Guard's *Record of Movement* incorrectly lists the date of capture as the 24 November 1812.
22. Northern Ireland PRO, Bill of Sale A3842-2-0, 16 June 1813.
23. PRO Kew, ADM 103/26, POW Registers. Bermuda 130, 6. The *James Madison's* officers arrived at Bermuda on 14 September. The record indicates they were to be paroled to New London on 24 October. However, they traveled to New York on board the Brig *Diamond* with the officers of the USS *Wasp*, including Captain Jacob Jones, First Lieutenant W. Rodgers, Second Lieutenant James Biddle, and another 170 prisoners. No explanation has been uncovered to clear the discrepancy in the dates.
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39. Jackson, "Defense of the Revenue Cutter *Eagle*," 154; Smith, *Early Days*, 28; King, *Under Sail*, 59; Bell, *Always Ready*, 48; Evans, *USCG*, 19; *ROM*, 116.
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Saturday, 10 April 1999 — The National Archives — Mid-Atlantic Region will host a seminar on the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which will look at the past, present, and future of this historic site. For more information please contact: Joseph-James Ahern, PNSY Seminar Chair, American Philosophical Society Library, 105 S. 5th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106, or by e-mail: jjahern@amphilsoc.org

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
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COLOMBIAN NAVY IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950–1953

MARK H. DANLEY

For the Colombian navy, the Korean War was a period of considerable success. Colombia's contribution to the United Nations war effort was minimal compared to that of other powers, but her armed forces, particularly her navy, succeeded in accomplishing the objectives for which Colombia went to war in 1950. The effective combat service of the navy against North Korean and Chinese forces demonstrated that Colombia was committed to the principle of collective security, and earned the respect of Colombia's allies. While accomplishing this objective, the navy benefitted as an institution. It gained valuable experience which only active service in combat could provide. Such experience increased the readiness of Colombia's navy, and gave the nation's decision-makers a more effective instrument of

policy.

Upon initial consideration, it might seem that Colombia in 1950 had few vital interests to protect by devoting its limited resources to send a naval force to the other side of the globe. In reality, however, Colombia had much to gain from fighting in Korea. Although Colombia's potential to exert seapower was very limited, the nation used its naval forces during the Korean War to secure prestige which Colombia's leaders believed would be advantageous to the nation's international position. In the process, the navy made significant advances in training and acquisition of equipment, which Colombian strategic planners deemed applicable to future potential conflicts. It is unlikely that Colombia fought in Korea with the express intent of training forces for a future war with its own neighbors, but the navy's operations had significant implications for the status of latent territorial disputes with Peru and Venezuela.


The roots of Colombia's involvement in the war lay in American efforts early in the conflict to bring other UN members into active participation. Soon after the conflict began on 27 June 1950, the UN called for military assistance from member states. During the late summer and fall of 1950, the United States government began trying to bring Latin American states into the war. Not everyone in Washington favored the idea. The State Department hoped that Latin American participation in the Korean conflict would lead to future United States-Latin American military cooperation, but the Pentagon feared the possibility that no Latin state would offer forces large enough to justify the cost of the American logistic aid they would inevitably

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Area of Colombian Naval Operations in the Korean War, 1950-1953





require. The Pentagon eventually demurred, however, agreeing that the United States should accept forces from any Latin American state willing to reimburse the United States for the cost of any logistic support received. On 25 September, the Defense Department agreed to accept Colombia's offer of support.¹

However justified American misgivings, Colombia had its own reasons for contributing to the UN's effort in Korea. Sending forces to Korea was of immense symbolic value. It reaffirmed Colombia's commitment to the principle of collective security, and implicitly indicated that should Colombia's own interests become endangered, it might expect other states to be as "generous" as it had been in committing forces to a UN effort. The war also afforded Colombia an opportunity to expand the training and readiness of its armed forces, particularly its navy. Such an opportunity came at a time when the government faced criticism from senior military officers who opposed reductions in defense spending.

Recent internal political developments provided some reason for this desire to send forces to Korea. Colombia's two long-established political parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, maintained a longstanding tradition of intense rivalry which sometimes turned violent. The latest round began in November 1949, following the victory of Conservative presidential candidate Laureano Gómez, not long after the assassination of a prominent opposition politician. Despite the trouble at home, Colombian leaders believed that entering a war halfway around the world was still in their interest. Gómez himself may have felt a need to have a closer relationship with Washington. As an opposition politician during World War II, he had advocated strict neutrality for Colombia. As president, he was concerned that memory of his former activities might make Washington cool toward his regime. Further, sending forces to Korea might open the door for American military aid, which would allay the concerns of his military chiefs who remained dissatisfied

with budget cuts. When the war began, Lieutenant Commander Julio Cesar Reyes Canal, who would later command the first Colombian frigate sent to Korea, was about to resign in protest over proposed cuts in naval forces. Involvement in a foreign war might distract Colombian attention from internal disputes, as it had in the past. Nationalist sentiment arising from the 1932–1933 Colombian war against Peru had helped quell partisan strife.²

Foreign policy concerns also provided reasons for Colombia's entry into the war. Some believed the nation might gain significant benefits from participation in an international organization's efforts to back collective security with armed force. Colombia had been an enthusiastic participant in the creation of the UN. In 1946, a Colombian delegate presided over the inaugural meeting of the General Assembly. Colombia's previous experience with international organizations had been positive, such as when the League of Nations successfully mediated the 1932–1933 conflict with Peru. Now in 1950, Colombia shared in the hope of some minor powers that a determined stand against aggression through collective security could help make the UN what many had hoped the League would be. During the war, Colombians articulated what they saw as the significance of their participation. For example, the Bogotá daily *La Nación* published two articles in March–April 1952, arguing that Colombia was wise to fight in Korea now in order to set a precedent for possible future collective action on its own behalf, should it ever become necessary.³

Both internal and foreign policy concerns were thus behind Colombia's official offer to contribute land and naval units to the UN effort in Korea. In mid-September, the Colombian War Minister, Dr. Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, first offered the Colombian navy's newest ship, a patrol frigate recently acquired from the United States, ARC *Almirante Padilla*. Urdaneta Arbeláez wisely avoided all mention of American logistic support until late October, after the Pentagon finally accepted the offer.

Although the War Minister had originally claimed the frigate was ready to sail immediately, in fact neither it, nor any other unit of the Colombian navy, was ready for intensive combat operations. Moreover, the entire military was unprepared for any major conflict. The army and navy both had a very limited record of experience. Unlike those of other Latin American nations, Colombia's armed forces never enjoyed much prestige within society. Nor did they have a tradition of political intervention. Rather, it was distinctive among Latin American states for having a small, apolitical military. In 1950, the combined strength of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Infantry was only 14,660, and defense spending composed only 1.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.⁴

The foundations of the Colombian armed forces date from the Conservative presidential administration of Raphael Reyes. Taking office in 1904, shortly after Colombia's latest and most severe interparty conflict, the 1899–1902 War of a Thousand Days, Reyes had sought to professionalize the armed forces. He had hoped that a new and efficient army and navy might become truly national institutions, and help mitigate old party animosities.⁵ He was successful, in the minds of some naval personnel. Pablo E. Nieto, who entered the newly founded Naval School in 1907, recalled that the inclusion of cadets from families associated with Reyes' rivals represented "an event that logically gave general backing to the Reyes government, that is, this gave new and eloquent demonstration of his political inclusiveness and especially showed his generous and noble desire to nationalize the military."⁶

Despite their increased professionalization, Colombia's military forces remained small throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Both the army and the navy proved themselves effective in the war against Peru in 1932–1933, but by 1950 the navy ranked only among the minor navies of the world. The nucleus of its surface force in 1950 still consisted of two old Portuguese destroyers built in 1932 and acquired during the war with Peru. There were also ten river gunboats of several



Tacoma-class patrol frigate USS *Groton* (PF 29) prior to her sale to Colombia. Built by Walter Butler, Superior, Wisconsin and completed in September 1944, she was acquired by Colombia in March 1947 and renamed ARC *Almirante Padilla*. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Julio César Reyes Canal, she was the first of three Colombian frigates to serve under United Nations command during the Korean War. United Nations naval commanders lauded her crew's proficiency during shore bombardment and escort operations. US Navy. Print purchased from Real War Photos, Hammond, Indiana.

hundred tons displacement. The only recent acquisition was an ex-US Tacoma class patrol frigate, ARC *Almirante Padilla*, built in 1943 and transferred to Colombia in 1947.⁷ Despite the paucity of its forces, it was to the navy that the government turned in 1950 when it sought to enter the Korean War.

Initially, the Navy Command considered sending one of the old Portuguese destroyers to Korea. They were still the largest units and backbone of the small force. The Colombians decided against the option, knowing that such older units would need extensive repairs. In addition, their operational radius was limited, even when compared to the smaller ex-American frigate. Such a consideration turned out to be very important, since naval operations in

Korea often required grueling blockade and patrol operations, in which units kept station for extended periods of time.⁸

The alternative was ARC *Almirante Padilla*, which was far less ready than Urdaneta Arbeláez might have led the United States to believe. The new Director of the Marine, Commander Juan A. Pizarro, selected a thirty-two year veteran of the navy, Lieutenant Commander Julio César Reyes Canal, to command the ship. Reyes, in the process of retiring over the proposed destroyer sale, was surprised when he was recalled for the appointment, and admitted he had almost no knowledge of the ship he was to command or her readiness for the mission. Reyes Canal later remembered:

I had only been on board two or three times on social functions. I had supposed it was more or less ready for the mission. My orders spoke of minor repairs and training at the naval base at San Diego, which were to take five or six weeks. The government hoped the frigate would be in Korea by the end of the year.

Much to my surprise, two hours after setting toward San Diego [upon] leaving Balboa and asking for 15 knots my chief engineer left me speechless when he told me the machinery was very bad and could not make more than 10 knots.⁹

Clearly, some improvement was necessary if the navy was to go to war. Although the government was anxious to get land and naval forces into action as soon as possible, *Almirante Padilla* needed considerable overhaul and repairs. In addition, her crew needed training. Accordingly, Captain Rubén Piedrahíta Arango, the Colombian naval attaché in Washington, arranged for the frigate to sail to Long Beach Naval Yard where she would undergo repairs necessary for combat operations.¹⁰

Even the process of readying the unit for active service provided an opportunity to achieve Colombian goals. Making the ship combat ready offered unique training opportunities and gave the officers and crew a justifiable sense of pride. The initiative navy personnel displayed while facilitating and speeding the repairs helped validate their nation's claim that it sincerely wanted to support with armed force the cause of collective security. However, the reality of preparing for Colombia's first war in twenty years, and its first overseas war, allowed senior officers to assess the real readiness of the republic's navy as a whole.

Readying the ship for war proved a long and difficult task. Financial resources were limited, but Reyes and his men did have access to the logistical infrastructure of the world's most potent naval power. How much access

they would have was, however, uncertain. It was easy for the Colombians to imagine that the United States Navy would quickly forget them. With all the difficulties of remobilizing for a new and unexpected war, the Americans might have better things to do than repair one small unit of a minor ally. The dispatch of the *Almirante Padilla* was a significant act for Colombia's political and naval leaders, but would it be for the Americans? Lieutenant Oscar Herrera Rebolledo, first officer of the *Almirante Padilla*, later recalled, "Our frigate, lost between 650 destroyers, signified almost nothing in the eyes of any strategist."¹¹ The Colombians had to prove themselves. By the time the repairs were complete, they would earn the recognition and respect of their American colleagues in Long Beach.

The *Almirante Padilla* arrived at the naval base in San Diego on 13 November. Reyes and his men set to work, moving to nearby Long Beach Naval Yard on 12 December 1950. Upon recommendation of yard officials, the Colombians accepted Wilmington Welding and Boiler Works' bid to complete the repairs. Since the Colombians in San Diego controlled the payments to the company, Reyes and his officers strove to make every dollar count, strictly monitoring all expenditures. The goal was to transform every dollar spent directly into repairs for the ship, which certainly needed them. Fundamental systems such as propulsion, communications, armament, and fire control were inadequate. ARC *Almirante Padilla* departed Colombia without even basic reconditioning, such was the government's hurry to send it to war. Oscar Herrera lamented that some of the required repairs were so basic they might have more wisely been completed in Colombia.¹²

The length of the stay in California began to demoralize the officers and the crew. Herrera remembered how each day spent in the naval yard seemed to mean one day less in Korea.¹³ But Colombian morale did not falter. The crew maintained a schedule of physical exercise, even including daily rifle drill. The Americans

with whom the Colombians had contact found their enthusiasm and dedication contagious. Reyes remembered in particular the empathy of E. C. Arnold, the Chief Manager of the Naval Yard. Reyes recalled:

The U.S. Navy was interested in that rare ship which maintained a clean, well-uniformed crew, working as busy as bees, and that could put 100 armed men ashore, from time to time to perform marches and close order exercises, all without losing the opportunity to offer... fine social events on board, under elegant naval protocol. And [the Americans] began to help and help and help.¹⁴

Even while readying the ship for war, the Colombians were demonstrating their nation's sincere commitment to devote the naval force to the international mission in Korea. They had managed to distinguish themselves in the midst of several hundred other units of comparable size, and impressed their American benefactors with their enthusiasm and professionalism.

The repair process in San Diego taught the Colombians the first of many lessons about the realities of modern naval warfare. Although they rose to the challenge, the initial unreadiness of the unit had been sobering. With even their most basic shipboard systems unsatisfactory, the officers of ARC *Almirante Padilla* had confirmed the lesson that military preparedness was essential to every nation, even small powers, which hoped to act on the international scene. Herrera remembered that in the early stages of the repairs, he and his colleagues had to concede sadly that they lacked competence in some technical areas. Since the government never properly funded it, the Colombian Navy never had the organizational structure necessary for a maintenance program worthy of a modern navy. Herrera expressed a frustration similar to that of his commander over the proposed destroyer sale:

If a country maintains a navy, it is because of necessity. If it needs it, it

should give it that which it requires for good development, and not narrow its path with grants in estimated appropriations which begin to put it in the ridiculous position of a "porcelain fleet," a decoration navy, which in this case renders no benefit to a nation, but consumes money without any benefit."¹⁵

If Gómez wanted Colombia represented in Korea, then the government had to be serious about funding the navy.

The experience of modernizing the frigate's weapon systems substantiates Herrera's point. After repairs made the *Almirante Padilla* seaworthy, Captain Reyes noted that the vessel's guns were still obsolete. Replacing them would cost five or six times the original estimate for the entire repairs. Funds were short, but as Reyes recalled, an American advisor candidly told him, "I congratulate you on the magnificent repairs to the machinery and hull, but what are you going to do in Korea with seaworthiness, and with good propulsion, but without armament?"¹⁶ Herrera concurred, noting simply, "We are going to war and we must go prepared."¹⁷ Fortunately, both Reyes and Piedrahíta, the naval attaché, successfully conveyed their sobering realizations to the government in Bogotá, which authorized the additional funds.

The installation of new guns and fire control systems completed the ship's refitting, and ARC *Almirante Padilla* finally sailed from San Diego on 28 February 1951. Reyes and his crew arrived at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 21 March, where they completed four weeks of intensive exercises. The Colombians rehearsed with their new ship the latest methods of antisubmarine patrol, antiaircraft defense, and shore bombardment. Upon completion of this final training, ARC *Almirante Padilla* set out for the Far East, at last ready to back with armed force Colombia's commitment to collective security.

The Colombians arrived at the UN naval base at Sasebo on 5 May, now assigned to the Patrol and Escort Group of Task Force 95.13, a

component of the UN naval forces in Korean waters. The reality of combat now seemed very close. To Lieutenant Herrera, Sasebo seemed the last outpost of peace on a long journey from safety to combat. The busy port city, full of UN personnel coming and going from leave, seemed to him "the very edge of the war."¹⁸

The Colombians entered the naval war at a time when it was undergoing transition. After UN Forces halted the Chinese offensive in late spring 1951, the land war had become stalemated. Previously, when the ground campaign had involved considerable movement as UN and communist forces pushed each other up and down the peninsula, the task of the UN naval forces had been to support ground operations with coastal gunfire and participation in amphibious flanking maneuvers. As the spring of 1951 passed into summer and the land war became deadlocked, such operations became less vital. The UN naval commanders sought new ways to render their forces useful. First, they initiated a vigorous coastal minesweeping campaign, in order to keep options open for future amphibious operations should a war of movement resume on the ground. Second, UN naval forces harassed North Korean and Chinese coastal supply lines by attacking any depot, road, or rail line within naval gunfire range and by conducting coastal raids behind enemy lines. When the *Almirante Padilla* arrived to bring a Colombian naval presence to the Far East, the naval side of the Korean conflict had turned into a war of extended siege and harassment operations.¹⁹

This did not mean that the Colombians would lack opportunities to realize their nation's objectives for sending forces to Korea. Supposedly unglamorous missions could quickly turn dangerous, giving the Colombians considerable opportunities to draw attention to their vessel as a valuable contribution to the cause of collective security. Although the Colombian navy's unit in Korean waters would receive seemingly unglamorous patrol and escort assignments, it would gain valuable experience unavailable elsewhere.

In general, commanders of escort ships such as destroyers and frigates enjoyed considerable opportunities to display initiative. Blockade and convoy operations meant either aggressive action or monotonous drudgery, depending on the attitude of the commander and officers. Rear Admiral George Dyer, USN commander of PF 95, believed that the naval war in Korea offered skippers of escort vessels the chance to exhibit a special kind of aggressive leadership. Dyer called this special quality the "combative spirit" and believed it set apart the best officers and crews from those who, while technically competent, might lack this inner quality.²⁰ For Captain Reyes and his crew, displaying such combative spirit meant going far towards achieving Colombia's objectives and gaining international recognition.

The officers and crew of ARC *Almirante Padilla* received their first chance to display their initiative on 14 May 1951 when they sortied on their first mission. The operation typified naval actions following the stalemate. A UN naval force consisting of two carriers, two cruisers, six escorts including ARC *Almirante Padilla*, four minesweepers and two auxiliaries was to raid the island of Cho-do off the west coast of Korea. The objectives of the raid were to land a force of Royal Marines and South Korean marines on the island and the nearby coastal village of Yonchon-Do, gather intelligence, and take prisoners.²¹

As the force moved into firing position off Yonchon-Do on the afternoon of 20 May, Oscar Herrera Rebolledo recalled being "in total suspense" as the Colombians awaited the order with the rest of the force to open fire. The bombardment began at 1630, and Colombian sailors finally made good their nation's promise to resist aggression as part of the international community. They soon received a chance to demonstrate their enthusiasm and professional capabilities. When the crew of the destroyer HMS *Amethyst* noticed a beached mine which required destruction by gunfire, Reyes' gunners responded to the signal and opened fire immediately. At 1500 meters, they bracketed the

mine with two shots a few meters to either side, seconds after *Amethyst's* salvo had fallen 100 meters short. One gunner, Seaman Second Class Pedro Tenjo, enthusiastically jumped from behind the casemate of one of the 3-inch guns to call the final shot. The shot was perfect. Since the Colombians had fired a tracer round, every other UN ship saw the direct hit. Reyes and his men were quite proud that their allies noticed the precision of their gunnery, but Reyes recalled later that only laconic congratulations came at the time. The commander of the group radioed "Good shot." "And that was all," Reyes remembered, "The British are the British."²² Having encountered no opposition, the force left that evening.

Although heartening, the successful completion of their first operation marked only the beginning of a tour of duty for *Almirante Padilla* that would last over nine months, until 26 January 1952. During that time, Reyes and his crew would go far towards gaining Colombia's objective of achieving international recognition. They simultaneously acquired the navy combat experience unavailable elsewhere.

ARC *Almirante Padilla's* crew would participate in many missions that other sailors considered routine or unglamorous, but which the Colombians believed to yield valuable experience. Most of the frigate's assignments involved support of UN forces blockading communist-held ports. One such port whose environs they would come to know well was Wonson. The UN Command first decided to besiege Wonson in February 1951.

After the stalemate of the ground war in June, the UN Command decided to undertake a continuous and intense naval siege. The objective was to hold the harbor so that the port, the largest on the east coast of Korea, might be opened rapidly as a supply conduit if UN ground forces ever advanced north of Wonson. Naval forces could bombard the Wonson oil refinery and the main east coast rail line which ran through the town, thus furthering UN blockade efforts, and an intense siege might tie down communist ground forces by forcing them to

guard against a major UN amphibious landing.²³

The UN naval effort around Wonson soon became intense. Seemingly endless weeks of patrol and escort missions to, from, and around Wonson lay in store for Reyes and his crew, but the experience of real operations in a real war zone, and in cooperation with the most powerful navies in the world was invaluable for the development of the navy of a small Latin American state. The Colombians' persistence, dedication, and efficiency gained them recognition from their allies.

With one mission to their credit, the Colombians resumed active operations on 5 June when ARC *Almirante Padilla* sortied from Sasebo. They remained constantly at sea for the next twenty-seven days, completing a wide variety of challenging missions typical of naval operations in Korea. After escorting logistic vessels to Wonson, *Almirante Padilla* sailed 150 miles north to the enemy-held port of Songjin. There they participated in a week of night shore bombardment. Navigating under fire in dense fog tested their skill. Further experience in zero-visibility navigation came during underway replenishment operations, completed with a US oiler in dense fog, thanks to the expertise of radar operator Seaman First Class Humberto Jiménez. Colombian naval personnel of all ranks were becoming even more proficient in the skills necessary for modern naval operations. Additional valuable experience came on 14 June, when *Almirante Padilla* picked up a group of South Korean intelligence operatives on the island of Yo-do, who had previously landed behind enemy lines.²⁴

The *Almirante Padilla's* next mission lasted from 10 July to 31 July. The majority of the time at sea in this mission, however, was spent in more routine escort missions, convoying supply ships and tankers from the UN logistical base at Ullung-Do to the naval forces blockading Wonson. Crews of other UN escort ships assigned such duty often longed for more exciting bombardment missions. Captain Reyes and his crew, however, relished this and any opportunity to acquire real operational experience of any kind. Oscar Herrera Rebolledo recorded in his diary of such missions that:

surely for others [they] did not have any importance, or were even disliked, but for us, what we sincerely desire is work, to train ourselves and deduce from the mission the best advantage; we were without care [as to] the type of mission they assigned us.²⁵

Other units may not have enjoyed such supposedly boring work as escort duty, but the *Almirante Padilla*'s service was achieving Colombia's objectives in the war: making a statement and gaining experience. Since any type of real experience was valuable, even "boring" escort duty was worthwhile, but the navy was not exerting a presence in Korean waters only to get practical experience. The military forces also had to demonstrate that the government stood committed to collective security. The pride of knowing, and seeing others acknowledge that Colombia was making a worthwhile contribution did much to further this second objective.

For example, some officers connected the commemoration of events in Colombian history with what they perceived as the present fight for freedom in Korea. Oscar Herrera recorded the celebration of Navy Day, which commemorated the Colombian victory of 24 July 1823, in which Admiral José Prudencia Padilla defeated a Spanish squadron in the battle of Lake Maracaibo. Enjoying a respite from uneventful escort duty, the crew of Colombia's only warship in the Far East spent Navy Day firing vigorously at Chinese shore batteries in Wonson harbor. They were proud they could spend the anniversary of the battle in combat. Colombian fears that their larger allies would regard them as a nuisance and barely tolerable token unit were allayed when commanders of American supply vessels specifically requested the frigate as an escort. They were pleased that the *Almirante Padilla*, in apparent contrast to other frigates and destroyers, actually steamed with a sense of urgency.²⁶

Although the chance to gain recognition and acquire valuable experience meant the Colombians accepted cheerfully those missions others

disliked, their enthusiasm was not unshakable. As the escort work continued, Herrera wished the crew could spend more time bombarding actual Chinese positions in Wonson harbor. He felt they had a duty to face danger, and was concerned that the Colombian public falsely imagined the crew in heated battle every day. Herrera wanted to fight. He knew, however, that the Colombian navy was in Korea to prove a point to the international community, and in doing so it was gaining valuable experience. The means of achieving Colombia's objective might not always entail performing the most exciting duties. Even though a mission was unglamorous, executing it with dedication was what mattered. Despite the disappointment of being away from the action at Wonson, Herrera wrote, "we have been able to conform ourselves to this situation." Some occasional breaks in the monotony enlivened the crew, such as when the *Almirante Padilla* made intermittent sonar contact with what the Colombians believed might be hostile submarines. If UN ships ever positively identified any Russian submarines, this could signal the beginning of a serious extension of the war. Herrera recorded in his diary his conviction that the confirmed appearance of enemy subs would likely signal the beginning of "a very frightening war."²⁷

For the most part, the monotony continued through the rest of the summer. The Colombians completed an additional cruise before sailing on 20 September for Yokosuka. There the *Almirante Padilla* remained until 1 November for overhaul and maintenance. Officers evaluated their combat experiences thus far, and began the formal institutionalization of their new experience. During the overhaul, they prepared a new Book of Unit Organization for the ship. It outlined standard operating procedures for all major departments, directors and personnel, watch procedures, and daily routines.²⁸

Herrera noted that this new unit organization reflected the needs of actual combat service. The Colombian officers did have access during the revision to a comparable US Navy



ARC *Capitán Tono*, the former USS *Bisbee* (PF 46) and sister to ARC *Almirante Padilla*, during the 1950s. Built by Consolidated Steel Corporation in Los Angeles and completed in February 1944, she was purchased by Colombia in January 1952. She spent about a year in Korean waters, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Hernando Berón Victoria. Her missions included shore bombardment and escort duty around North Korean and Chinese held ports on the east coast of Korea. Her crew's skill and dedication earned them the praise of their American allies. Official photograph, US Navy. Courtesy of The Mariner's Museum, Newport News, Virginia.

publication. It was not enough, however, to simply translate the American work. Each section of the new manual resulted from careful considerations, based upon actual experience of the past few months. They decided that, contrary to American practice, the position of armament section head should go to an officer senior to the head of the operations section. Reyes based his decision on distinctly Colombian concerns. In any future conflict in which the navy was likely to participate, an armament section head would likely have more responsibilities than he would on a typical US escort vessel. The real developmental benefits of operations in an actual war zone for the navy were becoming increasingly clear.²⁹

Captain Reyes put his crew's experience to use again when the *Almirante Padilla* sailed from Yokosuka on 1 November to resume the familiar escort and bombardment missions. The crew experienced a different though unpleasant element of active operations late on 2 November when Lieutenant Jaime Parra Ramirez and Petty Officers Alfonso Fajardo and Vidal Martínez were wounded when thrown against some machinery in extremely rough seas. Reyes hospitalized the injured men in Sasebo, then steamed toward the zone of operations. For most of November and December, the Colombians remained at sea. Reyes' crew gained a wide variety of valuable experience, such as assisting a US transport vessel with difficult navigation



*Tacoma-class patrol frigate USS Burlington (PF 51) prior to her sale to Colombia. Built by Consolidated Steel Corporation and completed in April 1944, she was sold to Colombia in January 1953 and renamed ARC *Almirante Brión*. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Carlos Prieta Silva, she was the last of three Colombian frigates to serve during the Korean War. US Navy. Print purchased from Real War Photos, Hammond, Indiana.*

into the port of Masan. Other operations included sinking contact mines with gunfire and participating in the rescue of downed pilots.³⁰

Almirante Padilla's final mission in Korean waters lasted from 6 January to 26 January 1952. Again, the Colombians received valuable experience. This time they transported and participated in the logistic support of a mixed US-South Korean intelligence-gathering force on the island of Yang-Do, near Songjin. Upon completion of her seventh and final mission, ARC *Almirante Padilla* prepared to return to Colombia. The frigate's service had done much to further Colombia's goals in the war. Reyes and his crew had put Colombian guns behind the nation's faith in the UN to uphold principles of collective security, all the while accumulating invaluable combat experience. After stops in Yokosuka and Pearl Harbor, ARC *Almirante*

Padilla arrived at Bocachica, Colombia on 20 March 1952.³¹

The return of ARC *Almirante Padilla* did not signal the end of Colombia's naval participation in the Korean war. As early as June 1951, the Gómez government began asserting to the United States that Colombia's war effort came, ironically, at the expense rather than benefit of the navy's long-term development. They cited the difficulty of continuing routine training at home with their best ship and men in Korea. Thus they requested an additional two ships comparable to the *Almirante Padilla*. Washington did assent to this argument, apparently ignoring the real gains in valuable experience Colombia actually acquired from her navy's service thus far. The Colombians purchased on 24 January 1952 USS *Bisbee*, another Tacoma class patrol frigate, and sister of the

Almirante Padilla.³²

The Colombian crew took over the *Bisbee* on 31 January 1952. She received the name ARC *Capitán Tono*, in honor of Captain Rafael Tono, a naval hero of the war of independence against Spain. Most senior officers and department heads, as well as many petty officers transferred to the new frigate. Captain Reyes, however, went home, turning over command of Colombia's contribution to the UN naval forces to Lieutenant Commander Hernando Berón Victoria.

Berón and his largely veteran crew faced even more intense challenges and received even more opportunities to gain experience than the men of *Almirante Padilla* had the previous year. Many of the *Capitán Tono*'s missions throughout the next year initially might have seemed similar to those of the *Almirante Padilla*. The sea war in Korea during 1952, however, would involve greater demands on UN warships. The continued stalemate on land inspired the American commanders of the UN naval task forces in Korea to increase the intensity of coastal bombardment operations. UN ships would have to display increased skill in navigation and gunnery during the new year, as more intense enemy coastal gunfire forced UN ships to steam faster, change course more frequently and offer extremely accurate gunfire.³³

Captain Berón and his men rose to the challenge. After five weeks of intense training and working up, *Capitán Tono* received orders assigning her to Task Force 95.5. She sortied from Sasebo on 1 May, and remained at sea until 3 June. The veterans of ARC *Almirante Padilla* would have found most of the crew's work familiar. Her missions included escorting logistic ships supporting the Wonson siege, and rendering assistance to UN minesweepers operating off Hungnam and Songjin. The *Capitán Tono* also devoted four days to antisubmarine training, reflecting the UN naval command's increasing concern with a possible Russian submarine threat.³⁴

Like the crew of her predecessor, the men of the *Capitán Tono* did not suffer from lack of

opportunities to add to their operational combat experience. The Colombians were becoming proficient in all the tasks expected of the expert crew of an escort vessel. Once while patrolling off Wonson, the *Capitán Tono* responded to a South Korean frigate's report of enemy troop movements on the shore opposite *Capitán Tono*'s patrol sector. Berón and his crew reacted quickly, and the now experienced Colombian gunners successfully disrupted the enemy ground movement. The *Capitán Tono* also contributed to the UN effort to interdict North Korean fishing, destroying eight fishing sampans during late May and early June.

The Colombians were heartened when sailors from other UN nations recognized their proficiency. On one occasion during June, while off Hungnam, the Colombians received a radio message of thanks from US minesweepers when the *Capitán Tono*, responding to a call for help, silenced shore batteries harassing the minesweepers.³⁵

ARC *Capitán Tono* continued escort and patrol operations throughout the rest of the summer and into the fall. The crew received several weeks of much needed rest in July, and again later in September. The *Capitán Tono*'s antisubmarine training paid off on 9–10 October, when she made contact with an unknown submarine and kept it in check for thirty hours. The variety of experience which the Colombians had been accumulating was turning into a variety of expertise. Further international recognition of the Colombian war effort came in November, when the South Korean Minister of Marine officially recognized the ship's service as exceptional, a distinction upon which the Colombians placed much importance.³⁶

ARC *Capitán Tono* then concluded her service in Far Eastern waters and sailed for Colombia on 27 January 1953. Most of the senior officers returned home, some after almost two years of service in Korea. Of the department heads, only one officer, Jaime Parra Ramirez, remained to serve on the *Capitán Tono*'s replacement. The new ship was another recently acquired Tacoma class patrol frigate,



Lieutenant Commander Jaime Parra Ramirez during the Korean War. Parra served as Executive Officer on all three Colombian frigates during the war. He later rose to the rank of admiral and commanded the Colombian navy from 1968–1974. Photo courtesy of Admiral (ret.) Jaime Parra Ramirez, Santafé de Bogotá, Colombia.

the former USS *Burlington*. On 12 January 1953, Lieutenant Commander Carlos Prieta Silva took command of the frigate, now renamed ARC *Almirante Brión* after Admiral Luis Brión, another of the naval leaders of the Colombian war of independence.

Like her predecessors, *Almirante Brión*

needed some minor repairs and working-up before she could begin active operations. In addition, the mostly non-veteran officers and crew needed considerable training. For the next several months her crew intensively practiced underway replenishment, antiaircraft and surface gunnery, antimine gunfire, and antisubmarine attacks. It was not until 18 July, over six months later, that *Almirante Brión* finally sailed from Yokosuka for Sasebo, ready for active operations. ARC *Almirante Brión* had been on active service off the Korean coast for only a few days when the UN and communist delegations at Panmunjom finally agreed on truce terms on 27 July 1953. Colombia maintained a frigate in Korean waters until 15 December 1955, but the fighting phase of the war was over.³⁷

When the hostilities ended, the Colombian navy could say it had done much to achieve the nation's objectives in Korea. Through successful active service, it had clearly demonstrated the seriousness of the nation's commitment to the principle of collective security. It was not simply a theoretical principle. Rather, it was a reality, backed by an international

force which included a Colombian contribution. The international community had demonstrated that unwarranted aggression would be met with force, and Colombian naval power, although minor compared to that of other powers, helped enforce that point. Moreover, Colombia's UN allies recognized through actions and state-

ments the value of its small but effective contribution.

Colombian naval officers themselves expressed pride and satisfaction at having completed the mission their government gave them in October 1950. More than four decades later, Captain Manuel Torres Guzman, who had served as a lieutenant on both ARC *Almirante*

Padilla and ARC *Capitán Tono*, summed up the significance of the navy's contribution in Korea by recalling that it "signified the completion of a solemn promise by Colombia to repel aggression on a member of the United Nations organization." Torres likewise felt satisfied that the navy's efforts received recognition. Praise from allies was linked in Torres' recollection to the



Lieutenant Manuel Guillermo Torres Guzman (left) and Jaime Parra Ramirez (right). Torres served aboard ARC *Almirante Padilla* as communications officer and ARC *Capitán Tono* as operations officer. Like many of his colleagues, he believed the Colombian navy's Korean service was decisive for its development. At the same time, he claimed, the navy avoided becoming entangled in political controversy at home. Photo courtesy of Admiral (ret.) Jaime Parra Ramirez, Santafé de Bogotá, Colombia.

Colombians' own fighting spirit. He recalled "moments of tension were mixed with risk and camaraderie with Allied ships, nostalgia for our own far-off country, and indescribable pride when we received word of congratulations for completed missions."³⁸

The US recognized Colombia's efforts, thanks to the latter's ardent, small scale use of naval force. Despite its initial concerns, the Defense Department never found Colombia's small military and naval contribution to the UN effort to be more trouble than it was worth. On the contrary, the Americans were so impressed that the United States government waived Colombia's financial responsibility for the logistical support it received throughout the war.³⁹ Admiral Gidberto Barona Silva, who served as a lieutenant aboard the *Almirante Brión*, believed that sustained logistical support had been linked to Colombian competence. Forty years later, he recalled, "The force which the Colombian government sent to heed the call of the United Nations was always valued by commanders on all levels, from the hands of which we received that which was most valued: continued logistic support." He noted that such support was important for morale in that it facilitated, among other things, continued contact with home through an excellent military and naval postal system.⁴⁰

Colombian naval officers believed the navy's effort was successful in affirming the nation's support of collective security for another reason. They believed the navy's service in Korea represented the Colombian polity as a whole, not a specific political party or group. Certainly Gómez and the Conservatives hoped to show their support for the United States in a period of interparty strife. When Colombian guns fired off Wonson, however, internecine conflict at home was far from the minds of most Colombian officers. In this sense, the navy avoided the difficult position of the ground forces, which helped "conservatize" the Colombian army. Many of the officers sent to serve with the 1,100 man infantry battalion, which fought from June 1951 to July 1953,

were affiliated or sympathized with the Liberal Party. While some army officers sought Korean service as an alternative to the possibility of fighting Liberal Party rebels, others believed the Conservative government sent them to Korea hoping to remove them from the domestic political scene.⁴¹

Colombian navy officers, by contrast, never believed the Korean War politicized their officer corps. First, all officers who served in Korea were volunteers. When asked about the effect of the inter-party dispute on the navy in the early 1950s, Manuel Torres Guzman wrote:

It does not bother me at all to comment unqualifiedly that in our navy, and this was my case, that there was no political preference on the part of its components.

That was a norm best understood by realizing that the entire nation was maintaining an inflamed political fight between the two traditional political parties. But for us in the navy, we had to act by going to war devotedly, and committed totally to the service of the country.

Believe me that we did this, and more; we did it without surprise, without doubt, and with a firm conviction that it was what we should do, for the good of Colombia.⁴²

The navy's experience in Korea confirmed the armed forces' tradition of remaining largely unpoliticized. Rather than concerning themselves with the increasingly problematic political controversies at home, naval officers believed they embodied their republic's application of naval power to the cause of collective security.

Many officers also believed that while pursuing the objective of demonstrating a commitment to collective security, the navy succeeded in earning a corollary benefit: the acquisition of valuable new equipment, training and real-life experience for the armed forces. The men who led Colombia's small naval

contingent in Korea knew the war would not place them in the heart of the most exciting or glamorous naval actions; however, they did know that it would place them in a position to learn lessons unavailable elsewhere.

For the United States, the decision to commit armed forces to Korea was fraught with dilemmas about defining objectives and limiting the war.⁴³ For Colombia, however, the decision was much more clear cut. It would use its armed forces to demonstrate the nation's commitment to the ideals of the UN, and in the process increase its military capabilities. It was enough that the navy completed any active combat service at all. Perhaps the Korean War frustrated the US Navy, as it strained after the stalemate to make some appreciable positive contribution to the war. For the Colombian navy, the war was far from frustrating; in Torres Guzman's words, it was an "exceptional opportunity." The navy learned "the most advanced techniques in naval warfare, participating as equals in wartime operations in combination with the most prestigious navies in the world."⁴⁴

The men charged with Colombia's defense in the years following the Korean War knew such experience would be applicable. General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, who commanded Colombian ground forces in Korea, and later served as Armed Forces Chief of Staff, considered the experience of the *Almirante Padilla* and the *Capitán Tono* in landing troops behind enemy lines and participating in logistical support of ground forces applicable to any possible future conflict with Peru. Colombia's foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s was not overly confrontational towards its Latin American neighbors, but outstanding territorial disputes raised increasing concern, and military planners naturally thought of applying the real war experience gained in Korea to contingency plans.⁴⁵

The Colombians probably did not mind showing their neighbors that they had learned much in Korea. The real war experience of 1950–1953 set the navy apart from the fleets of Colombia's neighbors. Several weeks after

returning from its Korean tour, ARC *Almirante Padilla* became involved in a tense incident with Venezuela. The ship's participation in gunnery exercises off Los Monjes, three disputed islands in the Gulf of Venezuela, evoked protest from the Venezuelan government. The two states resolved the incident peacefully, but a Colombian warship had demonstrated the navy's recently acquired expertise in small-caliber naval gunnery. While the exercises were probably not intended as a provocation, the incident indicated that the navy's ability to protect the nation's interests had to be taken seriously.⁴⁶

The Korean war had mixed effects on the individual careers of the naval officers who served there. For some, the experience of fighting in a real war undoubtedly set them apart from their colleagues and their counterparts in other Latin American navies. Admiral Gidberto Barona Silva recalled:

My service in Korea was totally favorable to my career, not only in itself, but for all the experience acquired there, applied later in Colombia for the development of a modern and efficient navy. Personally, it had a favorable effect on my career and permitted me to transfer to different levels including remaining for a space of six years a professor at the Superior War School of my country, and transmitting my experiences to those being promoted.⁴⁷

Captain Manuel Torres, conversely, never believed that his Korean service ever affected his later career one way or the other. He was, however, careful to note that the opportunity to serve in Korea did "enrich my personal life very much in the aspect of my education and culture."⁴⁸

Barona and Torres agree, however, that the Korean War indisputably gave the navy a unique opportunity to increase its readiness in both material and training. At the same time, Colombia's navy successfully acted as an instrument of foreign policy. The Gómez government had the simple objective of making the

point that Colombia believed the principle of collective security could and should be backed by armed force.

The Colombian navy helped make that point effectively in 1950–1953. In doing so, it enhanced its ability to protect the nation's interests. The opportunities for institutional development in the Korean War were considerable. Gidberto Barona Silva reflected unequivocally; "The navy of Colombia can be divided in

two: before Korea and after Korea. That is the feeling of the officer corps which has led the institution."⁴⁹ The Korean War may have been a time of frustration and uncertainty arising from unclear objectives and indecisive results for those powers who did the lion's share of the fighting. Colombian sailors knew their nation's objectives and applied naval force to achieve them. Although small scale, Colombia's use of seapower in 1950–1953 was expert.



NOTES

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2. David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 181–183, 195–196, 199–206, 211–213; Urán, *Guerra de Corea*, 28–30; Julio Cesar Reyes Canal, "Discurso del Capitán de Navío (r) Julio C. Reyes Canal en la Conmemoración del Cuadragésimo Aniversario del zarpe de la Fragata ARC 'Almirante Padilla' hacia Corea," photostat of printed document held by Colombia, Armed Forces, Naval Staff, Department M5: History and Public Relations, 49–50.
3. Bushnell, *Colombia*, 183; Stueck, *Korean War*, 12; Janet E. Hohmann, "Colombia y las Naciones Unidas," *La Nación* (Santafé de Bogotá) 29 March 1952, 2–3; Janet E. Hohmann, "Colombia y Corea," *La Nación* (Santafé de Bogotá) 26 April, 1952, 2–3.
4. Urán, *Guerra de Corea*, 29–30; J. Mark Ruhl, "The Military," *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Modern Colombia*, R. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman and Mauricio Solaun, eds. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), 187; J. Mark Ruhl, *Colombia: Armed Forces and Society* (Syracuse: Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1980), 17–19. Although Colombia has suffered from considerable political unrest in the twentieth century, its military has rarely interfered in the political process. Military leaders have been president only three times in the nation's history, and only one came to power through a coup. See Robert Wesson, ed., *The Latin American Military Institution* (New York: Praeger Press, 1986), 138–140, 177–180.
5. Ruhl, "Military," 182–183.
6. Pablo E. Nieto, *Historia de la Marina en Colombia: Escuela Naval, 1907–1957* (n.p.: Aedita, n.d.), 11. This and all following translations from Spanish language sources are mine. For Reyes' military reforms, see Bushnell, *Colombia*, 157.
7. Ruhl, "Military," 183; Roger Chesneau, ed., *Conway's All the Worlds Fighting Ships 1922–1946* (New York: Mayflower Books, 1980), 148–149, 415; Randal Gray, ed., *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947–1982, Part II: The Warsaw Pact and Non-Aligned Nations* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 411–413.
8. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War* 3 (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 1974), 177; Valencia, *Historia*, 388.
9. Reyes, "Discurso," 50–51.
10. Ibid.; Julio Cesar Reyes Canal, "Actividades de la Fragata ARC Almirante Padilla," Alvaro Valencia Tovar, *Historia de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, vol. 4 Armada Nacional* (Santafé de Bogotá: Planeta, 1993), 393.
11. Oscar Herrera Rebolledo, "Comentario a las Reparaciones," photostat of printed document held by Colombia, Armed Forces, Naval Staff, Department M5: History and Public Relations, 286.
12. Reyes, "Discurso," 51; Herrera, "Comentario," 281–282.
13. Ibid., 290.
14. Reyes, "Discurso," 51.
15. Herrera, "Comentario," 283.
16. Reyes, "Discurso," 51.
17. Herrera, "Comentario," 285.
18. Reyes, "Actividades," 393; "Reseña Histórica de las Unidades Navales que participaron en la Campaña de Corea," memorandum from Commander Manuel Guillermo Torres Guzman Commanding Officer, ARC 20 de Julio, Cartegena, 26 November 1964, Nr. 470/FNA-MF, 3; Oscar Herrera Rebolledo, "Diario de un tripulante del A.R.C. Almirante Padilla,"

- manuscript in private collection of Admiral (ret.) Jaime Parra Ramirez, Santafé de Bogotá, Colombia, 128–129.
19. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957), 301–314.
 20. Ibid., 322.
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 23. Cagle and Manson, *Sea War*, 398–401.
 24. Reyes, "Actividades," 399–400; Torres, "Reseña," 3; Herrera, "Diario," 149.
 25. Ibid., 159.
 26. Ibid., 170; Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 5; Valencia, *Historia*, 392; Herrera, "Diario," 197.
 27. Ibid., 166, 189–190.
 28. Reyes, "Actividades," 402.
 29. Herrera, "Diario," 176–177; Reyes, "Actividades," 402.
 30. Ibid., 402–403.
 31. Ibid., 404–406; Torres, "Reseña," 3; Reyes, "Actividades," 406.
 32. Urán, *Guerra de Corea*, 38–39.
 33. Valencia, *Historia*, 293–294, 406–407; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War*, 330–331, 364–365.
 34. Valencia, *Historia*, 406.
 35. Ibid., 408–409.
 36. Ibid., 410; Torres, "Reseña," 5–6.
 37. Valencia, *Historia*, 203–205, 410–417.
 38. Manuel Guillermo Torres Guzman, Santafé de Bogotá, letter to Mark Danley, Manhattan, Kans., 22 November, 1995.
 39. Urán, *Guerra de Corea*, 52–53.
 40. Gidberto Barona Silva, Santafé de Bogotá, letter to Mark Danley, Manhattan, Kans., 7 January 1996.
 41. Adolfo Leon Atehortua and Humberto Velez, *Estado y Fuerzas Armadas en Colombia (1886–1953)* (Santafé de Bogotá: TM, 1994), 193–194. The claim that the Gómez government sent forces to Korea specifically to remove Liberal officers from the domestic political scene may have been exaggerated; Bushnell, *Colombia*, 212.
 42. Manuel Guillermo Torres Guzman, letter to Mark Danley. Torres' comments are substantiated by long-standing traditions of the Colombian armed forces. Unlike the military forces of other Latin American states, the Colombian military as a whole has consistently resisted any government attempts to politicize them. Even Gómez's efforts to "conservatize" the army during the Korean War period met with resistance. See for example Wesson, *Military*, 138–140.
 43. Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 45–106.
 44. Letter, Guzman to Danley.
 45. Alberto Ruiz Novoa, *Ensenanzas de la Campaña de Corea: Aplicables al Ejercito de Colombia* (Santafé de Bogotá: Antares, 1956), 287; Ruhl, "Military," 189.
 46. Valencia, *Historia*, 488–491.
 47. Letter, Silva to Danley.
 48. Letter, Guzman to Danley.
 49. Letter, Silva to Danley.



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THE BRIG *MEXICAN* OF SALEM, CAPTURED BY PIRATES, AND HER ESCAPE

EDWARD C. BATTIS

Some little time ago, the Essex Institute Historical Collections was transformed into the Peabody Essex Museum Collections, an annual monographic series. The pages of this remarkable periodical contained many important articles on marine subjects. The article published here is a sample. Written and printed a century ago, long before The American Neptune was first published in 1941, this article is here reproduced as a recognition of the wealth of materials published by the Peabody Essex Museum and its component parts for so very many years. The illustration is provided from PEM's collection, with the assistance of Dr. Daniel Finamore and Mrs. Geraldine Ayers of the Marine Department.

— Barry Gough

From the earliest times since men first dealt together and brought by land and sea the fruits of their toil for common exchange and trade, we find that they have been set upon and deprived of what rightly belongs to them, by those whose lawlessness proved a passport to riches and supremacy.

It has been remarked that piracy is a relic of that age before the usages of trade were conceived of, when the desire of one to possess that which belonged to another was his sufficient warrant in taking from him the property wished for.

For centuries, the effort of the civilized world has been directed against the system of

spoliation practiced upon "Those who go down to the sea in ships," and each country, for the protection of its subjects, has from time to time enacted such laws as were necessary for its suppression, until, by common consent, the law of nations has declared "a forcible deprivation on the high seas without lawful authority, done *animo furandi* in the spirit and intention of universal hostility" to be piracy, a felony punishable with extreme penalties.

Notwithstanding the increased watchfulness of authority and stringent enforcement of maritime laws toward the extermination of this common enemy of mankind, we find that there have always been those ever ready, through love of adventure or gain, to enter the lists with all the possibilities of final disaster and death. In modern ages there seems to have been a growing fondness for this high-handed spoliation of public and private interests, for the boldness of the freebooter did not presume to halt at individual belongings, but the property of the Crown has at times contributed toward a successful voyage.

The exploits of LeGrand Lolonais, Bert the Portuguese, Sir H. Morgan, Sharpe and Watlin are chronicled full of daring and brutality, while those of Mission, Bowen, Kidd, Halsey, Bellamy, Burgess and North, of a later period, exhibit but little improvement, except in the ingenuity of their cruelties.

It is true the buccaneers of the Barbadoes, with a certain flash and flavor of old ocean, have come down to us through history as the typical Rover of the deep, a combination of ferocity and courtly gallantry.

For our own commonwealth, as early as 1685, we find one of these birds of prey hover-

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ing off the coast to the southwest of Cape Cod, evidently scenting some not-over-plump Puritanical craft, for the Governor, by solemn proclamation, warned all mariners to look well for this stranger, supposed to be a pirate. From the beginning of Salem's commercial importance, down to the early part of the nineteenth century, we learn of innumerable piracies perpetrated on ships or other craft belonging to or sailing from this port.

So universal had this scourge become that, in 1824, the merchants of Salem, by circular letter, were summoned to counsel on the matter of petitioning Congress for means of relief.

These piratical depredations were in general committed by vessels putting out from Cuba, and preying on our commerce bound for South America, Africa, or the Indies.

True, the people of this good town had but little need of legend or poetic fancy to portray the horrors of piracy.

In the month of February, 1829, only a few years previous to the capture of the *Mexican*, the brig *New Priscilla*, of Salem, Captain Hart commanding, was found apparently abandoned a short distance out from Havana, but the finding by the boarding party of a young Salem boy spiked to the deck told a too-often repeated tale.

The British Government had at about this time begun a well-directed warfare against piracy along the West coast of Africa, also extending their work in the line of such craft as might be found engaged in the transportation of slaves, otherwise known as "Black Ivory." While our Navy at this time, hampered in its efficiency by the existence of that crime which the political power of the country sustained, was unable to watch too closely the acts of any vessel cruising for a double purpose and bent on the commission of either offense as might meet its convenience or profit; by England's code, piracy and slavery received about the same special attention, and the British, from the very start, made short work of offenders of either category who fell into their hands.

On the 29th of August, 1832, there sailed

from Salem the merchant brig *Mexican*, commanded by Captain John G. Butman, and owned by Joseph Peabody of this city. By the United States Custom records, we find the *Mexican* to have been a craft of two hundred and twenty-seven tons burthen register, built in Salem in 1824, and to have cleared at date referred to for Rio Janeiro and market.

In view of subsequent purchases, she sailed from this port in ballast, with the exception of about one hundred bags of salt petre and one hundred chests of tea, also having concealed in the run, some twenty thousand dollars in specie. Exclusive of the captain, the *Mexican* was officered and manned as follows: Benjamin B. Reed, first mate, John R. Nichols, second mate, Giancomo Ardissonne, Israel Luscomb, Frederic Trask, Theodore Siesbuttel, Benjamin Larcom, John Battis, Benjamin Daniels and Thomas Fuller, able seamen, Thomas C. H. Ridgely, colored cook, and John Lewis, colored steward; thirteen, all told.

On the 20th of September, 1832, when in latitude 33 north and longitude 34½ west, she fell in with and was captured by the schooner *Panda*, a piratical craft, by whom she was robbed of her specie, the crew maltreated and robbed of their small belongings; the pirates also taking such provisions and ship material as they wished, including such canvas, coils of rope, two spare spars, painted black. The crew and officers of the *Mexican* were finally driven below and all means of egress securely fastened, all running rigging and sails of the brig cut and mutilated, her caboose filled with combustibles and then fired, and both crew and brig abandoned to the flames. Of the officers and crew of the *Mexican* thus left to their fate, one officer, Capt. John R. Nichols (second mate), Capt. Thomas Fuller, John Battis and Benjamin Larcom still survive the events of that awful day sixty-six years ago.

From my father, I have derived the following narrative of that affair, which, I believe, was the last that has ever troubled the course of navigation upon the high seas, and for which its perpetrators received the prompt and full measure of justice meted out to them by the Federal Courts of this land.

NARRATIVE

"On the morning of the 29th of August, 1832, the brig *Mexican*, Joseph Peabody owner, sailed from Salem, Massachusetts, under command of John G. Butman, Captain, having a crew of twelve men; I had shipped as ordinary seaman on board the *Mexican*, signing the papers in Peabody's office at the foot of Elm street. I was at Peabody's store house at about seven o'clock on the morning of the day of sailing, and others of the crew came soon after. After waiting quite a while, it was suggested that we go after the cook, Ridgely, who was then boarded with a Mrs. Ranson, a colored woman living on Becket street, so we set out, three or four of us, to find him. He was at home, but disinclined to go, as he wished to pass one more Sunday at home. However, after some persuading, he got ready, and we all started out of the gate together. Here one little incident happened, illustrative of sailors' superstition; and as it afterwards turned out, might be applied to this particular narrative. A black hen was in the yard, and as we came out, the bird flew upon the fence, and flapping her wings gave a loud crow. The cook was wild with terror, and insisted that something was going to happen; that such a sign meant harm, and he ran about in search of a stone or something capable of knocking out the brain of the offending biped. The poor darky did not however, succeed in his murderous design, but followed us, grumbling.

"At about ten o'clock we mustered all present and accounted for, and commenced to carry the specie with which we were to purchase our return cargo, on board the brig in a sailboat from Peabody's wharf. We carried aboard twenty thousand dollars in silver, in ten boxes of two thousand dollars each; we also had on board about one hundred bags of salt petre, and one hundred chests of tea. The silver was stored in the 'run' under the cabin floor, and there was not a man aboard but knew where the money was stored.

"The brig lay in the harbor about opposite of Phillips' Wharf, well over toward Naugus Head.

"At last everything being ready, we hove anchor and stood out to sea in the face of a southeast wind, under the pilotage of old Captain Joseph Perkins of Baker's Island. The wind continued ahead all day; we kept beating, making but little headway, but by night we had made good offing, and were out of sight of land. As soon as we got outside and stowed anchor, cleared ship, and captain called all hands and divided the crew into watches; as near as I can remember, the mate's watch was Jack Ardisson, Israel Luscomb and myself. The captain's watch was composed of Benjamin Daniels, Benjamin Larcom, Fred Trask, Theodore Siesbittel and Thomas Fuller; John R. Nichols was second mate.

"On account of the several acts of piracy previously committed on Salem ships, Captain Butman undoubtedly feared, or, perhaps, had a premonition of a like happening to his vessel, for the next day while I was aft at work on the main rigging, I heard the captain and first mate talking about pirates. The captain said he would fight a long while before he'd give his money up. They had a long talk together, and he seemed to be very much worried. I think it was the next day after this conversation between Captain Butman and Mr. Reed, that I was at the wheel steering, when the captain came and spoke to me. He asked me how I felt about leaving home, and I replied that I felt the same as ever, all right. I learned afterwards that he had put this question to all the rest of the crew.

"We sailed along without anything occurring worthy of note, until the night of the 19th of September. After supper, we were all sitting together during the dog watch (this being between six and eight o'clock, P.M.), when all seemed bent on telling pirate yarns, and, of course, got more or less excited. I went below at twelve o'clock, and at four the next morning my watch was called. Upon coming on deck, the first mate came forward and said that we must keep a sharp look-out, as there was a vessel 'round, and that she had crossed our stern and gone to the leeward. I took a seat between the night heads, and

had been sitting there but a few minutes when a vessel crossed our bows and went to the windward of us. We were going at a pretty good rate at that time. I sang out and the mate came forward with a glass, but said he could not make her out. I told him he would see her to the windward at daylight. At dawn we discovered a top-sail schooner about five miles off our weather quarter, standing on the wind on the same tack we were. The wind was light, at south southwest, and we were standing about southeast. At seven o'clock, the captain came on deck, and this was the first he knew of the schooner being about us. I was at the wheel when the captain came out of the cabin; he looked toward the schooner, and as soon as he perceived her, he reached and took his glass and went up into the main-top. He came down and, closing his glass, said, 'That's the very man I've been looking for. I can count thirty men on his deck.' He also said that he saw one man on the fore-top-gallant-yard, looking out, and that he was very suspicious of her. He then ordered us to set all sail, as the schooner didn't seem to sail very fast, thinking we might get away from her. While I was up loosing the main-royal I sat on the yard, and let them hoist me up to the truck, so that I could have a good look around. I saw another vessel, a brig, to the eastward of us, away ahead, and reported it. The schooner had in the meanwhile sailed very fast, for when I started to come down, she was off our beam. From all appearances and her manner of sailing, we concluded afterwards that she had a drag out. When we went to breakfast, the schooner kept ahead of us and appeared to be after the other vessel. Then the captain altered the brig's course, tacking to the westward, keeping a little off from the wind to make good way through the water to get clear of her if possible. After breakfast, when we came on deck, the schooner was coming down on us under a full press of sail. I noticed two kegs of powder alongside of two short carronades, the only guns we had. Our means of defence, however, proved utterly worthless, as the shot was a number of sizes too large for the guns. A few moments before this the schooner had fired a short at us to heave to, which Captain Butman was on the point of

doing as I came on deck. The schooner then hoisted patriotic colors (Colombian flag), backed her main-top sail and laid to about half a mile to the windward, within hailing distance. The schooner was a long, low, straight, topsail schooner of about one hundred and fifty tons burthen, painted black, with a narrow white streak, a large head with a horn of plenty painted white; mast raked aft, and a large main-topmast, a regular Baltimore clipper; we could not see any name. She carried thirty or more men, with a long thirty-two pound swivel amidships, with four brass guns, two on each side. A hail came in English from the schooner, asking us where we were from and where bound and what our cargo was. Captain Butman replied, 'tea and salt petre.' The same voice from the schooner then hailed us for the Captain to lower a boat and come alongside, and bring with him his papers. The boat was got ready, and Captain Butman and four men — Jack Ardissonne, Thomas Fuller, Benjamin Larcom and Fred Trask — got in and pulled to the schooner. When they started, Captain Butman shook hands with the mate, Mr. Reed, and told him to do the best he could if he never saw him again. The *Mexican's* boat pulled up to the gangway of the schooner, but they ordered it to go to the forechains, then five of the pirates jumped into our boat, not permitting any of our men to go on board the schooner, and pushed off, ordering the captain back to the brig; they were armed with pistols in their belts, and long knives up their sleeves. While at the schooner's side, after getting into our boat, one of the pirates asked their captain in Spanish, what they should do with us, and his answer was 'Dead cats don't mew — have her thoroughly searched, and bring aboard all you can — you know what to do with them.' The orders of the captain of the schooner, being in Spanish, were understood by only one of the *Mexican's* crew then in the boat, namely, Ardissonne, who burst into tears, and in broken English, declared that all was over with them.

"It was related to me by one of our crew that while the *Mexican's* boat was at the forechains of the schooner, the brig before mentioned was plainly seen to the eastward, and the

remark was made to Thomas Fuller that it would be a good thing to shove off and pull for the vessel in sight, to which the proposition Fuller scornfully answered, 'I will do no such thing; I will stay and take my chances with the boys.'

“Our boat returned to the brig, and Captain Butman and the five pirates came on board; two of them went down in the cabin with him, and the other three loafed around the decks. Our first mate came up from the cabin and told us to muster aft and get the money up. Luscomb and I, being near the companion way, started to go down into the cabin, when we met the boatswain of the pirate coming up, who gave the signal for attack; the three pirates on deck sprang on Luscomb and myself, striking at us with the long knives across our heads. A Scotch hat I happened to have on, with a large cotton handkerchief inside, saved me from a severe wounding, as both were cut through and through. Our mate, Mr. Reed, here interfered and attempted to stop them from assaulting us, whereupon they turned on him.

“We then went down into the cabin and into the run; there were eight of us in all; six of our men then went back into the cabin, and the steward and myself were ordered to pass the money up, which we did, on to the cabin floor, and our crew then took it and carried it on deck. In the meantime, the pirate officer in charge (third mate) had hailed the schooner and told them they had found what they were looking for. The schooner then sent a launch containing sixteen men, which came alongside, and they boarded us. They made the crew pass the boxes of money down into their boat, and it was then conveyed on board the pirate.

“The launch came back, with about a dozen more men, and the search began in earnest. Nine of them rushed down into the cabin where the captain, Jack Ardissonne and myself were standing. They beat the captain with their long knives, and battered a speaking trumpet to pieces over his head and shoulders. Seeing we could do nothing, I made a break to reach the deck by jumping out of the cabin window,

thinking I could get there by grasping hold of the boat's davits and pulling myself up on deck. Jack Ardissonne, divining my movement, caught my foot as I was jumping and saved me, as I should probably have missed my calculation and gone overboard. Jack then ran and I after him, and the pirates after both of us, leaving the captain, whom they had continued to beat and abuse, demanding more money. We ran into the steerage. Jack, not calculating the break of the deck soon went into the hold, and I on top of him. For some reason, the pirates gave up the chase before they reached the break between decks, or they would have gone down with us. By the fall Jack broke two of his ribs. Under deck we had a clean sweep, there being no cargo, so we could go from one end of the vessel to the other. The crew then got together in the forecastle and staid there; we hadn't been there long before the mate, Mr. Reed, came rushing down, chased by the boatswain of the pirate, demanding his money. The mate then told Luscomb to go and get his money, which he had previously given Luscomb to stow away in some safe place; there were two hundred dollars in specie, and Luscomb had put it under the wood in the hold. Luscomb went and got it, brought it up and gave it to the pirate, who untied the bag, took a handful out, re-tied the bag, and went up on deck and threw the handful of money overboard so that those on the schooner could see they had found more money.

“Then the pirates went to Captain Butman and told him that if they found any more money which we hadn't surrendered they would cut all our throats. I must have followed them into the cabin, for I heard them tell the captain this. Previous to this, we of the crew found that we had about fifty dollars, which we secured by putting into my pickle keg, and this was secretly placed in the breast hook forward. On hearing this threat made to the captain, I ran back and informed the crew what I had heard, and we took the money out of my keg and dropped it down the air streak, which is the space between the inside and outside planking. It went way down to the keelson. Our carpenter

afterwards located its exact position and recovered every cent of it. Strange to say, the first thing they searched, on coming below, was the pickle keg. The search of our effects by the pirates was pretty thorough, and they took all new clothes, tobacco, etc. In the cabin they searched the captain's chest, but failed to get at seven hundred dollars, which he had concealed in the false bottom; they had previously taken from him several dollars which he had in his pocket, and his gold watch, and had also relieved the mate of his watch, and when they finally departed, took our boat and colors.

“About noon it appeared to be very quiet on deck, we having been between decks ever since the real searching party came on board. We all agreed not to go on deck again, and to make resistance with sticks of wood if they attempted to come down, determined to sell our lives as dearly as possible. Being somewhat curious, I thought I'd peep up and see what they were doing; as I did so, a cocked pistol was pressed to my head, and I was ordered to come on deck, and went, expecting to be thrown overboard. One took me by the collar and held me out at arm's length to plunge a knife into me. I looked him right in the eye, and he dropped his knife and ordered me to get the doors of the forecastle, which were below. I went down and got them, but they did not seem to understand how they were to be used, and they made me come up and ship them. They were not doors in the same sense as those now in use, but were merely boards fitting into grooves, as in a coal bin. There were three of them, and as I was letting the last one in, I caught the gleam of a cutlass being drawn, so taking the top of the door on my stomach, I turned a quick somersault and went down head first into the forecastle; the cutlass came down, but did not find me; it went into the companionway quite a depth. Then they hauled the slide over and fastened it, and we were all locked below. They fastened the aft companionway leading down into the cabin, locking our officers below as well. From noises that came from overhead, we were convinced that the pirates

had begun their work of destruction. All running rigging, including tiller ropes, was cut, sails slashed into ribbons, spars cut loose, ship instruments and all movable articles on which they could lay hands were demolished, the yards were tumbled down and we could hear the main boom swinging from side to side. They then, as appears by later developments, filled the caboose, or cook's galley, with combustibles, consisting of tar, tarred rope-yarn, oakum, etc., setting fire to the same, and lowered the dismantled mainsail so that it rested on top of the caboose. In this horrible suspense we waited for an hour or more, when all became quiet, save the wash of the sea against the brig. All this time, the crew had been cooped up in the darkness of the forecastle, of course unable to speculate as to what would be the next move of the enemy, or how soon death would come to each and all of us.

“Finally, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, Thomas Fuller came running forward and informed us that the pirates were leaving the ship; one after another of the crew made their way to the cabin, and on peering out of the two small stern windows saw the pirates pulling for the schooner. Captain Butman was at this time standing on the cabin table, looking out from a small sky light, the one means of egress the pirates had neglected to fasten. We told him that from the odor of the smoke, we believed they had fired the brig; he said that he knew it and ordered us to remain quiet. He then stepped down from the table and for several moments knelt in prayer, after which he calmly told us to go forward and he would call us when he wanted us. We had not been in the forecastle long before he called us back, and directed that we all get buckets under the deck and fill them with water from casks in the hold. On our return he again opened the skylight and drew himself upon deck. We then handed him a small bucket of water, and he crept along the deck in the direction of the caboose, keeping well under the rail in order to escape observation from the schooner, and pushing the bucket before him. The fire was just breaking through the top of the caboose, when he arrived in time to throw several handfuls of water on top as to keep it

under; this he continued to do for a long time, not daring to extinguish it immediately lest the pirates should notice the absence of smoke and know their plan for our destruction had been frustrated. When the fire had been reduced to a reasonable degree of safety, he came and opened the aft companionway and let us all up. The schooner, being a fast sailer, was in the distance about hull down. The fire in the caboose was allowed to burn in a smouldering condition for perhaps a half hour or more, keeping up a dense smoke. By this time the pirate schooner was well nigh out of sight, or nearly topsails under to the eastward. On looking about us, we found the *Mexican* in a bad plight, all sails, halyards and running gear were cut, head sails dragging in the water, and on account of the tiller ropes being cut loose, the brig was rolling about in the trough of the sea. We at once set to work repairing damages as speedily as possible, and before dark had bent new sails and repaired our running gear to a great extent.

"Fortunately, through the shrewdness and foresight of Captain Butman, our most valuable ship instruments, compass, quadrant, sextant, etc. had escaped destruction. It seems that immediately on discovering the true character of the stranger, he had without mentioning the fact to any one, placed them in the steerage and covered them with a quantity of oakum, making quite a pile; this the pirates somehow overlooked in their search, although they passed and repassed it continually during their visit.

"The brig was then put before the wind, steering north, and as by the intervention of Divine Providence a strong wind came up, which before dark developed into a heavy squall with thunder and lightening, we let the brig go before the fury of the gale, not taking in a stitch of canvas.

"On attempting to provide a mess, we found that the pirates had, in their search for money, not neglected to pay a visit to the galley, for they had, much to our disgust, run their knives through and through the duff bags, pudding and all. Of course that was speedily thrown overboard as unfit for men to eat.

"We steered north until the next morning,

when the brig's course was altered and we stood due west, tacking off and on several courses for a day or two, when finally a homeward course was taken which was kept up until we reached Salem, October 12, 1832."



So ended the voyage of the *Mexican*. But to the honored memory of Captain Butman, let it be said that throughout the terrible doings of that awful day, when the lives of himself and his crew were momentarily in the greatest danger, the true character of this gentleman and commander stood forth above all. While on him was directed the hideous brutality of the pirate horde, both nobly and manfully did he maintain his dignity and noble bearing, never for a moment forgetting his duty to God and his fellow-man.

On his landing from the *Mexican*, Captain Butman communicated the facts to the authorities, submitting a statement of the piracy for publication.

It so happened that a few days after the arrival of the *Mexican*, there hailed from this port a ship bound to Africa, commanded by a Captain Hunt. This officer took with him a copy of the *Essex Register*, a Salem newspaper, containing Captain Butman's statement. In due course of time, Captain Hunt arrived with his ship at the island of St. Thomas, and while lying there at anchor, he noticed the arrival of a top-sail schooner, which from the first excited his suspicions. Having on shore a confidant, whom he supposed he could trust, Captain Hunt one afternoon invited this man on shipboard and communicated to him his suspicions regarding the new arrival. Hunt then showed him a copy of the Salem paper and told him that in his opinion this craft was the identical one that robbed the *Mexican*. They remained on board sufficient time to make themselves familiar with all that might in any way lead to identification, and then took their boat for shore. Hunt then unfolded to his friend a plan of capture, saying that it was his intention to slip his cable

at night, put to sea and run down to a rendezvous of British war ships and report what he had discovered.

In a measure, Captain Hunt was prevented from carrying his plan into execution, for just before dusk the schooner, under full press of canvas, ran out and as she passed within hailing distance, spoke Captain Hunt, informing him that if he dared to put to sea that night, he and his crew would have their throats cut. It is evident that treachery had been lurking somewhere or that the pirates had suspected Hunt's design.

While Hunt watched the retreating schooner, he was rewarded by sighting a British man-of-war coming to harbor. As quickly as possible, he put out in his boat, and speaking the frigate, gave information of the robbery of the *Mexican* and his opinion concerning the craft just put to sea. The man-of-war at once about-ship and followed in chase, but the schooner appears to have made good her escape in the night and steered for the African coast.

At about this time, the British brig-of-war *Curlew*, commanded by Capt. Henry D. Trotter, was cruising along the west African coast, and after making several ports, arrived at Prince's Island; while there she received information regarding the robbery of the *Mexican*, probably from the frigate engaged in the chase referred to, or from reports circulated by its officers. Captain Trotter was convinced, from the description given him of the vessel, that it corresponded with that of a schooner then lying in the River Nazareth, for which place the *Curlew* at once sailed.

We find from the statement of George H. Quentin, R.N., at the trial of the pirates in Boston that, on arrival of the *Curlew* at the River Nazareth, Captain Trotter, with a force of forty men, proceeded up the river in boats, and at daybreak the next morning, got sight of the schooner lying at anchor. As soon as the pirates saw the English, they took to the shore. After an unsuccessful attempt to capture the crew, the English returned to the schooner, which they found on fire, but extinguished the same before

it had done much damage. Immediate search for the log book and papers was made, but without success. The schooner was described by Quentin to have been at that time a long, low craft, with top-sails, sharp, and with masts which raked a great deal; her figure head had been cut off, also was destitute of a name. The English appear to have had possession of the schooner about ten days, when by accident she took fire and blew up, killing two officers and two men belonging to the *Curlew*.

The pirates, on fleeing to the shore, struck into the bush, and in a measure sought the protection of some native king, on whom Captain Trotter promptly made demand for the surrender of the fugitives, which the king finally agreed to, but failed to carry out his agreement. The English succeeded, however, in capturing four of the schooner's crew in or about this locality, five more were secured at Fernando Po, and several more afterwards apprehended at St. Thomas. The prisoners were carried to England, first landed at Plymouth, and afterwards taken to Portsmouth.

After several hearings on the case before the British Admiralty Courts, the English authorities waived jurisdiction in the matter, and surrendered the prisoners to the United States government for trial. For this purpose, they were placed on board the brig-of-war *Savage*, Lieutenant-Commander Loney, which sailed from Portsmouth, July 23, 1834, and arrived in Salem August 27, of that year.

The arrival of the *Curlew* in Salem harbor with sixteen pirates on board, that afternoon in August, sixty-four year ago, is fully chronicled in the newspapers of the day.

After coming to anchor, the Commander dispatched a note ashore directed to the commanding officer of the garrison, proffering the usual courtesies of a salute; but, as there was neither commanding officer nor garrison here, the note was duly opened at the Custom House and a verbal answer sent by the Collector that a salute would be returned. The absence also of a British flag in town, made it necessary to borrow one from the war vessel to be hoisted on

shore, as is customary in such cases while firing a shot.

The arrival of a foreign vessel of war within our harbor was an unusual occurrence, and the circumstances united with the interesting nature of her errand as an agent in the great cause of humanity, excited a general interest among the citizens. We learned that the officers were hospitably entertained by several of our prominent citizens at their homes, while the insurance companies, as a token of the estimation in which they hold the services of the officers and crew, sent on board the war vessel an ample supply of fresh provisions, etc.

It so happened that on the arrival of the "Savage" at this port, the *Mexican* was lying at anchor in the harbor and officered by the same captain and first mate who were in command at the time of the robbery, and fortunately most of her crew serving at the time of that disastrous voyage were also at home; they consequently were all detained as witnesses, and soon afterwards testified at the trial relative to the circumstances of the piracy and the recognition by them of several of the defendants.

On the 29th of August the prisoners were landed at Crowninshield Wharf and conveyed in carriages to the Town Hall (the Court House being under repairs) where a preliminary hearing was had before the Hon. John Davis, Judge of the United States District Court. To the complaint the prisoners severally pleaded "not guilty," and after further hearing were remanded to the jail in Boston to await action of the United States Grand Jury. At the coming in of the October terms of the United States Circuit Court at Boston, the Grand Jury presented a true bill against Pedro Gilbert, captain; Bernardo de Soto, first mate; Francisco Ruiz, Nicola Costa, Antonio Ferrer, Manuel Boyga, Domingo de Guzman, Juan Antonio Portana, Manuel Castillo, Angel Garcia, Jose Velasquez and Juan Montenegro for piracy on the brig *Mexican* upon the high seas, the name of Manuel Delgado being omitted, he having previously committed suicide in the Leverett Street jail; on the twenty-third of October the prison-

ers were brought into Court, arraigned and furnished copies of the indictment in both Spanish and English, and given three days to consider their pleas; at the expiration of that time they again appeared in Court and severally pleaded "not guilty." Their pleas were then recorded and the eleventh day of November next ensuing was appointed for the trial. At the opening of the Court that day, the Hon. Joseph Story, of the United States Supreme Court, and the Hon. John Davis, District Judge, presided. Andrew Dunlap, Esq., United States District Attorney, appeared for the Government, and Messrs. D. L. Child and George S. Hillard for the defendants. Stephen Badlam, Esq., was sworn by the Court as interpreter; but, at his request, was during the trial substituted by a Mr. Peyton, as Mr. Badlam did not think himself capable of correctly translating Spanish nautical terms. A jury was finally selected and impanelled, and the trial commenced. The sessions of the Court were held in the old Masonic Temple on the corner of Tremont street and Temple Place, Boston, it having adjourned to that place from the old United States Court House on School street, then located on the site of the present City Hall.

We may perhaps note here that at the hearings in England, five of the prisoners offered to turn Queen's or State's evidence, but on their arrival in this country only one was accepted by our Government, namely, Joseph Perez. From his testimony, it appears that the true name of the schooner that committed the robbery was given by the captain in answer to hail by Spanish officials when leaving the port of Havana, "the *Panda*, bound for St. Thomas." He minutely described the sighting and capture of the *Mexican*, together with other important evidence that could only have been given by one present at the time of the robbery; he claimed to have witnessed the whole affair from the fore-top of the schooner, and probably was the man seen by Captain Butman. He also further testified that the money stolen from the *Mexican* was first buried in a barrel on the banks of the River Nazareth, and afterwards taken up and again buried at Cape Lopez, when it was finally unearthed and divided among the officers and

crew of the schooner.

It was shown conclusively at the trial by experts — captains both of our naval and merchant service — that two vessels, one sailing from Salem at a given time, and the other from Havana, and proceeding on courses as taken by the *Mexican* and *Panda*, must have reached that latitude and longitude where they actually met.

After a long and tedious trial, occupying nearly two weeks, on the strongest evidence, both circumstantial and direct, produced by the Government against the defendants, the jury returned a verdict of "Guilty" as to Gilbert, de Soto, Ruiz, Boyga, Castillo, Garcia and Montenegro, and "Not Guilty" as to Costa, Ferrer, Guzman, Portana and Velasquez, it having been satisfactorily proved to the jury that they were not on board the *Panda* at the time of the commission of the offence charged. In the hush that followed the announcement of the verdict, the foreman of the jury drew from his pocket a paper and read to the Court the following recommendation to mercy:

"The sympathies of the jury have been strongly moved in behalf of Bernardo de Soto on account of his generous and self-sacrificing conduct in saving the lives of more than seventy human beings, constituting the passengers and crew of the ship *Minerva*; and they desire that his case should be presented to the merciful consideration of the Government."

It was in evidence from the testimony of Mr. David F. Hale, for the defense, that the ship *Minerva*, Captain Putnam, in the course of her voyage from New York to New Orleans, loaded with lime, naval stores and other freight, and having on board, besides the crew, some sixty passengers, on the night of October 19, 1830, struck on the "Little Isaacs," on the Bahama banks, and lost both boats and anchor in trying to get off. By reason of the ship springing a leak, the lime, coming in contact with the water, set afire to the ship. A raft was hastily constructed, on which the passengers and crew took refuge. The light of the burning ship brought to their rescue the brig *Leon*, commanded by de Soto, who after a while suc-

ceeded in getting them all safe on board his little craft, and in about a week landed the sufferers at Havana. It is stated in this connection that, in attempting the rescue of these people, de Soto was put to considerable loss and self-sacrifice, as he was obliged, in order to accommodate them, to throw overboard a considerable quantity of goods with which his brig was freighted, and in which he was financially interested.


On December 16, 1834, Justice Story pronounced sentence of death upon all those convicted. The defense, by appeal, protest and declaration attempted in every way to overthrow the verdict of the jury, but without success, and execution was done June 1, 1836, at Boston upon five of those under sentence, viz.: Gilbert, Boyga, Castillo, Garcia and Montenegro. A respite was granted in the case of de Soto and Ruiz by President Jackson, the former for sixty days and the latter for thirty days from said eleventh day of June.

Before the expiration of his respite, de Soto was fully pardoned by President Jackson, mainly upon account of his humane conduct in the case referred to, and duly discharged from custody. By reason of a claim on the part of the defense that Ruiz had become mentally deranged, the President ordered a further respite of sixty days, at the end of which time, this claim having been disproved by medical examination, execution of the sentence was done upon him, September 12, 1835.

Many years after, de Soto, then commander of a steam ship plying between Havana and Manzanillas, related to Captain Nicholas T. Snell, of this city, the story of the *Panda*'s voyage for plunder. He stated, and no doubt truthfully, that he had shipped on board of her at Havana, her business being represented to him as that of a slaver, but after once at sea he to his sorrow discovered her true character. He also admitted the robbery of the *Mexican*, the evening after the capture, while carousing in the cabin of the *Panda*, some one of the officers who had taken an active part in the affair, held his glass on high and exclaimed,

"Here's to the squirming Yankees!" whereupon Gilbert for the first time enquired how the people on the *Mexican* had been disposed of, and on being told they had been locked below, and the brig fired, he, with an oath sprang upon the deck, put his vessel about, and for two days cruised in search, declaring that if found alive, a quick death to every one on board was his

only safety. The failure of his search demonstrates that the one door crime ever forgets to shut had been left open; the good brig speeding to her haven, carried with her the damning evidence of a crime which all too soon for those lawless men brought them to a swift and fatal ending.



The Pirates leaving the Brig MEXICAN after they had robbed her and attempted to set her on fire, Sept. 20th 1832. Pen and ink. $8\frac{3}{4} \times 10\frac{1}{2}$ in. Unsigned. Built 1824, Salem, Mass., 227 tons. Said to have been done by the mate of the *Mexican* the morning after the engagement. Gift, Misses Carrie and Alice Butman.

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SHIPPING OUT:

CROSSING THE NORTH PACIFIC IN THE WINTER

J. L. DUNLAVEY

In the winter of 1952 I was in Portland, Oregon, trying to get a ship through the Sailors Union Of The Pacific hiring hall. The government was in the midst of a big grain giveaway to India, and they were crewing up some ships in the Portland area. In the hiring hall there was a rotary shipping board. The last man to register was the last man to ship. I got beat out of an able seaman's job on the SS *Pennsylvania*, a Liberty ship just out of the lay up fleet. Two days later, I shipped on the SS *Thomas Fitzsimons*, another Liberty ship, but I didn't mind; I just loved those old ships.

We were loading grain for India, 9,600 tons of the stuff. There was grain dust all over; dust in your food, dust in your quarters. On the day of departure, there was the usual hustle, signing of articles, securing for sea, new men on the job, mass confusion. I thought, "I'll be glad to get to sea January 4, 1952." I would remember this day for a long time.

We headed down the Columbia River to Astoria, where we would pick up the bar pilot and drop off the Columbia river pilot. About 9:00 p.m., we anchored and received word we would be here until the bar quieted down. We had dinner, and everybody who was off watch hit the sack. I was on the 12 to 4 watch, so we had time for a few hours' sleep.

Jack Dunlavey started shipping out when he was sixteen years old at the end of 1944, and shipped until 1949, when, as he puts it, "the bottom fell out of the shipping industry." He went back to sea in 1950 with the beginning of the Korean War. He shipped continuously until 1990, when ill health and a new marriage "made me drop the hook."

Unknown to some of us, we started moving earlier than expected. We went to sleep with our porthole open, not knowing we were approaching the bar. Both Joe Bozik, my watch partner, and I were in lower bunks. Joe and I would bear the brunt of the water pouring in and down on us. The ordinary seaman was above me in the upper bunk. This was his first trip to sea, and he was christened when the ship took a hard roll to starboard and the sea poured in.

The sea forced itself through the porthole with such force that I was pinned to my bunk. When the ship started righting itself, I jumped up and forced open the door. I was waist-deep in water; it started flowing out the door and down the passageway. I couldn't help laughing as I watched first one, then the other, of my shower shoes floating out. Then my brand new Samsonite suitcase floated out. We finally got organized and pulled all our linens, blankets, wet clothing and mattresses out and put them in the upper engine room. The heat from the engine below would dry them out.

At midnight, we went on watch, Joe, the other able seaman, and Frank, the first trip ordinary seaman, and me. Joe went up to the bridge to stand the first two hours of the wheel watch, while Frank and I went out on deck to relieve the watch and to try and get the bar pilot safely off the ship. He would be picked up by a small whale boat and rowed over to the larger pilot station boat.

It was a black night. The wind was blowing about 30 knots, and the air was full of salt spray. We were soaked to the skin by the time

we got over to the lee side, where the watch was standing by the pilot ladder and tending to the boat rope. We were watching the big pilot boat trying to launch the smaller boat into the rough sea. They finally got the boat and the two boat handlers into a following sea, where they would drift down to us and grab the boat rope to work their way down to the pilot ladder. The large pilot boat had to keep its searchlight on them, or they would have been lost in the darkness.

When we first spotted them, the men were starting down the face of a huge swell. It was at least thirty feet down into the trough. Then they had to start up the swell and start looking for the ship's boat rope, which was stretched along the ship's side by the pilot ladder. They made three passes and missed, and the sea carried them off into the darkness. Fortunately, the pilot boat picked them up after each attempt. It took a helluva lot of guts to just get into the boat, much less go out into the darkness and heavy seas and go after the pilot, but it was their job, what they got paid for. On their fourth attempt they succeeded. Their boat came sliding by us and they grabbed the boat rope; the pilot went down the ladder and half fell half slid into the center of the boat, and off they went into the darkness.

It was the last we would see of them until three months later, when they would come out of the darkness reaching for that old boat rope with another bar pilot to guide us across the Columbia River Bar, into the river, and over to Astoria. Those pilots were a tough breed of men in those days. Several of them were in their seventies.

Under normal conditions, the first day at sea is housekeeping day. You make sure everything is secured properly for the voyage. Nothing loose on deck or in the lockers, paint put away, lines stowed, and the ship's cargo gear secured. The keywords are: "She is properly secured for sea." Even after the severe pounding we took coming across the bar, the stormy night, and the heavy water we took on the ship, this ship was clean. We could forget the cus-

tomary wash down. There wasn't a single cigarette butt or a piece of straw to be seen. She was, in a word, spotless. We could now look forward to 30 to 40 days steaming time to Calcutta, India.

To those readers who are not familiar with the men who go down to the sea in ships, the next few paragraphs will be my attempt to try and enlighten them.

In 1952, the manning scales aboard American flagged ships with union crews were determined by the US Coast Guard, the companies operating them, and by the maritime unions representing the sailors who sail them. First are the captain and the three watch mates, including the chief mate, who is responsible for the deck department and the cargo. The chief engineer is in charge of the engine department, the three engineers, and the men under them. Then there is the radio operator, who is there for safety reasons, weather reports, and general ship's business. We can't forget the chief steward, who is responsible for the galley, the cooks, bakers, and messman. A highly competent chief steward can make a good ship better, and a good ship is a happy ship.

Now we come to the unlicensed crew, the people who make or break a ship with their behavior, their morale, and their union spirit. They can make a crew member remember the ship and the voyage for years afterward. The unlicensed crew comprises the following:

Deck	Engine	Steward
bos'n	3 oilers	chief steward
carpenter	3 firemen/	chief cook
deck utilityman	watertenders	second cook and
6 able-bodied	2 wipers	baker
seamen		galleyman
3 ordinary		saloon messman
seamen		crew messman
		bedroom steward

This was a veteran crew. Seventy percent had sailed during World War II. The majority of them had faced some sort of hostile action. The two 4-8 able seamen had been torpedoed in the North Atlantic on the Murmansk, Russia,

run. The rest of those who had seen action had suffered bombing attacks at sea or in port. Some were attacked by surface vessels at sea. They had been around.

The first day out was a stormy one, with gale force winds, heavy seas, and the first bad news arriving. The SS *Washington*, a States Line C-3, was in trouble. She was taking on water but maintaining steerage way. She was about three hundred miles northeast of us, and we couldn't do a thing to help. We were running about 50 rpm with our bow into the weather, just riding her out. Later on that night, we got an SOS from the SS *Pennsylvania*. She was in trouble and in danger of sinking. That was confirmed the following day: she went down and all hands were lost. This can show you the reality and power of the ocean. I could have been on that ship.

The whole North Pacific was just one huge storm system. Distress signals were coming in from all over. We took a helluva beating for the next week. When we had the weather on the beam, we rolled 30 to 40 degrees. Sleeping was out of the question despite the various ways we would strap ourselves into the bunks. When we had the bow into the weather, heavy green water would come crashing down on the main deck, and up into the amidship house and boat deck. When we would rise up, we would come crashing down and the ship would shudder all over. What I hated most was when the stern and the propeller came out of the water and started vibrating — so much noise.

I think it went through everybody's mind that this was a Liberty ship, and that she was thrown together in a matter of days. I knew, and I think everybody else knew, that the ship was built and welded together by older people, women, and men unfit for military service. We all prayed that they were happy with what they were doing and were in a good frame of mind when they built this one.

One day we would make fifty miles in a 24-hour steaming period, seventy miles the next, and thirty miles the next. At this rate of speed, it would take us a month to make the crossing.

The chief engineer estimated we would be out of fuel by then, but I couldn't have cared less. All I was looking for was some smooth weather so I could get some decent sleep.

The next few days were a little better. You might even call them acceptable, but the barometer started dropping when I went on watch at midnight. I was on the wheel and I would keep looking at the barometer behind me on the bulkhead. Every time it dropped further, I would get real uneasy. The wind started to pick up and howl; two hours later it was up to a full scream. It was blowing about 60 to 70 knots at seven in the morning.

About noontime, the strangest thing happened. The wind was dying down, and when I got off watch at four in the afternoon, we were in an unreal calm. The eye of the storm was passing right over us. We still had tremendous seas, but everyone, including the captain, was happy with the silence. But it didn't last. About ten that night, the wind started to pick up. We were out of the eye and into the nasty stuff again. When I went on the wheel at two a.m., we were down to 45 rpm, just making steerage-way. Whenever we started up the face of a huge swell, the captain would increase the speed to 55 to 65 rpm. If he had not, the sea and wind would have forced us broadsides into the trough and we would have capsized. The third mate, Jan the Dutchman, would have his hands on the porthole dogs, holding on and looking out the porthole. Every time we would start up a big swell, he would turn to me and say, "Ja, I think we are going to make it up this one alright." By the time I got off the wheel, I was a nervous wreck.

Later that day, the wind started to shift around to the north and northwest, and we started to get a confused sea. The sea was breaking in every direction, over the bow, over the starboard side, up on the boat deck, even over the stern. It was about this time that the crew thought they had bought the farm. A huge sea rolled up on the port side of the boat deck, smashing through an oak door and into the passageway. Water poured in on the mates'

deck and down the ladder to the main deck. It got into some of the mates' rooms, and down the ladder to the galley and messrooms. It took some time, but we finally got the doorway plugged up by using the door and some mattresses. What a mess it was, but this, too, is part of going to sea.

The crew finally started getting serious about the severe pounding the ship was taking. How much more of this beating could she take, day after day? It was the most continuous and severe pounding I had seen in my seagoing career. The ordinary seaman told me he was going up and stand by the boats. I told him it was too late. The last big sea we took washed one boat over the side, and the other was hanging by one davit. The bad weather was getting on the nerves of the crew. We were starting to snarl at each other.

About this time, I thought I detected a change in the weather. The next day the sky started to clear, and that evening we were seeing a red sky, which every sailor knows is an omen of good weather. In the morning we were able to go on deck to survey the damage. What a mess! Two boats were gone and the other two were severely damaged. We checked all the hatches, mainly to see if any water got into the grain. The chief mate was very pleased and surprised that the securing on the hatches had kept the water out.

As far as I was concerned, the bos'n was the man responsible for this. You did things his

way or you packed your bags. And as it turned out, his way was the right way. The stiffeners, the steel plates that are about six to eight inches wide and a half inch thick that come down from the boat deck and are welded to the bulwarks, are devices that help support the boat deck above. These were just hanging loose, welds popped, and were bent and twisted. The captain's estimate was ten days in the shipyards in Yokohama. This went over big with the crew.

We were steaming right along now, with good weather ahead, and a good seaport for shore leave. We would arrive in Yokohama with about one hundred barrels of oil. It was enough for about a half day's run, but we were better off than some of the ships, which had to be towed the final hundred miles. It was some crossing! It took twenty-nine days and some hours. Several of the old timers said that in thirty to forty years at sea, they had never seen a ship take such a continuous pounding.

Of the three ordinary seamen — the first trippers — one was going back to logging, the other two were going back to driving cabs. I suspected that if we had a good trip weather wise from Yokohama to Calcutta and back to Portland, I would find them in the Union hall waiting to ship. The final words were from the bos'n, who said the first drink would be toasted to the men and women who built this ship. It was a tough crossing, but we made it. The *Thomas Fitzsimons* was a helluva ship.



GENERAL MILITARY WEBSITES

COMPILED BY ROBERT MARTYN

General Military Websites

www.dnd.ca/dnd.htm
www.cyberus.ca/~army/army/
www.allc.com/
www.crad.dnd.ca/
www.dnd.ca/diso/disoeng.htm
www.dreo.dnd.ca
www.lfc.dnd.ca/english/index.htm
www.dnd.ca/navy/marcom/cdnnavy.html
www.achq.dnd.ca

Department of National Defence
Canadian Army
Canadian Army Lessons Learned
DND—Research and Development
Defence Information Services
Defence Research Establishment
Land Force Command
Maritime Command
Air Command

US Department of Defense

www.dtic.dla.mil/airforcelink/
www.army.mil/
www.forscom.army.mil/
www.dot.gov/dotinfo/uscg/
www.usmc.mil/
www.ncts.navy.mil/
www.navy.mil/
www.defenselink.mil/
webs.hqda.army.pentagon.mil/

USAF
Army
Army Forces Command
Coast Guard
USMC
USN
Navy On Line
US Defense Dept (general)
Army Web Servers

Non-Cdn/US

www.nato.int/
www.adfa.oz.au/DOD/dodhmpgn.html
www.adfa.oz.au/DOD/dara/welcome.html
www.army.mod.uk/
www.jda.go.jp/index_e.html

NATO
Australian Department of Defence
Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)
British Army
Japanese Defense Agency

Military Educational Institutions

www.rmc.ca
www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/milorg/

www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/index.html
www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/index.html
www.au.af.mil/
www.afsc.edu/
leav-www.army.mil/
www-cgsc.army.mil/

Royal Military College of Canada
War, Peace and Security Guide: World Armed Forces
War, Peace and Security Guide
War, Peace and Security WWW Server
Air University
Armed Forces Staff College
Army Command and General Staff College
Army Command and General Staff College (altn)

www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html

www.ndu.edu/

www.ndu.edu/ndu/nwc/nwchp.html

www.nps.navy.mil/

www.usnwc.edu/nwc

www.mcu.quantico.usmc.mil/

www.ndu.edu/ndu/ica/icaftp.html

www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/insshp.html

www.marshall.adsn.int/marshall.html

www.usma.edu/

www.vmi.edu/

www.cfsis.brdn.dnd.ca/

www.cdsar.af.mil/home.html

Army Miscellaneous

www.jiga-watt.com/AVNDirectory/

www.cbdcom.apgea.army.mil

call.army.mil/call.html

www.milnet.com/milnet/index.html

www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/milorg/canada.html

www.iaw.on.ca/~awoolley/lwcf.html

www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/milorg/index.html

Special Operations

www.specialoperations.com/canada/default.html

www.blarg.net/~whitet/jtf2.htm

www.dtic.mil/socom/index.html

<http://www.usasoc.soc.mil>

www.hurlburt.af.mil

www.eo.com/index.html

www.navsoc.navy.mil/

www.hqmc.usmc.mil/meu.nsf

<http://www.specialforces.net>

www.specialoperations.com

www.blarg.com/~whitet/specwar.html

www.specialops.org

members.aol.com/Spets1/spetsnaz.html

www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/3141/

home3.inet.tele.dk/jdj/spec_ops/count/belgium.htm#esr

leav-www.army.mil/fmso/lic/issues/may96.htm

www.eme.eb.mil.br/~eme3sch/home2/ft/brigadas/infsl/binfselv.htm

Advanced Study of Information Warfare
Institute

National Defense University

National War College

Naval Postgraduate School

Naval War College

Marine Corps University

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Institute for National Strategic Studies

GC Marshall European Center for Security
Studies

United States Military Academy (West Point)

Virginia Military Institute

CF School of Intelligence and Security

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and
Education (CADRE)

Army Aviation Directory

Army Chemical and Biological Defense
Command

Center for Army Lessons Learned

MILNET-Open Source Military Information

www.allc.com/ArmyLessonsLearnedCentre

Canada: Armed Forces

Canadian Military Links

Armed Forces of the World

JTF-2

JTF-2

US Special Operations Command

US Army Special Operations Command

USAF Special Operations Command

Executive Outcomes

NAVSPECWARCOM

Official MEU-SOC

SOF Links

SOF Links

SOF Links

Special Operations Warrior Foundation

Soviet/Russian SPF

Anti-Terrorism in Argentina

ESR Special Reconnaissance Teams

Bosnian Muslim "Black Swans"

Brazilian Army Jungle Brigades

ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/lc_vedel/legion.htm

www.kepi.com/

www.spots.ab.ca/~overlord/gign.html

Jaegertruppe.home.pages.de/

www.mil.fi/english/

www.mil.fi/varusmies/erikoisalat.html

www.thompson.com/janes/jpict.html

www.geocities.com/Pentagon/3936

users.aol.com/armysof1/SpecialForces.html

www.pipeline.com/%7Ebco175-ranger/1276n.html

www.nightstalkers.com

www.the-south.com/TheTeams

www.NavySEALs.com

users1.ee.net/hersh/cct

www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6707/

www.earthlink.net/~aircommando1/

207.201.170.168

liberty.uc.wlu.edu/~tilitzen/ForceRecon

www.spots.ab.ca/~overlord

home3.inet.tele.dk/jdj

home.wxs.nl/~haan0054/index.htm

www.sprint.net.au/~nigel/Aussie.html

hem1.passagen.se/inlajn/index.htm

www.geocities.com/Area51/5906/

www.st.nepean.uws.edu.au/~mstopnia/

www.geocities.com/Pentagon/3245/indexe.html

www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5268/#english-grumec

Jaegertruppe.home.pages.de/

www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2524/

www.securitynet.net

Strategic Studies

www.umanitoba.ca/centres/defence/

www.qsilver.queensu.ca/cir/

www.iir.ubc.ca/

www.yorku.ca/research/ciss/

www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/

www.carleton.ca/npsia/

www.rmc.ca/informal/war_studies/war.studies.html

www.wlu.ca/~wwwmsds/

is.dal.ca/~centre/cfps.html

French Foreign Legion

The Foreign Legion Association

GIGN

Fallschirmjaeger

Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish SF

Marine Commando

Special Operations

US Army Special Forces

Army Rangers

Army SOF Avn

US Navy SEALs

US Navy SEALs

Combat Controllers

ParaRescue

Air Commando Association

ParaRescue Online

Force Recon

SF and CT Links

Spec Ops

Special Air Service

Australian Special Forces

Britain's Elite

Portugese Green Beret's

Australian Special Para Group

Spain's UEI

Brazil's GRUMEC (Cbt Divers)

Jägertruppe

Spec Ops

Intl Assn of CT and Security Professionals

UofM Centre for Defence and Security
Studies

Queen's University Centre for International
Relations

UBC Institute of International Relations,
York Centre for International and Security
Studies

University of Calgary Strategic Studies
Program,

Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs

RMC War Studies Program

Laurier Centre for Military

Strategic/Disarmament

Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy Studies

- www.unb.ca/arts/CCS/
www.unb.ca/web/arts/MSS/
www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/
carlisle-www.army.mil/ssi
ksgweb.harvard.edu/csia/

globetrotter.berkeley.edu
www.pitt.edu/~rcss/ridgway.html

cis-server.mit.edu/DACS/index.html
www-leland.stanford.edu/group/CISAC/
www-iis.stanford.edu/
www.smsu.edu/contrib/dss/index.htm

www.byu.edu/acd1/fhsswww/html/departmt/kcis/kcis.htm

www.hull.ac.uk/csecurity/

<gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/secdef/csrc/csrmmain.txt>

web.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR/

www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/inssh.html
web.bu.edu/ISCIP/

globetrotter.berkeley.edu/

www.columbia.edu/cu/iwps/

hypatia.ss.uci.edu/gpacs/index.html
www-hoover.stanford.edu/

www.ciia.org/ciia.htm
www.ciss.ca
www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca

www.aucc.ca/english/

qsilver.queensu.ca/~ecsac/

cspo.queensu.ca/ascar.html
www.usafa.af.mil/inss
witloof.sjsu.edu/peace/conflict.html
ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/peace.html

www.rand.org/
- UNB Centre for Conflict Studies
 UNB Military and Strategic Studies Program
 Strategic Studies Network
 Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
 Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs
 UCBerkeley, Institute of International Studies
 International Security Studies, U of Pittsburgh
 MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies
 Stanford Institute for International Studies
 Stanford Institute for International Studies
 Def/StratStudies Dept Southwest Missouri State U
 David M. Kennedy Center for Int'l Studies
 Centre for Security Studies, University of Hull
 Royal Military Academy Conflict Studies Research Centre (formerly Soviet Studies Research Centre)
 Conflict Analysis & Resolution Institute
 GeoMason U
 Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU
 Conflict Ideology Policy Institute, Boston University
 Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
 Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia U
 Global Peace and Conflict Studies, UC, Irvine
 Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
 Canadian Institute of International Affairs
 Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
 Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre
 Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada
 European Community Studies Association - Canada
 Queen's Canadian American Studies
 USAF Institute for National Security Studies
 United States Institute of Peace
 Program on Peacekeeping Policy, George Mason U
 RAND Corporation

www.sipri.se/	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.rusi.org/rusi/	Royal United Services Institute (UK)
www.cdi.org/	Center For Defense Information
www-leland.stanford.edu/group/CISAC/	Center for International Security and Arms Control
www.uga.edu/~cits	Center for International Trade and Security
cns.miis.edu/	Center for Nonproliferation Studies
www.arts.su.edu.au/Arts/departs/cpacs/cpacmain.htm	Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (Australia)
www.security-policy.org/	The Center for Security Policy
www.fsk.ethz.ch/	Security Studies & Conflict Center (Switzerland)
www.csis.org/	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
www.vuw.ac.nz/css/	Centre for Strategic Studies (New Zealand)
www.isn.ethz.ch/iiss/	International Institute for Strategic Studies
www.ida.org/	Institute for Defense Analyses
www.ifpa.org	Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
www.igc.apc.org/imtd/	Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
www.mgu.bg/pages/isis.html	Security & International Studies Institute (Bulgaria)
www.iss.co.za/	Institute for Security Studies (Africa)
www.weu.int/institute/iss_uk.htm	Institute for Security Studies (WEU)
sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/isd.htm	Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
www.kcl.ac.uk/orgs/icsa/	International Centre for Security Analysis (UK)
www.fsk.ethz.ch/d-reok/fsk/iiss/iisshome.html	International Institute for Strategic Studies
www.isn.ethz.ch/	International Relations and Security Network
www.tau.ac.il/jcss/	The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies (Israel)
www.jinsa.org/	Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
www.fas.org/man/	Military Analysis Network
www.policyj.com/	Policy Links
www3.sk.sympatico.ca/mccam/	Politics International (Canada)

Doctrine

www.atsc-army.org/	Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library
www-tradoc.army.mil/	Training and Doctrine Command
www.fas.org/man/doctrine.htm	DoctrineLINK
ndcweb.navy.mil	US Navy Doctrine Command
www.mnsinc.com/cbassfrd/CWZHOME/CWZBASE.htm	Clausewitz Homepage

Intelligence

www.odci.gov/cia/index.html	Central Intelligence Agency
www.fas.org/irp/nsa/	National Security Agency
www.nsa.gov:8080	National Security Agency (altn)
www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel.html	Loyola Strategic Intelligence Homepage
www.janes.com/geopol/geoset.html	Jane's Geopolitical Intelligence Unit (UK)

www.awpi.com/IntelWeb/
www.fas.org/irp/
www.oss.net/
www.cfsis.brdn.dnd.ca/
www.gchq.gov.uk
www.csis-scrs.gc.ca
www.rdg.ac.uk/SecInt
www.his.com/afio
www.intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de

Joint/Combined Ops

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html
tecn0.jcte.jcs.mil:9000/htdocs/dodinfo/joint.html
www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/

www.jwfc.js.mil

Future Concepts

www.atimp.army.mil/Army
www-dcst.monroe.army.mil/atxxi/atxxi-hp.htm
www.army.mil/2010
www-dcst.monroe.army.mil/AE5/AE5.htm
tiu.arl.mil/artac
www.arpa.mil/
www.monroe.army.mil/pao/awe1.htm
artac1.arl.mil
www.pentagon-ai.army.mil
www.arpa.mil/
199.221.105.20/digitize/
www.ado.army.mil
www.aro.ncren.net
aspo.army.mil
www.smdc.army.mil/smdbl.html
battlelabs.monroe.army.mil

Military History

www.army.mil/cmh-pg/
www.e-hawk.com/

kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/history/
www.uss-salem.org/navhist/canada/
www.dnd.ca/dhp
www.history.navy.mil
www3.sympatico.ca/dis.general/magazine.htm
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/anc/anchhome.html
147.51.101.5/museum/
www.atsc-army.org/atdls.html
carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/
www.navy.mil/navpalib/.www/welcome.html

IntelWeb
 Project on Intelligence Reform
 Open Source Solutions
 CF School of Intelligence and Security
 GCHQ
 CSIS
 Security/Int Studies Group, Reading U (UK)
 Assn of Former Intelligence Officers
 Int'l Intelligence History Studies Group

Joint Doctrine
 Joint DOD Activities
 Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics
 Joint Warfighting Center

Training Information Management Program
 Army Training XXI
 Army Vision 2010
 Army Experiment 5
 Army Future Technologies Institute
 Advanced Research Projects Agency
 Advanced Warfighting Experiment
 Army Technologies and Concepts
 Artificial Intelligence Center – Pentagon
 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
 ForceXXI Intranet
 Army Digitization Office (ADO)
 Army Research Office (ARO)
 Army Space Program Office (ASPO)
 Army Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab
 Army Battle Labs

Center of Military History
 Electronic HQ for the Acquisition of War Knowledge
 Index of Resources for Historians
 Canadian Navy of Yesterday and Today
 DND/Directorate of History
 US Naval History Centre
 Mil Hist Links
 Army Nurse Corps Historian
 Signal Corps Museum
 Army Training Digital Library
 US Army Mil Hist Institute
 US Navy Public Affairs Library

www.af.mil/50th/
 www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/
 www.ang.af.mil/ngb-paih/history.htm
 www.nara.gov/

www.brown.edu/Facilities/University_Library/general/guides/ASKB/ASKB.Welcome_to_343.html
 Brown Univ Library Military Collection

www.nypl.org/research/chss/subguides/milhist/home.html

web.gmu.edu/chnm/aha
 www.onramp.net/~hbarker/
 sunsite.unc.edu/pha/pha

www.mit.edu:8001/afs/athena/activity/a/afrotc/www/names

www-scf.usc.edu/~sarantak/stuff.html

US Air Force 50th Anniversary
 Air Force Historical Research Agency
 Air National Guard History
 National Archives and Records
 Administration

Brown Univ Library Military Collection

NY Public Lib Mil Hist Coll
 American Historical Association
 Korean War Project
 Pearl Harbor Archives

Pearl Harbor Casualties List

US Diplomatic Hist Resources Index

Regional Sites

www.ndu.edu/ndu/chds/chdslgo1.html

leav-www.army.mil/fmso/

www.milparade.ru/links.htm

sunsite.unc.edu/pjones/russian/outline.

www.pitt.edu:81/~cjp/rees.html

www.pacom.mil/apc/

www.insidechina.com/

www.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ecentasia/

www.nbr.org/

www.ipsjps.org/

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Foreign Military Studies Office

Russian Defense Internet Resources

Soviet Archive

Russian and East European Studies

Asia-Pacific Center

Inside China Today

The Harvard Forum for Central Asian Studies

National Bureau of Asian Research

Institute for Palestine Studies

Terrorism/Info-War

www.infowar.com/

www.terrorism.com/infowar/index.html

www.fas.org/irp/wwwinfo.html

www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html

www.terrorism.com/terrorism/index.html

www.nsi.org/terrorsim.html

www.ict.org.il

www.cdt.org

www.worldonline.net/securitynet/CTS/index.html

Information Warfare and INFOSEC

Information Warfare Research Center

Information Warfare on the Web

Institute for the Advanced Study of Info
Warfare

Terrorism Research Center

National Security Institute (good source docs)

Int'l Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism

Counter-Terrorism

Counter-Terrorism & Security

Terrorism

Advanced Study of Information Warfare

Institute

International Relations

www.embassy.org/

ian.vse.cz/orgpages/ian.htm#comp

www.mindspring.com/~gilliatt/internatl/

ksgwww.harvard.edu/

The Electronic Embassy

International Affairs Network

International Affairs

John F. Kennedy School of Government

www.isn.ethz.ch/
www.basicint.org/

www.brookings.edu/
www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER/homepage.htm
is.dal.ca/~centre/cfps.html

www.us.net/cip/index.htm
www.cis.ethz.ch/
www.access.digex.net/~cnp/index.html
www.foreignrelations.org/
www.dlcppi.org/

US Government Sites

www.acda.gov/initial.html
www.va.gov
www.house.gov/
www.senate.gov/
www.state.gov/index.html
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dbsearch.html
www.loc.gov/
www.fedworld.gov/ntis/ntishome.html
www.pccip.gov/

www.acda.gov/
www.usia.gov/usis.html
www.voa.gov/
www.whitehouse.gov/WH/html/briefroom.html

Research Links

www.nira.go.jp/ice/tt-info/nwdtt96/index.html
www.nira.go.jp/ice/links/index.html
www.cdhowe.org
members.aol.com/rhrongstad/private/milinksr.htm
www.iaw.on.ca/~awoolley/lwlinks.html
www.pitt.edu/~ian/ianres.html
www.pitt.edu/~ian/resource/thinktk.htm
www.apnet.com/violence/

www.fas.org/index.html
www.gsp.cam.ac.uk/raf.html
www.stimson.org/
www.heritage.org/
www.isn.ethz.ch/iiss/iisshome.htm

www.adpa.org/
www.ned.org/
www.nationalsecurity.org/

International Relations and Security Network
 British American Security Information
 Council
 Brookings Institution
 Carter Center
 The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
 (Canada)
 Center for International Policy
 Center for International Studies (Switzerland)
 Center For National Policy
 Council on Foreign Relations
 Democratic Leadership Council

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 Department of Veterans Affairs
 Congress-House
 Congress-Senate
 Department of State
 Government Printing Office
 Library of Congress
 National Technical Information Service
 President's Commission on Critical
 Infrastructure thomas.loc.gov/Thomas
 Legislative Information on the Internet
 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 United States Information Agency
 International Broadcasting Bureau (VOA)
 White House Briefing Room

NIRA's World Directory of Think Tanks
 Think Tanks and Policy Research Resources
 CD Howe Institute
 Worldwide Military Links (Rongstad)
 Worldwide Military Links (Woolley)
 WWW Virtual Library: Research Resources
 WWW Virtual Library: Think Tanks
 Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and
 Conflict
 Federation of American Scientists
 Global Security Programme
 The Henry L. Stimson Center
 The Heritage Foundation
 International Institute for Strategic Studies
 (UK)
 National Defense Industrial Association
 National Endowment for Democracy
 National Security Website

Peacekeeping

www.fas.org/pub/gen/peace_security/peacekeeper.kosone.com/
www.un.org/Depts/dhl/pkeep.htm
www-igcc.ucsd.edu/

www.unbsj.ca/library/subject/peace1.htm
ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/peace.html
www.comw.org/pda/pdahome.htm

Peace and Security WWW Metapage
 The Peacekeepers Home Page
 Peace-keeping Operations Bibliography
 UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
 UNB Peacekeeping and Related Operations
 Program on Peacekeeping Policy
 Project on Defense Alternatives
www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/Pearson Cdn
 International Peacekeeping Trg Center

International Organizations

gopher://gopher.law.cornell.edu/11/foreign/fletcher
cs1-hq.oecd.org/

www.oas.org/
www.un.org/
www.worldbank.org/html/Welcome.html
europa.eu.int/index.htm
www.amnesty.org/
www.worldbank.org/
www.library.yale.edu/un/unhome.htm
witloof.sjsu.edu/peace/usip.html
gopher://nywork1.undp.org:70/1
www.un.org/
www.law.cornell.edu/icj/home.htm

Multilateral Treaties
 Org for Economic Cooperation and Development
 Organization of American States
 United Nations
 World Bank
 European Union Web Server
 Amnesty International
 World Bank
 United Nations Scholars' Workstation
 United States Institute of Peace
 United Nations
 United Nations Home Page
 International Court of Justice

Journals

www.fas.org/man/pubs.htm
www.olcommerce.com/cadre/index.html
www.cdsar.af.mil/air-chronicles.html
www.afji.com/
www.breakingthecycle.com/
www.baxter.net/cdq/
www.tandf.co.uk/jnls/cst.htm
www.cdi.org/dm
www.fca.asdc.kz/
www.foreignaffairs.org/
magazines.eneews.com/magazines/foreign_policy/

National Security Publications on the Net
 E-HAWK
 Air Chronicles
 Armed Forces Journal International
 Breaking the Cycle: Conflict Intervention
 Canadian Defence Quarterly
 Comparative Strategy
 The Defense Monitor
 Focus Central Asia
 Foreign Affairs

www.gulf-def-magazine.com/
gopher://gopher.eneews.com/11/magazines/alphabetic/all/iorg

Foreign Policy
 Gulf Defence Magazine (UAE)

gopher://gopher.eneews.com/11/magazines/alphabetic/all/int_security

International Organizations

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm
ultratext.hil.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/index.html
www.iwar.org/

International Security
 Joint Force Quarterly
 Journal of Conflict Studies
 Journal of Infrastructural Warfare

www.milparade.ru/	Military Parade (Russia)
www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/index.htm	Military Review
cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/	The Nonproliferation Review
carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/parahome.htm	Parameters
epn.org/psq.html	Political Science Quarterly
www.sagepub.co.uk/journals/details/j0035.html	
www.tandf.co.uk/jnls/ter.htm	Security Dialogue
www.usia.gov/journals/journals.htm	Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
www.kenpubs.co.uk/worldstatesman/	US Information Agency Electronic Journals
www.defensenews.com/homepage.html	World Statesman (UK)
leav-www.army.mil/fmso/lic/issues	Defense News
www.economist.com/4G77eU1Q/editorial/freeforall/current/homepage.html	Low-Intensity Conflict
	The Economist
www.btg.com/janes/	Jane's EIS

Reference Sources

www.biography.com/find/find.html	biography.com
tycho.usno.navy.mil/time.html	Directorate of Time
www.odci.gov/cia/publications/pubs.html	CIA Publications
www.unbsj.ca/library/subject/cyberlaw.htm	Legal, Privacy and Security Issues
www.loc.gov/	Library of Congress
www.msstate.edu/archives/History/	Mississippi State University Historical Text Archive
www.nara.gov/	National Archives
www.fedworld.gov/ntis/ntishome.html	National Technical Information Service
www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/wfb-all.htm	
www.npr.org/	World Factbook
www.fas.org/pub/gen/nsns/index.html	National Public Radio
www.dtic.mil/dodsi/bulletin.html	National Security News Service
www1.cfesc.dnd.ca/spotlight.html.en	The Security Awareness Bulletin
www.pbs.org/frontline/	Spotlight on Military News
www.army.mil/vetinfo/vetloc.htm	PBS "Frontline"
flightdeck.airlant.navy.mil/public/ships.htm	Army Alumni Assns
	COMNAVAIRLANT Ships Homepage

Miscellaneous Links

204.180.198.56:80/ajax/ajax.htm	AJAX
www.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/	US/Int'l Govt, Mil, Int Access
www.dtic.dla.mil/bosnia/	Catalog of Countries
www.dtic.dla.mil/dtiw	Bosnia Link
www.ausa.org/	Defense Technical Information Web
www.emergency.com/	Association of the United States Army
www.militarycity.com/	Emergency Net
www.desert-storm.com/index.html	Military City Online
	Desert-storm.com

Modeler's Notes

PAUL DUSTIN

THE PISCATAQUA GUNDALOW A UNIQUE AMERICAN VESSEL

Tucked away in the northeast corner of the United States are the Piscataqua River and Portsmouth Harbor, which form part of the boundary between the states of New Hampshire and Maine. Further up the Piscataqua is the Great Bay (of New Hampshire), a wide estuary which has a tidal range of over six feet. Indeed, at low tide large areas of the bay are mud flats with open water at a considerable distance from the shore. To provide transport during colonial days along these and other coastal waters from New York to Nova Scotia, the flat-bottomed scow vessel, subsequently referred to as a "gundalow," was developed. The term "gundalow" is a variation of "gondola." In line with her use, the gundalow design changed and took on an unusual hull shape and sailing rig to better adapt her to her environment and working tasks. As stated by Capt. Mike Gowell¹ of Kittery Point, Maine, the skipper of the only extant Piscataqua gundalow, she was the "flatbed truck of her day," carrying commerce along the rivers and bays of northeast New England.

An early volume of *The American Neptune*² carried two articles about gundalows by D. Foster Taylor. The first of these, "The Piscataqua River Gundalow," explains their history and development. The second article, "The Gundalow *Fannie M.*," specifically discusses Capt. Edward Henry Adams and the vessel that he built and sailed from 1886 to the early 1900's along the Piscataqua. A reproduction of the *Fannie M.* is now

skippered by Capt. Mike Gowell, who sails the Piscataqua region as well. Mike describes his vessel, the *Capt. Edward H. Adams*, as an accurate copy of this last working gundalow.

Significantly, the wheel and windlass of *Fannie M.* were recovered and are now part of *Capt. Edward H. Adams*. The *Adams* is 70 feet long, has an 18 foot beam, draws 18 inches of water unloaded, and can carry 60 tons of freight on her open deck. For display purposes, she now has a partial cargo of granite. The recent photograph of *Capt. Edward H. Adams* which accompanies this article shows her tied up at the dock in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Observant readers will notice that the stern board



in the photograph carries the name *Capt. Edward Adams*, whereas Capt. Gowell refers to his vessel as the *Capt. Edward H. Adams*. Since the skipper knows best, I shall follow his convention.

Begun separately as The Piscataqua Gundalow Project,³ and now associated with the Strawberry Banke Museum in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the reproduction *Capt. Edward H. Adams* was launched in 1982 for the purpose of developing an historical awareness of the Piscataqua region, particularly among school children. When I talked with Capt. Mike Gowell, he noted that all children must study New Hampshire history while in elementary school. Now in May and June before the opening of *Capt. Edward H. Adams* as a Strawberry Banke public exhibit, Mike Gowell is host to over ten thousand fourth grade students. In his words, Mike Gowell describes the *Adams*: "she is a teaching platform, a moveable open-air classroom and an experiential learning tool. No matter how many words you use to describe early timber harvesting for shipbuilding, it is hard to be as eloquent as the creak of the seventy foot white spruce yard. The experience of crawling through the bilge, and stepping along the oak floor timbers and keelsons, teaches that a vessel's skeleton is much more important than her skin. The integration of this information, vessel, cargoes, economies and environment, forms the basis of the environmental history which the *Adams* is so good at communicating."

She returns to Great Bay in September and October, and can occasionally be seen under sail while continuing her educational activities at the Sandy Point Discovery Center in Stratham, New Hampshire, while hosting another thousand students. This gundalow's role, unlike her earlier sisters which carried freight of hay, bricks, cordwood, lumber, etc., is educational, a role that is no less important today as we strive to recover much of our maritime heritage.

The hull shape of a gundalow is basically a rectangle in planform with a slightly rounded spoon bow and stern, and with the beam being about a quarter of the overall length. She is of shallow draft with a flat bottom, and carries a single lateen rigged sail on a stump mast. The

flat bottom allows the vessel to sit on the mud flats at low tide, while the spoon bow allows her to sail hard onto a mud shore. One interesting use of this bottom is to run the vessel up onto a sand bar and, at low tide, pull out plugs in her bilges and allow any water to run out. Once the vessel has drained in this fashion, the plugs are reinserted and she floats free on the incoming tide.

The gundalow's principal mode of power is the ebb and flow of the tide. She does have the ability, however, to move on her own with her single sail and long sweeps, one of which can be seen on the starboard bow in the photograph. The lateen rig was used and further modified to allow the vessel to readily drop the yard and sail to pass under bridges. In the original, or Arabian, version, the lateen yard is lashed to the upper part of the stump mast, thus making the sail essentially fixed in place. For the Piscataqua gundalow, the yard is counterbalanced and slung from the mast by a chain. This arrangement allows the yard to be rapidly pivoted downward for quick passage under a low bridge. Although the Piscataqua gundalows adopted the lateen rig after about 1860, and apparently uniquely so, earlier vessels employed a square sail as did the gundalows on other waters. In all cases the sails were loose footed.

What makes this story additionally interesting is that models of this unique New England vessel are being constructed at the top of a mesa two thousand miles away in Los Alamos, New Mexico. Dennis McLain⁴ started making gundalow models while he was living in Exeter, New Hampshire. Like the *Capt. Edward H. Adams*, his models are also copied from the lines of *Fannie M.* McLain's source was "American Ship Models And How To Build Them," by V. R. Grimwood. Before leaving New Hampshire, he built a model for a local medical foundation, which then gave it as an honorarium to a keynote speaker. Since then, he has built twenty more models for the *Foundation For Seacoast Health*, which has given them as honoraria to other speakers as well as mementos of appreciation to retiring members of their Board of Directors. One of the presenta-

tion models is shown in the photograph.

Over a ten year period, McLain has made twenty-five gundalow models. His models are constructed to a scale of $3/16" = 1'$ and are a solid basswood hull, with deck furniture from basswood and cherry. Ironwork is made from electrical wire, and commercial Britannia fittings are used for blocks, etc. The mast and yard are fashioned from hardwood dowels, while the sail is made from cotton fabric. Finishing is done with acrylic paints, and Floquil's "Tar" is used for the deck. To add a further bit of realism, Dennis includes a pail on deck.

In a more accessible setting, gundalow models can be seen at Salem's Peabody Essex Museum. In the "Coastal Commerce, Gundalows and Pinkies" display, there are two gundalow models. One, which was donated to the museum by D. Foster Taylor, is a model of *Fannie M.* and was constructed by Capt. Edward Adams in 1886. Presumably, this is the model to which Taylor refers in his *American Neptune* article.⁵ Also part of the display is an even earlier model. This one was built by Joseph Low in 1862, and was taken from the lines of his own vessel. Significantly, this gundalow was used on the Merrimac River of Massachusetts. It serves to support the fact that vessels of this type were used on many of the area's tidal rivers from the North River in Scituate, south of Boston, to the Kennebec River in Maine.

Notes

1. Much of the background material in this article on Piscataqua gundalows was related to me in a discussion I had with Capt. Mike



Gundalow model by Douglas McLain. Photograph by Paul Dustin.

Gowell of the *Capt. Edward H. Adams* while sitting on her deck, and for his help and insight I wish to thank him.

2. D. Foster Taylor, "The Piscataqua River Gundalow" and "The Gundalow Fanny M.", *American Neptune*, Volume II, 127-137, 209-223.
3. Descriptive brochure, The Piscataqua Gundalow Project, Strawberry Banke Museum, PO Box 300, Portsmouth, NH 03802-0300.
4. Private communication from Dennis McLain, 994 Alamo Road, Los Alamos, NM 87544.
5. D. Foster Taylor, "The Gundalow Fanny M.", *American Neptune*, Volume II, 209-223.

YEAR 2000 SHIP MODEL COMPETITION

The Mariner's Museum, Newport News, Virginia, has announced changes in the dates of its ship model competition and exhibition which is to be held in the year 2000. The dates

have been adjusted to coordinate with OpSail 2000, a display of tall ships which will take place in Hampton Roads in June 2000, where over one hundred tall ships are expected to assemble. The dates for the ship model exhibition are Saturday, 10 June to Saturday, 28 October 2000. Specific details and an entry blank for those wishing to enter can be obtained from: The Mariner's Museum — 2000 Ship Model Competition, 100 Museum Drive, Newport News, VA 23706-3759.

ACROSS THE POND

The expression, "across the pond", here in the United States carries the connotation of something on the other side of the Atlantic ocean. In the present sense, this is certainly true. At the *Neptune*, we recently received an announcement from a company aptly named "Across The Pond," a supplier of not only domestic ship models but also a wide selection of British and Continental models. I spoke with Dudley Bowditch Fay, a direct descendent of

Nathaniel Bowditch, who runs the company which he founded earlier this year. He tells me that he started with three launches from the British firm of Marten, Howes and Baylis, and has since expanded to include not only "pond" models which can be adapted to radio control, but also the more familiar "static" or display models built by modelers, such as those produced by Bluejacket.

The models that most intrigued me, however, were his 1:1250 scale miniature waterline model ships. These apparently are quite popular in Europe, although not nearly as popular here. He had models in his shop as diverse as Transatlantic liners of old and a modern aircraft carrier. In answer to my question, "Who buys these and why?" he answered "Individual collectors, as a memento of a favorite ship or to add to a collection, and organizations such as the Naval War College to use for war gaming." "Across The Pond" plans to offer a wide selection of these models, which are produced principally in Europe, but also in Japan. His catalog is available on line through his Internet site: <http://people.ne.mediaone.net/acrossthepond>.

Attention: Authors and Commentators

The American Neptune actively seeks significant original articles on ships, mariners, and the sea. Contributors do not need to be professional historians or academics. We are looking for thoughtful, insightful, interesting writing on maritime history and art, ship modeling, watercraft, movers and shakers in the marine world, etc. Articles submitted, including symposia contributions, are subjected to review prior to acceptance, and editorial reading and changes upon acceptance, if necessary.

The *Neptune* also publishes book reviews, brief notes and comments, and other matters of general interest. If you would like to be considered as a possible book reviewer, please contact Geraldine Ayers, *Neptune* Managing Editor, Peabody Essex Museum, East India Square, Salem, MA 01970. No geographical restrictions are placed on contents or contributors, but all articles will appear in English. Any other language should be kept to a minimum except where it cannot be avoided, such as in direct quotes. Any passage in a foreign language must be accompanied by an accurate translation. Articles that have already appeared or will appear simultaneously will not be accepted.

Materials submitted for publication are to be prepared in accordance with the Guidelines for Contributors. A copy will be sent upon request by the publisher or managing editor. For an e-mail copy of the Guidelines, send your request to dori_phillips@pem.org.

BOOK REVIEWS

J. S. MORRISON, WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY J. F. COATES, *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1996. xviii + 403 pages, illustrations, glossary, geographical gazetteer, bibliography, indices. ISBN 0-900188-07-4. \$120.00.

J. S. Morrison has been publishing about ancient warships since 1941 and, with J. F. Coates, has been involved in the design and construction of the *Olympias*, a full-scale replica of an ancient Greek trireme. Knowledge gained on that project is put to use in *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*, whose title is too modest. This book is both a history of naval warfare from the fourth to the first centuries BC, and a description of the new types of warships that appeared not just in Greece and Rome, but in the navies of all seafaring peoples of the Mediterranean.

Although material from slightly earlier and later is called upon, the literary evidence for ship types is considered within the context of a history of naval warfare from the moment Alexander the Great moved into Asia in 334 BC to the final battle of the Roman civil wars at Actium in 31 BC. In the fifth century BC, the trireme (here called a three) was the standard warship of all ancient navies. Just after 400 BC, we begin to hear of ships called fives and sixes; Alexander had sevens and tens. We hear of no ship larger than ten participating in battle, but in the half-century following Alexander's death, ships named for larger numbers — up to twenty and thirty — appear in the navies of his would-be successors. The largest warship built in antiquity was an impractical forty. There were also ships named for smaller numbers: the *hemiolia*, or one-and-one-half, and the four, which was developed after the five. This building of ships named for larger numbers was confined to the eastern Mediterranean. In the

west, the Carthaginian five served as a model for the Roman five, and this became the standard ship of both navies. The Romans employed a few sixes, but nothing larger. They built a variety of smaller, faster warships, including the bi-level *liburnian*, which was still in use in the second century AD.

Since the literary sources provide only limited information about these ships, an examination of the iconographic evidence is helpful, although it has limitations. Much of the evidence consists of small coins or painted or sculpted works in various states of preservation. With one exception, the ships depicted are never identified, and some of the material “defies rational interpretation” (page 178). Only a few ship types can be positively identified, but important conclusions do emerge.

In the final chapter, Morrison describes the categories and types of ships and discusses crews and tactics, while Coates applies his expertise as a naval architect to the task of reconstructing several ships on paper. The trireme served as an archetype for these new ships, and none had more than three levels of oarsmen. Most were not much longer than the trireme, but they were broader and heavier. Unlike the trireme, where each oarsman pulled a single oar, the ships of this period had multi-manned oars, and it was this innovation that led to the construction of ships named for larger numbers. The names are derived from the number of files of oarsmen per side. The five, for example, had five files of oarsmen per side at three levels; the oars were double-manned on two levels and single-manned on the third. Many smaller ships, the four and, Morrison believes, ships with names larger than eight had multi-manned oars at two levels.

This is a work of enormous erudition; it presents a mind-boggling array of data. There are, nonetheless, problems, beginning with the

historical narrative. While the maps and battle plans are superb, the text is far longer than it need be. Much of it consists of extensive quotation, in translation, from ancient authors. Frequently, there is accompanying enlightening analysis, but problems and discrepancies in the sources are sometimes passed over in silence. Some of the material quoted is of dubious value, and this goes to the heart of the matter. The evidence is sketchy, inconclusive, and frequently contradictory; invariably, it admits of more than one interpretation. So many ideas are advanced here that critics will find no shortage of things with which to take issue, but even they will have to acknowledge that all future work on ancient warships must begin here. From this perspective, the volume is truly a milestone — although at \$120, a very expensive milestone.

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JAMES P. DELGADO, ED., *Encyclopedia of Underwater and Maritime Archaeology*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998. 493 pages, illustrations, index, glossary. ISBN 0-300-07427-1. \$55.00

While the dust jacket on this book describes it as a comprehensive reference book, James Delgado readily acknowledges the fact that it is not. Its breadth is indeed great, but it by no means covers every known underwater and maritime archaeological site, as he states in the text. What it is, however, is an excellent example of what an encyclopedia and reference book should be.

The *Encyclopedia of Underwater and Maritime Archaeology* consists of a large number of entries with necessarily limited space for each one. This allows for a broad range of subjects to be covered in its 493 pages. Many entries were written by people who did actual work on the sites, while others were written by acknowledged experts. The international list of contributors is numbered at more

than 150, including such notables as George Bass, Paul Johnston, and Sean McGrail.

The arrangement of the book is alphabetical, with over five hundred entries, including over one hundred cross-reference entries. In addition, there is a detailed index at the end and an extremely useful topical subject list at the beginning of the book, arranged by type of site, e.g., Maritime/Underwater Sites (Non-Shipwreck) and Vessel Sites on Land; by date (for shipwrecks); by geographical location; by research themes; by technology, and more. A limited, but useful, glossary of nautical terms is also included. Most entries include an additional reading list if the reader is interested in learning more detailed information than is presented in the article. Also included in each article are bold-typed references to other entries in the volume.

A great diversity of subject matter is scattered throughout this work. The initial entry is Abandoned Shipwreck Act (US), and the final is Zwammerdam, a Roman fort on the south bank of the old River Rhine dating to AD 47. Illuminating examples packed in between include articles on the harbor of Caesarea Maritima, the Danish-Norwegian frigate and slave ship *Fredensborg*, the Franklin Expedition Graves, and maritime heritage preservation agency NUMA (National Underwater and Marine Agency), the underwater topographical mapping tool Side Scan Sonar, and Shipboard Society. The range of topics from the broad to the specific is thoughtfully done.

Delgado, director of the Vancouver Maritime Museum, should be very pleased with himself and his team of contributors for putting together this first-rate reference work. It should be mandatory for maritime and archaeological collections. I look forward to future editions.

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KIRSTEN A. SEAVER, *The Frozen Echo: Greenland and the Exploration of North America ca. A.D. 1000–1500*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. xvi + 407 pages, illustrations, bibliography, notes, index. Cloth. ISBN 0-8047-2514-4. \$49.50.

For centuries, the mystery of what happened to the medieval Norse settlements in Greenland has puzzled scholars. The first half of Kirsten Seaver's *The Frozen Echo: Greenland and the Exploration of North America ca. A.D. 1000–1500* represents a carefully researched and well organized presentation of practically all that is known about those settlements, namely the two major concentrations of the West Settlement, centered on present-day Nuuk, and the East Settlement, based on present-day Narsaq. Seaver outlines the latest developments in our knowledge of the chronology of settlement (from Iceland), assesses what is known of Norse voyages from Greenland to North America, and of the recent finds of Norse artifacts in various parts of the Canadian Arctic, and contributes a fascinating picture of the economy, trade connections, and lifestyle of the Greenland settlers.

She presents some fascinating (and credible) reinterpretations of accounts which have long been available to scholars. For example, her assessment of Ivar Bardarson's report of his visit to the West Settlement around 1349, when he found the settlement totally devoid of humans but with livestock still wandering around, is that since he was there as tithe and tax collector for the Norwegian crown and church, the first such visitor for some considerable time, the inhabitants had received prior warning of his visit and simply made themselves temporarily scarce. This would explain other contradictory indications that the West Settlement functioned for several decades after that date.

Seaver demonstrates convincingly, largely on the basis of the "Burgundian cap" and other well preserved garments of late fifteenth century European style, recovered from excavations at Herjolfsnes, that the East Settlement

was still flourishing and maintaining contact with Europe until about 1500. Since it is well established that no ships had reached Iceland or Norway from Greenland after 1410, clearly this contact had been maintained with some other European nation.

Soon after 1500, the West Settlement also came to an end. Seaver analyzes the archaeological and other evidence and discards the possibilities of genetic deterioration, epidemics, and attacks or absorption by Eskimos. All the archaeological evidence suggests that the farms of the West Settlement were flourishing right up until the end. This then leaves as the only possible explanation an orderly abandonment by the Norse Greenlanders of the area which had been home for five hundred years. This raises two questions: why and to where?

The second part of Seaver's book deals with her explanation, based on exhaustive research in English and Portuguese archives, of who had been maintaining links between Europe and Greenland throughout most of the fifteenth century. English ships, mainly from Bristol, fished Icelandic waters from the early years of the fifteenth century. Seaver argues that these English fishermen pushed westwards to harvest the fishing resources off the West Greenland coast, made contact with the Norse Greenlanders, and developed a lucrative trade between Greenland and England for almost another century. This appears quite reasonable.

Seaver then examines the history of Portuguese explorations in the North Atlantic, namely those of the Cabots, the Corte Reals, and others, emphasizing the Bristol connection. This leads her to one Joao Fernandes, who, along with two other Azorians and three well-established Bristol merchants, was granted a patent by Henry VII of England in 1501 to exploit the resources of an area other than "the new Isle" (Newfoundland), to which John Cabot had already been granted similar rights. There is absolutely no evidence that Fernandes and his companions mounted an expedition on the basis of this patent; indeed, at this point, Fernandes disappears. Nonetheless, on the basis of this extremely flimsy foundation, Seaver constructs an argument that Fernandes mounted

a colonizing expedition to Southern Labrador, and that *en route*, taking advantage of his Bristol colleagues' knowledge of the existence and location of the Norse Greenland settlements, he recruited a substantial number of the Greenlanders as colonists. Even Seaver concedes that they would not have recruited the entire population, given the scattered nature of the farms, but that the removal of many of the young, vigorous males would have tipped the balance against the survival of the remainder, who subsequently died off.

Particularly in that this is the central thesis of the book, this is an appallingly weak argument. Seaver correctly reports that absolutely no archaeological evidence has surfaced to suggest an attempt at a European/Greenlandic Norse settlement in Southern Labrador, but she has hopes that such evidence will at some stage be found. Unfortunately, her "clues" do not even start to approach the soundness of Selma Barkham's archival research in the Basque region of Spain which led to her identification of the Basque whaling station at Red Bay in Southern Labrador. Not even the most enthusiastic archaeologist would be persuaded to start a search based on Seaver's hypothesis.

In Helge Ingstad's excellent study of Norse Greenland, *Land Under the Pole Star*, first published in Norwegian in 1949, he deduced that it was quite reasonable to suppose that the Norse Greenlanders had moved to Labrador of their own volition, without the assistance of Portuguese or Englishmen. Seaver has made a contribution which could strengthen that argument by firmly establishing the continuing links between Greenland and Bristol throughout the fifteenth century, and by stressing the critical Bristol connection in terms of the exploitation of Newfoundland and area in the early sixteenth century. It would seem likely that reports of such activities would be related to the Greenlanders, thereby making the Newfoundland/Labrador area even more attractive to them. To postulate recruitment of the Greenlanders for an expedition which may not even have occurred is approaching the realm of fantasy. It is hard to credit that such flimsy hypotheses should have been made the central pivot in an otherwise

excellent scholarly work.

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MARK KURLANSKY, *Cod: A Biography of the Fish that Changed the World*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1997. Illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-676-97061-3. \$21.00.

Mark Kurlansky considers the relationship between humanity and nature from the perspective of the endangered cod, at a time when the world's fisheries are in ecological crisis. The cod fisheries of the North Atlantic have either been shut down, or effort in them severely reduced. In taking up the story of how cod stocks have collapsed, *Cod: A Biography of the Fish that Changed the World* this book emphasizes the importance of cod fishery to the history of the countries of the North Atlantic rim.

Kurlansky surveys the expansion of the trade in salted and/or dried cod from the late medieval period through the early modern expansion of rival European empires. The importance of the cod fishery to the establishment of Europeans in North America has often been neglected in the studies of the "Columbian exchange." Salt cod, a cheap source of protein, made the slave economies of the plantation colonies possible. The cod trade contributed to the growth of New England's competitive mercantile capitalism. The desire to find new fishing grounds and transport fresh food to the expanding urban markets of the late industrial world prompted the development of much of the freezing and packaging technology used by the modern food industry. Finally, the expansion of industrial fishing produced newer international rivalries, notably between the United Kingdom and Iceland in the 1960s and 1970s, and between Canada and Spain in 1995. Kurlansky flavors his history with recipes for salt cod drawn from the periods he examines. These recipes remind readers that quite ordinary human drives such as hunger serve as the basis for the most complex social, economic, and

political processes.

Kurlansky's condensed writing will leave many historians unsatisfied, and his work is sometimes simply inaccurate. The importance he attributes to cod fishery in the development of American capitalism, individualism, and independence, for example, borders on the reductionist. It is further untrue that an unbroken record of Spanish and Portuguese fishing on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland for five hundred years ended with Canada's assertion of a 200-mile limit in 1977. The Portuguese at least were absent from these waters for most of the nineteenth century.

Readers will find some natural history of the cod rather than a biography of the fish. Its fecundity, resistance to disease, and omnivorous feeding habits made cod a prolific species. Its abundance made it an important staple of human consumption and trade. Kurlansky argues that humanity's inability to see fish as having any worth except as a staple to satisfy human needs makes us an "openmouthed species greedier than cod" (page 45). The industrialization of the corporate industry and state management of the fishery have hastened the exhaustion of cod, but even ordinary inshore fishers must share in the blame for what has happened in the North Atlantic.

Kurlansky gives one example: the fishing people of Petty Harbour, Newfoundland. Deprived of their livelihoods by the closure of the northern cod fishery, these people like to talk about how offshore draggers hurt cod stocks. Petty Harbour people are, nonetheless, no more inclined toward conservation. Past community efforts to ban over-exploitative fishing gear were not due to a desire to sustain cod stocks, but to the lack of room in local waters to deploy new gear. Avoiding conflict with each other, rather than stewardship of the cod, motivated these fishermen.

Petty Harbour fishers' inability to appreciate cod for any reason except the satisfaction of their own needs, far from being unique, is part of a "1,000-year fishing spree" by Europeans generally (page 14). Kurlansky's acceptance of greed as natural to the way Europeans met their needs is problematic. Hunger, for example,

might be natural, but greed is a historical artefact determined by the cultures of production and consumption that surround its satisfaction. The literature on moral regulation of the commons suggests that many societies have governed their use of natural resources by cultural norms other than greed. If greed has triumphed, it is more likely because the market motivations of capitalism have undermined the legitimacy of other moral norms.

Kurlansky's tendency to oversimplify the history of the cod fishery stems from the book's brevity. The result is an unsatisfactory history but an effective polemic. However one might feel about Kurlansky's explanation for the crisis in the cod fisheries of the North Atlantic, it is difficult not to be disturbed by the long history of ecological collapse he presents.

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MARYANNE KOWALESKI, *Local Markets and Regional Trade in Medieval Exeter*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. xvi + 442 pages, tables, appendices, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 0-521-333717. \$69.95.

Maryanne Kowaleski has produced an excellent study that provides a window into the life of local market towns, especially Exeter, important as a regional market and a port. The principal thrust of *Local Markets and Regional Trade in Medieval Exeter* is to examine Exeter as the focal point in a marketing chain that links the countryside, towns, and overseas trade. This is an ambitious undertaking that requires the careful examination of dozens of manuscript collections. Kowaleski, a faculty member at Fordham University, invested the requisite time in the Devon County and Exeter records, including the Cathedral Library, the Public Records Office in Kew, and the printed records to produce a study firmly grounded in primary sources. Analytical data on occupational groups, fairs, populations, and a table of house-

holders reinforces the arguments made in the text. Exeter's population, which numbered about 3,100 in 1377, formed the basis for a prosopographical study that incorporated into a core part of her work. Students of maritime history will find her list of householders useful. Although no mariners are listed, merchants and "fishers" do appear.

Kowaleski builds on the economic studies of E. M. Carus-Wilson, W. G. Hoskins, R. H. Hilton, R. H. Britnell, Christopher Dyer, and others to produce her own analysis of the regional economy centered on Exeter in the fourteenth century. At the time, Exeter was the premier market town in southwestern England. Ten miles from the sea, although only four miles from its outport Topsham at the head of the Exestuary, Exeter was well situated for its establishment as both a local market center and an entrepot for overseas trade. She traces this development from the eleventh century, when Exeter was one of the leading towns in England, through the fifteenth century. By that time, other towns had grown faster than Exeter, but the town remained important, as evidenced by its designation as one of the nine wool staple towns in England.

Kowaleski expresses some ambivalence about the debt owed by the Exeter market and its development to the sea. She concedes that while "the maritime orientation of Devon's coastal communities undoubtedly stimulated trade and encouraged the founding of markets, fairs, and boroughs at many of these locations, the influence of the sea mattered little away from the coast" (page 48). However, her well researched chapter on the port trade and the hinterland (pages 222-278), makes a case for the strong impact Exeter maintained as a head-port, noted by its development of excellent inland communications links, its positions as the largest royal customs jurisdiction, as well as its status as one of the staple towns through which all English exports were channeled. It is true that earlier vessels could sail directly up the Exe to the town walls, but weirs and other obstructions prohibited this from at least the thirteenth century. Given the increased sizes of late medieval ships, Exeter could not have

maintained direct access to the sea. Topsham's control by the earls of Devon resulted in the imposition of heavy payments, amounting to one-third of the customs on wines. Ships mustered into royal service were arrested by royal writs addressed to Topsham or Exmouth. It was an official from Exeter who carried out the orders.

Kowaleski's examination of the import trade of Exeter reaffirms the significance of the wine trade. Consider that between 1302 and 1320, 81 percent of all Exeter importers owned cargoes of wine. By comparing the Bordeaux wine accounts with the Exeter customs accounts, Kowaleski calculated that 60 percent of the wine imported to Exeter ca. 1350-1425 arrived by coastal vessels that picked up the wine at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, or another first port of call. Some vessels which came from Bordeaux made several stops, such as the *Trinity* of Dartmouth, laden with eighty-three tons of wines on arrival in England, but carrying only four tons when she reached Exeter twenty-five days later.

This tightly written volume is replete with examples and data to bring into focus the myriad activities of Exeter as a market town, port, and ecclesiastical center. It spawned entrepreneurs, and through their efforts Exeter sat at the center of the web of mercantile networks that facilitated the movement of people and merchandise. This study is based on a complex but rational methodology that will serve as a model for regional studies of towns and trades.

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FRANK L. FOX, *A Distant Storm: The Four Days' Battle of 1666*. Rotherfield, East Sussex: Jean Boudriot Publications, 1996). xiii + 425 pages, 301 illustrations of which twenty-two are in full color, thirteen appendices, bibliography, notes, index. 9¾" x 12½". ISBN 0-948864-29-X. \$100.00.

The Four Days' Battle was one of the great epics in the age of sailing navies. On 1 June 1666, part of the English fleet, seriously weakened by the despatch of a squadron to the westward to intercept a French force which was rumored (erroneously, as it transpired) to be approaching the Channel, was engaged by a larger Dutch fleet. The four days of bitter fighting that followed gave the battle its name, and explain much of the abiding fascination with it. Its sheer scale and the enormity of the intelligence blunder that preceded it has given it a lasting fame that its actual consequences did little to justify. As even Frank Fox has to admit at the end of his equally epic *A Distant Storm: The Four Days' Battle of 1666*, it "obviously was not a turning point of history," was not particularly unusual in terms of the intensity or nature of the fighting, and was not even the decisive battle of the 1666 campaign, let alone of the second Anglo-Dutch war as a whole. Why, then, does the battle deserve to have such a weighty book written about it — and, it must be said, a book at such a weighty price?

Although Fox justifies his enterprise by noting that his is the first detailed study of the battle in English, the work's *raison d'être* is clearly much more than that: every aspect of the book betrays the fact that for the author, this was a twelve-year labor of love on the grand scale. Frank Fox has written much, much more than an account of this one battle, as shown by the fact that the "four days" themselves take up under half the length of the book. In reality, he has written the fullest and easily the best available account of the entire naval side of the second Anglo-Dutch war, concentrating on the Four Days Battle as a detailed "case study." For example, the reader will find detailed accounts of the administrations, ships, and personnel of the English and Dutch navies, analyses of the nature of the ordnance and the positions of the sandbanks in the Thames, and accounts of the other engagements of the war, from Lowestoft in 1665 to the *debacle* at Chatham in 1667. The profusion of appendices includes fleet lists for all of the major, and some of the minor, battles and operations. Indeed, few contexts escape

Fox's attention, although he achieves this despite the fact that he seems to have used little or none of the recent secondary work on the period, such as Bernard Capp's work on the English navy, Jaap Bruijn's book on the Dutch, or Brian Tunstall's work on naval tactics. However, Fox rightly devotes attention to the other navies which impacted on the 1666 campaign — not only the French fleet, exaggerated fears of which caused the despatch of Prince Rupert and his ships from the main English fleet, but that of Denmark as well, a paper tiger in many respects but one which had an important bearing on English strategic thinking at times in 1666. Probably the most important new insight that Fox provides emerges from his willingness to consider the battle, and the war as a whole, from these wider perspectives. The division of the fleet, which precipitated the battle, is seen here as the consequence of real alarm in English government circles about a possible French invasion of Ireland. This interpretation fits comfortably with evidence from other sources that Fox does not cite (notably in the Carte Manuscripts at Oxford); moreover, it lays to rest once and for all the old canard that a report from an inept "gentleman captain," misidentifying a fleet off Lisbon, panicked the English government into sending Rupert west.

Fox's text is impressive enough. However, his crowning achievement is to draw together probably the most comprehensive collection of illustrations of the second Anglo-Dutch war to appear in print. National and private collections in America and several European countries have been "mined" for anything of even tangential relevance to Fox's narrative, and the end result combines the familiar, the unfamiliar, and sometimes even the downright obscure — as well as ships and captains galore. There is even a picture of Brooke House, where the postwar committee investigating government mismanagement sat. In this, Fox has been well served by his publisher. The presentation of the book is lavish, rounded off by a splendid, specially commissioned dust jacket from the well-known marine artist Richard Endors. Expensive it may be, but in all respects *A Distant Storm* is a major contribution to the

historiography of the Anglo-Dutch wars.

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KENNETH R. MARTIN AND RALPH LINWOOD SNOW, *The Pattens of Bath: A Seagoing Dynasty*. Bath, Maine: Maine Maritime Museum, 339 Washington Street, Bath, Maine, and the Patten Free Library, 1996. x + 180, bibliography, 2 appendices, maps, illustrations. Paper. ISBN 0-937410-15-2. \$22.95.

Were James Michener to have written one of his "big books" about maritime Maine entitled, say, *The DownEasters*, he would in his meticulous research undoubtedly have used this strikingly complete work. With *The Pattens of Bath: A Seagoing Dynasty*, Kenneth R. Martin and Ralph Linwood Snow firmly establish themselves as the leaders of a Maine maritime historical cohort. Assisted by such stalwarts as Charlie Burden, MD, a true saltwater aficionado; Ruth C. Briggs, an "up-river girl;" Gary Mason and Nathan Lipfert, librarians without whose help one cannot write of seafaring Maine; Earle Shuttleworth, Jr., a Maine historical bureaucrat; Bill Bunting, a formidably able student of Maine's maritime history; Ermine S. Reynolds, who showed the way with her exemplary study of her own Kennebec River ship-owning family *The Skofields*, written in collaboration with Martin; Earl R. "Bud" Warren, who probably knows more of the physical geography of midcoast Maine than any other man; and Squiggles and Poe, the "ship's cats" of the Patten Free Library in Bath.

What have these scholars given us? An economic genealogy of the relatives of the brothers Patten, Jarvis and George, which is essentially a history of American maritime enterprise in its glory days from before the Revolution until the coming of the steamship. Martin, Snow, and foot soldiers tell us of the Patten brothers coming in 1859 to own the nation's largest private fleet (consisting of

twelve vessels of 11,169 tons), comprising the "Anchor line."

The Patten brothers, nephews, sons, and in-laws (such as Jarvis and James Patten and Noble Maxwell) made their money in the West Indies trade, by building ships in Bath and on Merry-meeting bay, in spite of the Embargo of 1807, and in the cotton trade during the 1820s, during the Mexican War — all with relatives Maxwell, Jarvis, and James, commanding and investing in Anchor line vessels.

They survived the panic of 1857, entered the Cape Horn and California grain trades, and weathered the Civil War and the opening of the Suez Canal which favored steamships.

Often with their clerk, Charles Davenport, who became wealthy investing in Patten ventures, the brothers contributed to the civic betterment of Bath and the Kennebec region by helping build a poorhouse, bringing the Bath Gas Light Company into existence, helping bring the Kennebec and Portland Railroad to town, creating the Bath Military and Naval Orphan's Asylum for young victims of the Civil War, and by investing in the Bath Whaling Company which eventually failed. Jarvis Patten extended and enriched the families' tradition of service to the community and involvement in government when he became the first United States Commissioner of Navigation in 1884. He owned bank stock, the Lincoln Bank, and sat on numerous boards of overseers and directors, created the magnificent Patten Free Library in Bath, helped build the stately Winter Street Congregational Church, and launched two steamers, *Montana* (1864) and *Idaho*, which ended their days with the California, Oregon and Mexico Steamship Company. Younger Pattens created the Patten Car Works in Bath to rebuild railroad cars of every description. When he died, a contemporary in the Maine State Legislature said: "The city of Bath owes more to Captain George F. Patten than any other man for its material wealth." Brother John, who passed on 26 September 1869, lived from the same bank account as George, who departed this mortal toil on 23 February 1887, at age 97.

The brothers left behind not only fortunes, but improvements, such as the water works, the

electric company, and a roller skating rink.

Main, Snow, and mob have furnished two useful appendices of family members, and of family-built and owned vessels (more than sixty). While this work is valuable for its meticulous research, it is useful for its insights into the American maritime enterprise and would supplement any course in American maritime history. It contains numerous black-and-white illustrations and endpaper maps of the region. It is one of the best fleet biographies.

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THOMAS J. OERTLING, *Ships' Bilge Pumps: A History of Their Development, 1500–1900*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. xvii + 105 pages, illustrations, photographs, notes, bibliography, index. \$17.95.

LAWRENCE V. MOTT, *The Development of the Rudder: A Technological Tale*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997, xv + 218 pages, illustrations, photographs, charts and tables, appendices, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-89096-723-7. \$19.95.

As Water Rat in *Wind in the Willows* once said, "There is nothing — absolutely nothing — half as much worth doing as messing about in boats." As all who undertake such pursuits professionally or avocationally well know, it is the simple, most mundane marine gear that is usually the most important to any maritime endeavor. Two such features which are perhaps the most critical to the management and survival of watercraft are the foci of Thomas J. Oertling's *Ships' Bilge Pumps: A History of Their Development, 1500–1900* and Lawrence V. Mott's *The Development of the Rudder: A Technological Tale*.

Oertling's research on the evolution and technology of the ship's bilge pump began as a Master's thesis survey of artifacts produced from the archaeological record of shipwrecks. Choosing to plunge in where there was a seri-

ous dearth of information, he elected to study one of the most mundane, albeit least documented, of all components of a ship's outfit. Based upon the simple premise that all wooden ships leak, and that pumps are thus vital to maintaining buoyancy for the vessel's survival, he organizes his research around three evolutionary typologies: the burr pump, the common or "suction" pump, and the chain pump on ships from ca. 1500 to ca. 1840. For the purpose of this monograph, he has also included a very brief discussion on pump types of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

To assist the readers in their journey through the developmental history of the bilge pump, Oertling has provided a cornucopia of selected historical illustrations. Drawings and photographs of pumps and pump components recovered during archaeological surveys of shipwrecks, primarily from English, Spanish, and French vessel sites of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries add immeasurably to the interpretive database. The text is well written and far superior to the usual thesis-driven publication. Oertling wastes not a word and the descriptive material is spartan, clean, and easily read. To take on such potentially dry subjects as the manufacture of wooden pump tubes or to describe a typical burr pump of the sixteenth century is in itself a challenge to his intellectual stamina and his ability to communicate clearly. Yet, the end product is a cohesive, digestible dollop of relevant data that has hitherto been sorely ignored in the voluminous works on the history of marine technology.

In presenting the evolution of the bilge pump, Oertling provides a brief but well organized examination of the nature and management of leaks in ships' hulls, citing germane, often colorful examples of the various means employed to staunch the flow of water. In an analysis of the methodology and tools employed in the manufacture of the pump tube, which changed little over the centuries, he arrays examples to illustrate each of the steps involved.

The description of the burr pump and its components has been drawn largely from the archaeological records provided from excava-

tions of such sites as the Basque whaler *San Juan* (1565), the Highborn Cay wreck in the Bahamas, the Emanuel Point wreck (1559), and others. The assessment of the suction pump, employed from at least as early as 1431, which William Falconer declared in his *Universal Dictionary of the Marine* (1780) as "so generally understood that it hardly requires any description," is the longest section of the book. As with the previous section, Oertling relies heavily upon the archaeological record reinforced by historic illustrations. This period type is clearly where his interest lies. The chain pump, the origins of which have been attributed to the Chinese, is treated in like manner, although somewhat more briefly.

If there is a handicap in this well done work, it is that it is an extension of a thesis project which could have been even wider in scope. Owing to the cost of research, he notes, British and American patent information was barely mined for its rich content, and his survey of archival manuscript data yielded little because of its admitted brevity. The work is heavily reliant on the archaeological record, and as such pointedly illustrates the value of that nascent discipline to historical research. Oertling is to be congratulated on such a cogent and readable presentation on an entirely ignored but important component of marine technology. Hopefully, his research will one day be expanded to include non-Western-Eurocentric pump system development.

Lawrence Mott's research on the evolution of the rudder, the "one instrument, that all ships, past and present, have in common" (page 1), is superbly ambitious and far wider in address. In his effort to encompass a topic as vital as any to maritime history and the evolution of navigation technology, he has tackled his subject in a systematic and lucid fashion. The work is extremely well illustrated with extensive technical drawings, historic illustrations, and photographs that amply expand upon and enhance the text.

Mott presents a well considered historical overview of the European rudder. Beginning with the Roman period and concluding with the Age of Exploration, he weighs the reasons why

some technologies evolved and endured while others were abandoned. The heart of the work focuses upon the evolutionary stages from the quarter rudder to pintel-and-gudgeon, analyzing along the way the developmental mechanics of rudder systems, and the parameters of human interests and societal adaptations brought on by innovation. Some accepted truisms, such as the casual factors influencing the abandonment of the quarter rudder, a flexible and utilitarian piece which survived well after the introduction of alternative typologies (owing to factors such as costs, simplicity, and need), are aggressively and successfully challenged. Unlike the quarter rudder, a stanchion of Mediterranean shipbuilding tradition, the development and adoption of the pintel-and-gudgeon system by northern Europeans required not only the radical evolutionary changes in hull design which found their maturity in the oceanic Age of Exploration, but a combination of a number of unrelated ideas and technologies.

Mining the rich resources of Europe, Mott has spared little in his holistic research to present the reader with a thoroughly erudite presentation of his subject. In blending the iconographic record with the precepts of modern hydrodynamics, he provides a sweeping assessment of the variations, innovations, technologic flaws, dead ends, and new solutions to the age-old requirements of navigation under sails and oars. In extensive appendices, he includes a mathematical model for quarter rudder flotation behavior, and the results of tests of flotation models, as well as a selected compilation of medieval contracts, inventories, and laws relating to the history of the quarter rudder.

This work, cover promotions notwithstanding, was clearly not intended for the layperson, but for maritime historians, nautical archaeologists, and ship modelers. The writing style is clear and lucid for a study which is technohistorical in design and intent. In addressing every relevant topic, from performance and flotation to mounting systems and construction, *The Development of the Rudder* should be considered a seminal work on the subject.

Although Oertling's and Mott's studies

were not necessarily intended as companion pieces, both have been published as individual but sequential titles in Texas A&M's prestigious "Studies in Nautical Archaeology" series. They deserve to stand side by side on the bookshelves of all maritime historians and nautical archaeologists, or indeed anyone with a serious interest in ships and the sea. It is unlikely that works on these two subjects equal in scope, character, or quality will appear anytime soon.

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RIF WINFIELD, *The 50-Gun Ship*. London: Chatham Publishing, 1 & 2 Faulkner's Alley, Cowcross Street, London EC1 M6DD, 1997. 128 pages, tables, illustrations, drawings, large scale plans, source references. Hardcover. ISBN 1-86176025-6.

Rif Winfield has authored an excellent work which traces the development of the Royal Navy's 50-gun ship from its early seventeenth century antecedents among the Flemish privateers to its final days in the early nineteenth century. *The 50-Gun Ship* is divided into two parts. Part I, containing seven chapters, traces the ship's technical development through the various periods of Royal Navy history, with particular emphasis on the effects of budget, armament, and the changing role from ship-of-the-line to that of a heavy cruiser. These changes are well documented by 123 tables, which are conveniently placed among the text to which they refer.

Part II contains five chapters dealing with everything from the masting and rigging of the 50-gun ship to its crew, armament, fittings, and stores. For the model maker, this part of the book displays two cutaway drawings by John McKay of HMS *Leopard* (1790), of *Chesapeake-Leopard* fame. Attached to the rear cover of the volume is a separate set of *Leopard* plans, also by John McKay.

Although the final chapter of this work does

an excellent job of reviewing the aspects of service of the 50-gun ship, especially its role off the North American coast during the American Revolution, one should not expect to read story after story of actions which involved the 50-gun ship. Winfield does include brief accounts of actions, but these usually serve to highlight the various technical and role changes of this class of vessel.

Mr. Winfield has included in this work over one hundred plans, drawings, and photographs of models representing his subject. These add greatly to understanding the text. Although he states that his efforts deal mainly with the 50-gun ships of the Royal Navy, one might wish he had included a bit more detail on the history of this class of vessel in the navies competing with the Royal Navy during the Age of Sail. *The 50-Gun Ship*, however, is a valuable addition to our understanding of a vessel type during the era of the sailing navy, and would be a valuable addition to the library of any maritime historian or model maker.

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THOMAS N. LAYTON, *The Voyage of the Frolic: New England Merchants and the Opium Trade*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997. xvi + 227 pages. Illustrations. \$24.95.

Thomas Layton, the author of this interesting and enjoyable book, is an archaeologist on the faculty of San José State University in California. His story begins with his professional interest in the material culture and trade routes of the Pomo people, who lived near the rugged coast of Mendocino County north of San Francisco. Fragments of bottle glass and cheap Chinese pottery, both dating from the nineteenth century, soon led him to the documents of the brig *Frolic*, formerly in the opium trade between Bombay and Canton (now Guangzhou) and wrecked on that coast in 1850. Layton's local history quickly becomes world history,

with much of special interest for the maritime historian.

The *Frolic* was built for Augustine Heard & Company of Boston, already well established in trade with Canton, in the Baltimore yard of William and George Gardner, builders of some of the finest of the "Baltimore clippers." True to his own professional bias toward material culture, Layton has assembled, with the aid of specialists in naval architecture, fascinating details on the building and the sailing characteristics of these famous ships. Specialists will particularly enjoy examining appendices offering details on supplies used and building procedures. Unexpected perspectives on American and world history pop up even here, as we learn that at least one Gardner-built clipper dodged through elaborate screens of fake documentation to participate in the African slave trade, and that the famous autobiography of Frederick Douglass contains a vivid account of his working and learning, while still a young slave, in the Gardner shipyard.

Ships of the Heard firm began carrying opium from India to China for the great British firm of Jardine, Matheson & Company during the Opium War between Britain and China, 1839–1842. Thereafter, Heard & Company were ready to go into the rapidly expanding opium trade on their own. Speed was of the essence for beating competitors to market and carrying opium to new coastal depots to the north and east of Canton. The *Frolic* was built specifically for the requirements of this trade. Her very able captain, Edward Horatio Faucon, was the son of a well connected French *émigré* who taught French at Harvard. The younger Faucon had attended Boston Latin School, and in 1833 startled and delighted Richard Henry Dana, Jr. by quoting Virgil to him as he scraped a cowhide on a beach near San Diego. Arriving in Bombay in 1845, Faucon and his ship quickly tapped into established Heard connections and made four round trips to the China coast in the next twelve months. Layton's touch with the changing situation in China and the importation of opium — illegal but tacitly acknowledged in the treaties that followed the Opium War — is a bit shaky; however, he makes

excellent use of the Heard papers and a variety of other sources, and will convince any historian of these matters that there is still much to be learned from such records as our understanding of Chinese and Indian contexts grows and changes. He also presents a fascinating picture of the trade at the Bombay end. It is clear that the real masters of that end of the trade were the great Hindu merchants. The Americans rarely traded to China on their own capital; more often, they were simply carrying and selling on freight and commission opium owned by the Indian merchants. As more clippers competed for freight and the first steamships appeared on the scene, the Heards' profits declined sharply, so the possibility of carrying a cargo of goods to sell in Gold Rush California was most welcome news.

A final fascinating aspect of this story is that as the results of Layton's investigation were made public and plans were made to exhibit some of the found objects in Mendocino County and to dramatize the story for local audiences, a small culture war ensued in which divers, archaeologists, and present-day representatives of the Pomo criticized each other and struggled to make their voices heard. This object lesson in the real cultural contradictions at work in the investigation and construction of the past is just one more reason why this book would be a most useful and many-sided addition to the reading lists for courses ranging from California history to the history of the modern world.

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LANCE E. DAVIS, ROBERT E. GALLMAN, AND KAREN GLEITER, *In Pursuit of Leviathan: Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1815–1906*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. xii + 584. Illustrations, tables, index, bibliography. 2.5 x 8. ISBN 0-226-13789-9. \$80.00.

When I first began to study the whaling

industry, the antiquarian in me became immediately certain that I had found a topic of interest. Never before had I found a field of inquiry that was quite like it: unapologetically, nearly all writing on the subject derived from the "standard history" of whaling, Alexander Starbuck's *History of the American Whale Fisher*, was originally published in 1878. If authors set out on even slightly new interpretations, such as Elmo Hohman, *The American Whaleman* (Longmans, Green, 1928), they at least employed Starbuck's data and furthered many of his observations. This has all changed because whaling possessed the "...technical change and productivity improvement" to make it an appealing case study for Lance Davis, Robert Gallman, and Karen Gleiter (page ix). *In Pursuit of Leviathan* draws from previously unused data sets as well as some well-worn sources to create what will likely serve as the standard reference of American whaling.

As a reference text, however, this hefty volume is not easy reading for most maritime historians. *In Pursuit of Leviathan* is a work of economic history, with interest in the details and nuances of whaling only when it serves the authors' purposes. Published in the National Bureau of Economic Research Series on Long-term Factors in Economic Development, this book could concern any industry that best fit the template of change. The economic historians focus their analysis on the raw material of whaling voyages, particularly those departing from New Bedford, Massachusetts, and produce extensive tables, charts, and diagrams. In essence, they produce the kind of data industrial historians would love to have concerning every undertaking; historians of whaling must now take the data and apply it.

Using primary sources, including the *Voyage Data Set* in which Joseph Dias assembled information on 4,000 New Bedford whaling voyages between 1783–1906 and the most comprehensive business records available, Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter persuasively position whaling within its deserved industrial and economic importance. Often, historical literature on the subject has veered into the human stories of the process of whaling and lost track

of the importance of whale oil as a product and the industry as an economic indicator of nineteenth century change. The whaling industry lends itself to this scrutiny by pursuing an unowned resource (outside of the limitations of all laws of property) and containing distinct units for analysis (each voyage serving as a separate business venture). These characteristics allow the authors to analyze the dynamics of technological innovation and changes in productivity as they influence, and are influenced by, changing profits.

While some of the findings here are available in previous histories, the collection and organization of raw data to support these points is an absolute treasure for historians. *In Pursuit of Leviathan* contains data supporting three major findings: there is no evidence that American whaling declined because of a serious shortage of whales; cheap labor was the primary key to profitability in whaling, and this supply was eroded with the proliferation of industrial jobs on land; and agents, captains, and owners clearly acted as managers within the industry by making decisions to spur productivity, including choice of vessels, substitution of larger vessels, and decisions to shift operations to other seas (page 5). While changes in illumination, specifically the development of petroleum, have been credited with whale/sperm oil's demise in the 1850s, Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter suggest a different story: Norway shifted the purpose of whaling from illumination to the creation of cattle feed and glue, which required iron-hulled vessels armed with harpoon cannons, thereby outmoding the American fleet (pages 519–520).

The most intriguing argument here may be that the authors seek to verify statistically that the American whale fishery did not permanently injure the mammal's population, thereby establishing that population depletion did not cause the industry's downfall. Using historical and marine biological data, Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter write, "...whalemen appear to have killed, in total, between 8–18 percent of the initial stock..." between 1805–1900 (page 135). These claims are precariously founded on a ration of barrels-of-oil-per-whale (ranging

between 25 and 45 per), which then is applied to logs of business transactions. In a way, we fall back to Starbuck, because these rations cannot be verified. However, if we simply accept these general limitations, these economists have presented persuasive evidence that a lack of technological innovations kept American whalers operating at an ecologically sustainable level. This claim functions as a way not of ethically rationalizing the pursuit but of distinguished technological pursuits of the early and later nineteenth century.

In Pursuit of Leviathan continues the steady trickle of recent whaling literature, characterized, most notably, by Briton C. Busch's *Whaling Will Never Do For Me* (University of Kentucky Press, 1997) and Margaret Creighton's *Rites and Passages* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), each of which discusses the social implications of whaling, and John Bockstoce's *Whales, Ice & Men* (University of Washington Press, 1986), which offers details of whaling in the Western Arctic. *In Pursuit of Leviathan* should act as a point of departure for an entire generation of historians of whaling.

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GEORGE PALOCZI-HORVATH, *From Monitor to Missile Boat: Coast Defence Ships and Coastal Defence Since 1860*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Illustrations, bibliography, index, glossary. ISBN 1-55750-270-6. \$59.95.

Most writers of naval history, and I am no exception, have dismissed coastal defense as something of a blind alley, at most the recourse of minor naval powers; far better to have at the enemy well before he comes near one's littoral. Effective coastal craft can prove nearly as expensive as seagoing warships (HMS *Dreadnought* was budgeted at about £7 million, while the roughly contemporary Swedish coast defense battleship *Sverige* cost just slightly less).

Coastal waters are sometimes tempestuous. There is nothing placid much of the time about the North or the Baltic Seas or the North Carolina coast. Oceanic warships can usually proceed through coastal waters relatively unhindered by weather, but almost all coastal defense ships, with their low freeboards, would have to put into sheltered ports in storms. USS *Monitor* foundered off the North Carolina coast in a gale, and a fast running tide was sufficient to overwhelm another monitor, USS *Weehawken*, in Charleston Harbor. Thus, the maritime powers seemingly went up a blind alley when they invested large sums in warships that could not truly depart their coasts. And not one fired a shot in anger between the close of the American Civil War and the Spanish-American War.

George Paloczi-Horvath will make the reader think twice about these assumptions, historically based as they may be. He rightly begins with the mid-nineteenth century, for in truth, the coast ship was a product of the age of steam, and he draws a line of succession from USS *Monitor* to the fast attack corvettes of the 1990s. He illustrates through valid historical examples that a combination of minefields, coastal land guns, and coast defense warships can inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker. Of the eight battleships sunk by mines in World War I, for example, no less than three were dispatched by one minefield laid by one Turkish minelayer at the Dardanelles. Even in the age of Mahan, the heyday of the "Big Gun Navy" on blue water, most of the naval powers, great and medium, except for the United States, built coast defense monitors. When elderly seagoing battleships were used in coast defense-offense in World War I, they proved quite successful.

After World War I, minor naval powers continued to build up-do-date defense warships. In World War II, coast defense ships saw action in Scandinavian, Baltic, and Thai waters. Coastal artillery gave an even better account of itself in Poland, Norway, France, the Baltic, North Africa, Italy, the Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific. Great Britain had amassed 153 batteries of coastal artillery by the second half of 1940, although they saw little action. The US

Army forts guarding Manila Harbor early in World War II denied that port to the Japanese for six months, even in the total absence of US air support. For months, the 14-inch rifles of Fort Dru, the "Army's Concrete Battleship," were the heaviest American weapons firing against any enemy in World War II. Only at Singapore did coastal artillery truly fail (along with just about everything else the British did there). This is an impressive record for an "obsolete" means of warfare.

Several decades after World War II, coast defense enjoyed a renaissance with the coming of the missile-firing light warship and the Fast Attack Craft (FAC). By the 1990s, various maritime nations were readying "stealthy" coastal protection warships. Then there are Scandinavia's modern fixed gun installations, and the reborn concept of mobile coast defense batteries and missiles, as well as a new generation of mines. Only a handful of maritime nations can afford the costs of modern, first-class warships. Coastal defense has been indeed an attractive alternative for some one hundred fifty years.

From Monitor to Missile Boat is very fully illustrated, based upon primary as well as secondary sources, and should long remain as the definitive work on the topic.

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CAPTAIN JAMES COOMER, *Life on the Ohio*. Lexington, Ken.: University Press of Kentucky, 1998. Ohio Valley Series. 169 pages, maps, illustrations, glossary. ISBN 0-8131-2000-4. \$24.95.

Historians of American inland river transportation have suffered from a little too much of a good thing. Researchers can, initially, easily find hundreds of primary and secondary steamboat accounts; after that, the pickings get mighty slim. Both pre-steam (flatboats, rafts, keels) and post-steam (diesel-powered towboats) get short shrift in a field enamored with

the important and compelling "Steamboat Age" on the Ohio and Mississippi and their tributaries. The scant attention paid diesel towboats is especially evident. These snub-nosed workhorses have dominated the trade for nearly two-thirds of this century; indeed, they have prevailed for nearly half of the history of European-American boating on western rivers. Yet the books of Dick Bissel and Jane Curry, the solid narratives of the Army Corps of Engineers historians, and a few other sources, including oral histories in the Cincinnati Public Library, University of Memphis, and other depositories, stand alone on a shelf heavily weighted down with "steamboatin'."

Captain James Coomer's lively memoir *Life on the Ohio* shows that Mark Twain's steamboat genre is equally compelling when the captain's voice emanates from the wheelhouse of a post-World War II 3,000-horsepower diesel towboat. Actually, Coomer worked on all sizes of towboats during a fifty-year career on western rivers. His experience on harbor tugs combines with that of over two decades on line boats to offer a broad perspective of the economics and culture of modern towboating. "I went from deckhand to port engineer, to pilot and captain on towboats pushing up to 24,000 tons of cargo," Captain Coomer reminisces. "On the river I found confidence in my ability to do a good day's work, to withstand the elements, to keep my nerve in a tight place, and to do my share of work alongside the toughest of fellows. I awoke each day eager to get to my job" (page xvii).

Coomer is a storyteller whose vernacular simultaneously evinces knowledge and authority. Through him, we learn the ins and outs of boating during the post-World War II decades, a time when a reborn inland water commerce emerged as a giant force in the economies of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. Just as Twain told of his apprenticeship under Captain Horace Bixby, Coomer relates how apprenticeship, still alive and well one hundred years later, functioned in his own Cincinnati Harbor and Ohio River training. Because he worked as a port captain as well as in the wheelhouse, we learn a good deal about the business end of the game,

harbor politics, and the market dimension of diesel towboating. Technology is an interwoven theme, and Coomer skillfully transports the reader through towboat engine rooms (with 3,000-horsepower "screamin' jimmies" pushing full throttle), hopper and petroleum barge holds, and shore tanks and loading docks.

This nuts and bolts information is complemented by Coomer's vivid (and often humorous) memories of his everyday life on the river with the deckhands, engineers, and cooks whose colorful lifestyle is unique to America's western rivers. He talks of 5:00 AM breakfasts and bountiful towboat dinners, and of the ubiquitous galley jabber that constitutes the boatmen's only social life. He describes the "recreational" pursuits of rivermen and the ever-present tobacco, coffee, and beer and whiskey that sometimes lubricates their leisure pursuits. He notes the humorous, intense, and sometimes mundane society shared by five to ten men (and the occasional woman cook) aboard an Ohio River towboat. He talks about the constant dangers: barge wrecks and leaks, bridge mishaps, fires, and fearsome accidents that occur in high water, winter ice, and sweltering Delta humidity, sometimes at the cost of human life.

I worked for three years as a Mississippi River deckhand, oil tankerman, and cook. I have sailed many times into what boatman/singer John Hartford has lyrically named "the mystery below." While there is doubtless a compelling and romantic aspect to towboating, there is nevertheless the daily reality of doing hard and dangerous work, spending a good portion — sometimes over half — of one's life riding around on a diesel-perfumed towboat in the constant company of males. Travel brochures notwithstanding, life with the Delta Queen Steamboat Company is definitely *not* life on the Mississippi! Mark Twain would no doubt concur.

The irony of this kind of "romance" is not lost on Captain James Coomer. He knows well that "the River is a hard taskmaster" (page xvii), and yet he "wouldn't trade [his] life adventures with anyone" (page 172). That is the reason why, one concludes after reading this

engaging memoir, Captain Coomer has always "gravitated naturally toward the water" (page xvii).

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CAROL SHERIFF, *The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 1817–1862*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996. 251 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 0-8090-2753-4. \$13.00.

Until the publication of Carol Sheriff's *The Artificial River*, almost all histories of the Erie Canal had focused on the political maneuvering that brought about the decision to build this waterway and the prodigious engineering feats that made possible its construction. Her book is quite unlike these other volumes because she depicts the Erie Canal as being a primary catalyst and a metaphor for economic and social change.

In *The Artificial River*, the Erie assumes an overwhelming importance to the people who live along its banks. Its commerce breaks down the isolation of central and western New York and provides unbounded business opportunities for those individuals who are astute and industrious enough to take advantage of them. The Erie Canal symbolized the "Triumph of Art over Nature." Nowhere is this concept better expressed than in the following quotation from Chapter 2:

To nineteenth century Americans, nature was a powerful force. It provided the essentials of life: fertile land, sun and rain, trees and plants. But nature could also be deadly, rearing up unexpectedly in the form of floods, blizzards, tornadoes, hurricanes. Given nature's strength, the destruction of natural fixtures was as impressive as the construction of artificial ones. But art's ultimate triumph was that it forced

nature to do what nature had neglected to do on its own: create a river where it was needed.

The creation of the Erie Canal literally represented to New Yorkers a triumph of man over nature. It was seen as the work of republican free men, even though that title fit very few of the laborers who constructed the canal. As Sheriff so rightly points out, the Erie Canal was built by the muscle of landless laborers, many of whom were immigrants from Ireland who had little prospect of deriving economic benefit from their creation.

Almost immediately after its completion, the Erie Canal reduced time and distance for the inhabitants of central and western New York. It truly became an "artificial river" that allowed millions of men, women, and children to move through upstate New York to settle the rich farmlands of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.

The Erie Canal also served as the last leg of the underground railroad ferrying runaway slaves from Syracuse to Buffalo. Luxurious packet boats carried tourists on a northern circuit that ultimately led to Niagara Falls, while merchants outfitted boats to serve as traveling emporiums. None of this revolution in travel would have occurred had not the Erie Canal facilitated transportation and communication between regions of the country that had seemed to be extremely remote from one another. As Sheriff remarks, "The canal made distances seem short, not so much with speed as with efficiency."

Despite the many benefits that the Erie Canal brought to central and western New York, it proved to be a mixed blessing for some towns and adjacent land owners. Even before the opening celebrations had faded, many landowners learned from personal experience that the process of creating the Erie Canal had damaged their buildings and lands. Sheriff makes this point clearly when she states, "Rural people had long dealt with the vagaries of nature; the canal project added the mistakes, neglect, and whims of state employees to the list of forces which they faced." In order to receive compensation for their losses, landown-

ers had to deal with a government agency that was evolving into an organization that emphasized the needs of the state and business groups over the rights of the individual. Thus, the Erie Canal, which has so often been touted as a harbinger of unfettered individual opportunity, became instead an instrument which redefined to the advantage of government the relationship between the individual and the ruling authority.

Sheriff explores the social changes that were brought about by the creation and operation of the Erie Canal. Within two decades of its opening, over thirty thousand men, women, and children were employed around the clock to keep it in operation. To the middle class perspective, many of these workers were a threat to the established social order, since many of them drank, swore, whored, and gambled. They represented the underside of the economic progress and fluidity that was brought about by the Erie Canal.

To counter the threat posed by the immorality of the canal workers, many individuals, who were inspired by the great religious revival that has been termed the "Second Great Awakening," attempted not only to save the canal workers' souls but also "pressured merchants to live up to their promises to be moral guardians of a political economy based on market expansion and progress." To the middle class, the canal workers seemed to represent the future of commercial society and were a byproduct of the canal's prosperity that the middle class had hoped to avoid. Despite their best efforts, reformers were unsuccessful in reforming the canal workers and in raising their status in society. They were also unwilling to stop the commercial revolution brought about by the Canal and to send the canal workers back to the agrarian life from which many of them had come. Even the reformers came to realize that progress brought about by the canal had taken on a life of its own, even though it represented a perceived threat to the stability of middle class society.

Carol Sheriff's *The Artificial River* is a well written and thoroughly researched book that will appeal as much to the social historian as to the canal buff. It is unique in that it attempts to

view the Erie Canal as more than a physical river, but rather as a catalyst for economic and social change that profoundly altered the existing order of a region and, by extension, a state and a nation.

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OGDEN ROSS, *The Steamboats of Lake Champlain, 1809–1930*. Quechee, Vt.: Vermont Heritage Press, 1977. xi + 210 pages, 87 illustrations and maps, index, introductory material, afterword and postscript, appendices I–VII. 7" x 10". ISBN 0-91-1852-12-X. \$29.95 paper. \$39.95 hardcover.

The Steamboats of Lake Champlain, 1809–1930 is a treasure, especially for anyone interested in the early history and development of the steamboat. First published in 1930 and limited to two hundred copies for private distribution, this reprint edition fills a void in our knowledge. Ogden J. Ross, assistant to the vice president of the Delaware and Hudson Railroad, provides a factual, authoritative account, from the building of the *Vermont* in 1809, the second steamboat in the US, through the formation and growth of the Champlain Transportation Company (CTC), to their building of the *Ticonderoga*, 1906.

Fascinating history, seldom mentioned in standard works, is revealed. By 1809, the viability of Fulton's steamboat was established, as was its profitability. Canadian John Winans, a disgruntled Fulton workman, and brother James formed the Lake Champlain Company to run a steamboat from St. John, Quebec, to Whitehall, New York. With stage connections, they provided services from Montreal to Albany. They launched the hull of the *Vermont* in 1808. James Smallman provided the engine, and the *Vermont* began service in the summer of 1809, functioning successfully until October 1815.

Further opposition to the Fulton-Livingston monopoly on steam navigation in New York waters appeared from a group of Albany inves-

tors. Inspired by expectations of great profits, they placed their first steamboat, the *Hope*, on the Hudson River in April 1811. Fulton and Livingston promptly petitioned the courts for an injunction and treble damages against the Albany group for ignoring Fulton's steamboat patent and their state monopoly. A complicated and extensive legal battle ensued. The Albany Company persisted, putting the *Perseverance* on the river. Despite success in the courts, in December 1812 Fulton purchased the *Hope* from the Albany Company to end their competition. He also licensed a group of businessmen from Burlington and Vergennes to operate steamboats on Lake Champlain. Procuring a charter from the state, they formed the Lake Champlain Steam-boat Company and built the *Phoenix*, utilizing the engine from the *Perseverance*. The *Phoenix* operated successfully from 1815 until 1819.

Chartered by the state of Vermont in 1826, how the CTC, "crushing and absorbing competition," acquired complete control of steam transport on the lake is competently recorded. Also recorded is CTC's expansion in a search for profits as control of the company was changed through internal machinations until its purchase by the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company in December 1870. The external challenges of railroad expansion, increased use of automobiles on new highways, a bridge across the southern end of the lake, and changes in public taste finally brought about the company's demise after the Depression and World War II.

A new foreword and afterword by Arthur B. Cohn, Lake Champlain Maritime Museum Director, brings Ogden Ross' book up to date. Cohn describes the collapse of the railroad's subsidy and the efforts of entrepreneur Horace Corbin to continue the use of CTC's steamers. World War II brought the Donovan Construction Company to the Shelburne Shipyard to build ships for the Navy. Ownership changes after the war are recorded and a new optimism appears. The efforts of Ralph Nading Hill to save the *Ticonderoga* are acknowledged, and his book *Sidewheeler Saga* (New York, 1953) effectively describes those activities. The

chapter entitled "A Sidewheel Saga," based on Ross' book, in Jim Shaughnessy's *Delaware and Hudson* (New York, 1967) also expands on the story of Lake Champlain steamers. The postscript by Cohn describes the underwater archaeology of the lake.

Extensively illustrated with reproductions of the early boats and photographs of all the lake steamers since the *Francis Saltus* (1844), this book is an outstanding source. While I would have appreciated more information on the propulsion of the vessels, this is a minor drawback. Photographs of captains and company executive officers are included. Even genealogists will find the volume interesting with its names of pilots (54), captains (52), officers (42), and directors (104). The Vermont Heritage Press is to be congratulated for publishing an updated version of Ross' book.

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WARREN SPENCER, *Raphael Semmes: The Philosophical Mariner*. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1997. xii + 252 pages, four photographs, three maps, notes, bibliographical essay, bibliography, index. 6" x 9". Hardcover. ISBN 0-8173-0844-X. \$37.95.

Any mention of Raphael Semmes conjures up superlatives. His name is inevitably linked to CSS *Alabama*, the most successful commerce raider of all time. As skipper of CSS *Sumter* and *Alabama*, he personally accounted for thirty-six percent of the Union merchant ships destroyed by Confederate raiders. With his reputation as "the Nelson of the Confederacy," steely determination, and handlebar mustaches, he was the most colorful character in the Confederate Navy. He is by far the most written-about Southerner in Civil War naval historiography.

Yet, the real Semmes has remained hidden behind the two-dimensional, wooden image that usually appears in books about the *Alabama*. Most biographies of Semmes are either stilted

in style, extremely biased toward the "lost cause," or focused on his career as a commerce raider during the Civil War, with little to say about the rest of his life or formative experiences. John M. Taylor wrote the first critical and objective biography of Semmes, *Confederate Raider* (1997) that examines both his personality and his life before and after the war.

Warren Spencer's splendid *Raphael Semmes: The Philosophical Mariner* continues in this vein. Spencer, Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Georgia and Civil War diplomatic historian whose best known work is *The Confederate Navy in Europe* (1983), brings a broad and deep understanding of maritime law to the subject. *Raphael Semmes* is firmly grounded in Spencer's books and rarely-used unpublished papers, as well as the secondary literature.

Spencer's biography sets Semmes' Civil War career firmly within the broader context of his life, personality, and intellect. Semmes was a romantic, a nationalist, an opponent of social reform, and a devout Roman Catholic. Above all a self-educated intellectual, he studied weather patterns, astronomy, flora and fauna, history, and the classics. He became an authority on the US Constitution and maritime law and mastered the English language. Before the war, he earned a living as an officer in the United States Navy, a lawyer, and a best-selling author (*Memoirs of Service Afloat and Ashore during the Mexican War*, 1851). Despite spending most of his married life at sea, he was a devoted husband and a stern yet loving father and grandfather. Proud and impatient, he expected everyone else to be as correct as he, and he never tolerated insults. As a naval officer, he had the dubious distinction of losing three ships, yet he received a promotion after each loss.

Spencer clearly admires his subject, but his biography is no paean, as the dust jacket picture of a bronze statue of Semmes might suggest. Spencer delves more deeply into Semmes' racial attitudes than any other biographer. In essence, Semmes' view toward blacks was that of the "typical Southerner" (page 186): devotion to individuals but prejudice toward their

race. Spencer explains Semmes' racism as a product of his time and place, but does not excuse it: "The one great flaw of Semmes' character was his conviction that blacks were inferior to whites" (page 210).

Unlike other biographers, Spencer does not give a blow-by-blow operational account of Semmes' actions on the high seas during the Civil War. In fact, he devotes only one chapter to the cruise of the *Alabama*. To gain a full appreciation for how Semmes held together the *Alabama*'s drunken, mutinous, desertion-prone crew to become the most successful commerce raider in maritime history, one has to turn elsewhere, preferably to Taylor's biography. Spencer does provide fresh insights on Semmes' wartime exploits. His most penetrating insight stems from Semmes' view of himself as a "philosophical mariner," by which he meant "a seaman who studied and understood the science of the seas with their various winds and currents" (page 207). A student of Matthew Fontaine Maury, Semmes used his knowledge of hydrography and marine life to find prey and elude pursuers. "Indeed," notes Spencer, "his knowledge of the Gulf Stream and of the eating habits of the sperm whales produced his most successful period of destroying American merchant ships" (page 145).

Students of Semmes would be best served by reading both Taylor's and Spencer's books. Each probes the Confederate raider's personality more objectively and in greater detail than previous biographies, with Taylor more prone to criticize Semmes and Spencer more prone to praise him. Taylor focuses on Semmes' exploits on board *Sumter* and *Alabama*; Spencer sets these exploits firmly within the context of Semmes' life and times.

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WILLIAM MARVEL, *The Alabama and the Kearsarge: The Sailor's Civil War*. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina

Press, 1996. x + 337 pages, maps, illustrations, appendices, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 0-8078-2297-9. \$34.95.

Until recently, relatively little attention was paid to the naval aspects of the Civil War; consequently, very little was written on the subject. Fortunately, that situation has changed over the past decade or so. William Marvel's *The Alabama and the Kearsarge: The Sailor's Civil War* is a welcome addition to the growing shelf of popular and scholarly books on the naval aspects of the war.

Marvel had at least two motives in writing his book — to produce "a judicious and thorough investigation" into the history of the CSS *Alabama* and USS *Kearsarge*, and to satisfy his curiosity about the experience of the common sailor during the Civil War.

The need for a new history of the exploits of the *Alabama* and the *Kearsarge* arises, in Marvel's view (and I agree with it), from the biased, unreliable, and even fictive nature of the primary sources, mainly memoirs, upon which most secondary accounts have been based and from the uncritical use that the authors of those accounts have made of those sources, resulting in the repetition of old errors and the creation of a few new ones. Moreover, the *Kearsarge* has not been the subject of even a single book, whereas the *Alabama* has been the focus of many. I was somewhat disappointed, however, that Marvel, given his view, did not engage more fully in a critical assessment of the memoirs, and of the use, or rather, misuse, that has been made of them by the authors of various secondary works.

In order to provide a more balanced and accurate account of the *Alabama* and the *Kearsarge*, Marvel consulted the original muster rolls and logbooks of the two ships, the virtually unknown letters of Confederate Paymaster Clarence Young, census and pension records, and the little-used journal of Raphael Semmes, the commander of the *Alabama*.

Using these new or little-used primary sources, Marvel interweaves the stories of the *Alabama* and the *Kearsarge* from the laying of

their keels — in Liverpool, England, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire, respectively — until their climactic engagement off Cherbourg. At the same time, he chronicles the day-to-day life of deepwater sailors, writing of the everyday experiences of the men on board the two ships, from the Liverpool urchins who served as cabin boys on the *Alabama* to the senior officers on both ships.

The lot of both officers and men was one of almost unrelenting monotony and discomfort, interspersed with riotous carousing ashore and, occasionally, a few minutes of intense excitement and danger. Housed in damp, crowded quarters, their wartime mortality did not attain the level of that of their counterparts in the land forces, but service-related diseases shortened their postwar lives disproportionately. Most of the crewmen ended their lives in obscurity, and, until Marvel drew attention to them, their stories remained largely unheard.

In contrast to the lives of soldiers during the Civil War, the lives of sailors, both officers and men, have, to a great extent, been shamefully ignored in both the military and social histories of the period. Marvel has done them and us a great service by telling something of the everyday experiences of the sailors who were literate or who appeared before courts martial.

We can learn much about naval service during the Civil War by finding out more about the officers and men. Marvel's work in the primary sources tells us who the men were and what they did on duty and off. There are, however, also some broader questions that he leaves mainly unanswered — *e.g.*, why did the sailors enter service? What did their leaving and their returning mean to their communities? What impact did naval service have on them? These are large questions that are by no means easy to answer. At the same time, I was disappointed that Marvel did not attempt to put the experiences of the common sailors on board the *Alabama* and *Kearsarge* into broader and comparative contexts by drawing on the works of Langley and Valle on the Old Navy, and of Lewis, Rason, and Winton, for example, on the Royal Navy during the Victorian Era.

In sum, Marvel has written a fine, often

absorbing account of the *Alabama* and the *Kearsarge*, but the book did not satisfy my curiosity about many aspects of the experiences of the common seaman during the Civil War.

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MARK RUSSELL SHULMAN, *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 239 pages, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-766-X. \$39.95.

Historians have long viewed the 1880s and early 1890s as a critical juncture in American naval annals. This period saw the navy lay down its first modern steel-and-steam warship, while also adopting an aggressive new doctrine oriented around the battle fleet. In *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893*, Mark Russell Shulman contends that the main impetus for these changes came from the rising tide of navalism that swept through the upper echelons of American government and society. Fired by a common vision of national grandeur, a broad-based coalition of politicians, intellectuals, and naval officers looked to the creation of a world class navy as the ideal instrument to satisfy their imperial yearnings.

Shulman makes no pretense of offering a comprehensive survey of naval developments between the years 1882 and 1893. Rather, the book's eight topical chapters focus on select dimensions of the resurgent navalism of the era. The strongest sections are the early ones, devoted to the navalists' efforts to sell the public on the virtues of sea power and a battleship navy. A key component of this campaign was the spate of new histories of the War of 1812 penned in the 1880s. While earlier histories had concentrated on the land operations, the studies produced by navalists such as Theodore Roosevelt and Naval Academy professor James R. Soley reversed the emphasis. Their works glorified the exploits of the tiny American fleet,

downgraded the significance of the army's accomplishments, and stressed the importance of naval preparedness throughout. Their revisionist interpretations were of more than passing academic interest, Shulman demonstrates, for these authors provided fellow navalists with a compelling historical cautionary tale to buttress their pleas for an expanded fleet.

The rest of the book is more of a mixed bag. The chapter on administrative reforms within the Navy Department is informative enough, but Shulman never spells out the precise nature of the connection between the service's drive for increased efficiency and professionalization on the one hand and the navalist movement on the other. His attempt at a Peter Karsten-esque examination of the mentality of naval officers who served in the Pacific is also less than satisfying. His argument that the leaders of the new navy came to view the region as "a blank slate upon which the United States should write its imperial destiny" (pages 93–94) certainly has merit, but he reaches this conclusion by way of some very questionable inferences based on highly reductionist readings of his subjects' letters, diaries, and memoirs.

Thankfully, Shulman returns to firmer, more substantive ground in the pair of chapters on the naval debates in Congress. He approaches this well-worn subject from a refreshingly broad perspective, focusing on the interaction of partisan politics, public opinion, and the navy's own internal disagreements over doctrine and force structure. Although following the many different threads of his discussion can be difficult, Shulman does a nice job of laying bare some of the key political and institutional interests that shaped the legislative battles of the period. Yet, here too his analysis is weakened by his habit of rushing to judgement on matters that cry out for a more measured assessment of the documentary record. For instance, his very abbreviated account of Navy Secretary Benjamin Tracy's testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee in 1890 conveys the misleading impression that Tracy urged the committee to embrace blue-water navalism solely for the sake of national pride. In actuality, Tracy repeatedly maintained throughout the

hearings that battleships were wanted for one reason alone: national security. Shulman's claim that committee members also favored building battleships "for reasons of pride and the technical ability to do so" (page 130) lacks foundation as well, especially since he does not even bother to discuss the contents of the committee's official reports (which basically endorsed Tracy's views).

If *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power* is at times a very frustrating work, it is still a useful one. While others have examined the military, political, economic, and technological imperatives that produced the New Navy of the 1880s and 1890s, Shulman expands the matrix to include socio-cultural factors. In doing so, he has given naval historians some important new issues, both historical and conceptual, to weigh and to ponder.

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CHRIS HOWARD BAILEY, ED., *Social Change in the Royal Navy, 1924–1970: The Life and Times of Admiral Sir Frank Twiss, KCB, KCWO, DSC*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing for the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, England, 1996. xix + 236 pages. Illustrations (64 black-and-white photographs), select bibliography, index. ISBN 0-7509-0610-3. £25.00.

Dr. Chris Howard Bailey, Head of Oral History, Publications and Education at the Royal Naval Museum in Portsmouth, England, has selected the diary and oral history of Admiral Sir Frank Twiss, Royal Navy, as the background for recounting what she calls *Social Change in the Royal Navy, 1924–1970*. Dr. Bailey wrote the introduction and epilogue, Admiral Twiss the prologue, and Captain John Wells, a retired Royal Navy officer and historian, the foreword. The book is illustrated with dozens of photographs of the personal career of Admiral Twiss. That career included school at

Dartmouth Royal Naval College, gunnery officer of HMS *Exeter*, a cruiser sunk in the battle of Java Sea in 1942, prisoner of war of the Japanese for three years, liberation and resumption of his naval career, expertise in biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, fleet commander in the Far East, thence to Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, responsible for personnel matters. He retired from the Royal Navy, then served for almost a decade during the 1970s as Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, the chief administrative position for the House of Lords in Parliament. Dr. Bailey was able to conduct extensive oral history interviews with him in the last year of his life prior to his death in 1994. Among her accomplishments, she has published oral history books on the Burma campaign and the battle of the Atlantic.

Oral history is the strength of this book. There are extensive anecdotal and detailed accounts of life in the Royal Navy, strictly from the perspective of the quarterdeck. As Second Sea Lord, Twiss instituted some reforms at the level of the lower deck, notably in recruitment, retention, and education. He was also responsible for "a very fundamental moment" (page 200) in the history of the Royal Navy, the scheme eliminating the rum ration.


Twiss' naval career was obviously successful. He was repeatedly selected for highly responsible positions associated with future flag rank. As an officer, ship captain, and fleet commander, he was able to describe various aspects of discipline, training, victualing, punishment — including caning boys and midshipmen — worship, entertainment, sports, and welfare in the Royal Navy. There was social change, no doubt. He saw the "Invergordon Mutiny of 1931" (page xviii) as a turning point. Also included is a chapter on being a prisoner of war of the Japanese, with all of the gruesome details of horrendous treatment recounted. In agreeing to the extensive series of oral history interviews, Twiss determined to present his life and experiences within the context of changing conditions in the Royal Navy in the twentieth century. Interesting insights about the administration and ceremo-

nial occasions of the House of Lords are found in the final chapter.

Social Change in the Royal Navy is a misnomer. To be slightly more accurate, the proper title of this book should have been *Observances and Experiences of an Above Average Officer of the Royal Navy in the Mid-Twentieth Century*. The reading is tedious. Contractions and colloquialisms abound. Too much of the "social change" relates to officers, especially captains and above. The incidents of Invergordon in 1931 are more accurately described by recent experts as "down tools," definitely not "mutiny." If the reader is searching for the best and most scholarly accounts of social change in the Royal Navy in the twentieth century, recommended studies are those of Anthony Carew, Henry Baynham, John Winton, John Laffin, Christopher Lloyd, and Michael Lewis. N. A. M. Rodger of the National Maritime Museum is completing a new comprehensive, multi-volume history of the Royal Navy. Mary A. Conley, a Ph.D. candidate at Boston College, is preparing a promising study on images and identities of British seamen. The well-known American historian Ronald Spector is working on a study of sailors, including those of the Royal Navy, during the battleship era. Only two of these are included in the "select bibliography."

I do not recommend this book as an important study of social change or social history of the Royal Navy. Alternatives such as those mentioned above are preferable. To learn about the personal details of a superior British naval officer during the interwar, World War II, and post-war periods, read this book.

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JAN K. HERMAN, *Battle Station Sick Bay: Navy Medicine in World War II*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996. ix + 226 illustrations. ISBN 1-5575-0361-3. \$32.95.

The otherwise excellent history program of the US Navy has unaccountably never been interested in the history of the medical support of the Navy and Marine Corps. In contrast, the Army pioneer military medical history programs date from the Civil War, and those of the Air Force begin with World War II. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has produced a slim text on World War I (in 1947), three small volumes for World War II, and a modest account covering 1945–1955.

We are thus fortunate that Mr. Herman, historian of the Navy Medical Department, has produced *Battle Station Sick Bay: Navy Medicine in World War II*, a carefully arranged and well documented collection of oral histories which so well illustrate the excellent work of the medical men and women of the navy in World War II, primarily in the Pacific theater. These accounts, supported by his archival work and careful use of secondary sources, provide a more synoptic account than one would expect from a collection of miniature memoirs.

Physicians, dentists, nurses, enlisted corpsmen, and administrators review their wartime service afloat and ashore, with the fleet and with the Marines, on surface warships, submarines, and hospital ships, in devoted support of the fighting forces from 1939 to 1945.

Beginning before Pearl Harbor, Herman has gathered these eyewitness accounts to represent the nearly 169,000 medical personnel who served. Each account is preceded by a short summary of the person, place, and event reported. Here are stories of survivors of sunken ships, those under kamikaze attack, prisoners of war, desperate forward medical care with the Marines from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, and the more routine delivery of patient care.

There are new data — the familiar story of the appendectomies by corpsmen on submarines is completed by learning that the Surgeon

General was horrified and forbade it in the future. The now famous Dr. Henry Heimlich (of the maneuver) spent his war in Mongolia, caring for Chinese guerrillas, which led to his invention of the Heimlich valve for chest surgery. A few remembrances of England and D-Day in Normandy remind us that the Navy was not restricted to the Pacific. Dr. Howard Bruenn reveals new information about his management of President Roosevelt's various medical problems. One small error: US Army Air Force flight nurses and aeromedical evacuation C-47 aircraft were the first to operate from active battlefields, not their Navy counterparts.

Forty-two excellent black-and-white photographs markedly enhance the text. This is a useful, well organized, cogently edited collection of sixty-two oral histories, all but two secured by Herman. They are increased in their value by the concise but complete editorial introductions and annotations.

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GREGORY J. W. URWIN, *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997. xxiii + 727 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-8032-4555-7. \$58.95.

At first glance, Gregory Urwin's *Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island* seems inordinately long — 750 pages, including 570 of text — to tell the story of the sixteen-day siege and fall of Wake Island in December 1941. Surprisingly, this solid work features a fast-paced narrative that may well make it attractive to history buffs as well as scholars.

The research is prodigious. Urwin, a professor at Central Arkansas and author of several other books, has made effective use of archival and secondary sources as well as more than seventy interviews and correspondence with

Wake's American defenders. In addition, he has interviewed several Japanese commanders and has utilized interrogations undertaken after the war by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific, to relate Japan's side of the fighting. The result is an operational history that presents not only the view from the top down, but also from the bottom up.

Urwin has organized the book into four parts. Part I, "The Place," catalogues the geology and early history of the atoll from its discovery by the Spanish in 1568 to its occupation and buildup, first by Pan American Airways contractors in 1935, then by naval personnel for the construction of an air base and fortifications in 1941. In Part II, "The Defenders," Urwin delves into the lives and activities of a number of the individuals who defended Wake. Of the 1,742 involved, 1,218 were civilian construction workers and 524 servicemen, mostly Marines, but a handful of sailors and army radio-men as well.

Parts III and IV, "The Siege" and "The Fall," cover the combat phase. Many of the events Urwin describes are undoubtedly familiar to readers of the standard accounts, Robert D. Heinl, Jr.'s *The Defense of Wake* (1947) and Duane Schultz' popular history, *Wake Island: The Heroic Gallant Fight* (1978). The events Urwin discusses, among others, are the almost simultaneous awareness on Wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, the first Japanese air raid on the island the same day (many more were to follow), the turning back of the initial Japanese landing attempt, the failure of an American relief force from Hawaii, and the final surrender on 23 December to a much better prepared and overwhelming enemy assault force. He is not content, however, merely to recount the fighting — and waiting — of Wake's defenders, but provides details and personal reactions that add substantially to our understanding of what occurred. One thus gains an appreciation of the strengths and drawbacks of the naval station commander, Commander Winfield Scott Cunningham; the Marine's leader, Major James Devereux; and the air commander, Major Paul Putnam. At the same time, one does not lose sight of the heroics of the "lesser leaders" such

as Captain Wesley Platte, Lieutenant Arthur Poindexter, and Gunner Clarence McKinstry.

One of the final chapters deals with the survivors' forty-four months in captivity. The Japanese confined most of the 1,593 prisoners in a camp outside Shanghai, where Marine discipline came to the fore and helped save many lives. After their liberation from various camps in Japan, where they had been moved in 1945, naval officials found that only 244 of Wake's prisoners had died during the ordeal.

Other highlights of the book are Urwin's discussion of the continual praise the defenders of Wake received from the press and film industry during the war to sustain morale at home. He also analyzes in an even-handed manner a number of the controversies that have arisen surrounding Wake's siege and the aftermath. For example, he condemns, as have others, Admiral William S. Pye, the interim Pacific commander, for Pye's timidity in recalling the Hawaiian relief force, but Urwin reminds us that the Pacific chief's action did save American ships and personnel at a crucial time. He also examines the Cunningham-Devereux dispute which erupted after the war. He shows that in a sense both were to blame — Devereux for refusing to acknowledge Cunningham's role in the defense of the island, Cunningham for overstating what he really did. Urwin's unwillingness to fix blame on either party is perhaps too forgiving, but it demonstrates his thorough and thoughtful approach. Overall, *Facing Fearful Odds* may not be the last word on the fighting on Wake Island, but it is close to it. It warrants a wide readership.

ALAN F. WILT
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DOUG FRASER, *Postwar Casualty: Canada's Merchant Navy*. Lawrencetown Beach, NS: Pottersfield Press, 1997. 154 pages, illustrations. ISBN 1-895900-07-7.

In the Instructions accompanying books sent out for review, *The American Neptune* allows a reviewer to decide if the book is not

worth reviewing. I nearly exercised that option in this case. In the first place, *Postwar Casualty: Canada's Merchant Navy* is not a book; it is a pamphlet, and a very poor one at that. It has nothing substantive to reveal about Canada's merchant navy, which is why I had agreed to review it in the first place. This is an area of Canada's maritime history in which I was looking for further enlightenment. Such will not be found in this publication.

The work deals with one of the many sorry stories connected with Canada's participation in World War II. In this case, it is the manner in which suitable and deserved benefits were denied to a large number of Canadians who, for whatever reasons, decided they could best forward the Allies' war effort by going to sea in the merchant navy. Serving all too often in old, cold, decrepit, and dangerous vessels, they carried to Europe the cargoes that were vital in sustaining Britain in its extremity, and, later, to supply the hundreds of thousands of troops sent overseas. Their story has yet to be told in its entirety — but do not look for it here. Those sailors were shamefully treated; except for a few, ever-decreasing as death takes them, most of these grievances have been redressed. Do not look for a balanced account of the struggle for equity here.

The publication itself is tendentious, argumentative, and disorganized. It is a mishmash of memories by Fraser and others, harbored slights and injustices, and plain outright mistakes of fact. As to the opinions expressed, they can be judged by readers, but factual errors should be corrected. Thus, *Lady Nelson* (photo caption page 14), was not Canada's first hospital ship. "Ottawa" had not, by 1944, started to sell off Canada's wartime merchant fleet (page 27). The ships Canada built during the war might not have been top drawer, but they were as well built as any wartime building in any country, a fact acknowledged by British and American officials. There are other mistakes.

In reading, we jump from the Spanish civil war to the infamous Halifax riots in May 1945, from the 1930s Depression to the G-7 Summit held in Halifax in 1995, all without cohesion. We do not really learn what Fraser's own

wartime experiences were, beyond service in a small and vulnerable cable ship. This in itself could have been an interesting story, given its employment, but we are not allowed that story either.

I will restrict myself to one specific comment. It is in connection with Fraser's denigration of those crew members of the Canadian cruiser HMCS *Uganda* who were polled as to whether or not they wished to serve in the European theater by serving in the Pacific and who chose to go home. Both the RCN and Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, are objects of disdain in Fraser's view, and he holds them up to ridicule for this episode (pages 85–86). He is off the mark. Both King and his senior cabinet member, C. D. Howe, were well aware that the United States was determined to bring the war in the Pacific to a conclusion in its own way, and that the British were equally determined to insinuate their presence at the surrender of Japan. Neither Canadian wished to be part of this, and took — and made — every opportunity not to do so. Machiavellian, perhaps, but hardly dastardly.

So the question is, what has all this to do with the fate of Canada's merchant marine after World War II? The answer is, next to nothing. It is beyond question that the "commercial navy" went into a steep decline immediately postwar, despite a lukewarm attempt to retain at least a portion of the war-built fleet under the Canadian flag. One will find nothing of this story here.

KENNETH S. MACKENZIE
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NATHAN MILLER, *War At Sea: A Naval History of World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Soft cover. ISBN 0-19-511038-2. \$17.95.

It is an audacious author who dares to offer another comprehensive, yet readable, one-volume history of the naval side of the largest war in history. Sea power, or the lack of it, played a crucial role throughout the globe in the

defeat of the Axis powers. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan could not prevent the free movement of Allied raw material, goods, and manpower, or repel the amphibious offensives that led to their own downfall. The naval literature of the Second World War is vast, complex, uneven and rapidly growing. Most histories either deal with specialized topics or are strictly national in scope and outlook.

Nathan Miller has written a wide variety of books on naval and other historical subjects. His *War At Sea* very largely succeeds in its goal of providing an excellent, up-to-date introduction to World War II naval history. His lively narrative ably shifts back and forth from the big picture in terms of national strategy and war production down to the individual campaign and battles, where he inserts personal combat reminiscences where particularly appropriate.

Miller goes far beyond previous general accounts with a much broader discussion of the often decisive impact of Comint — communication intelligence. He has profited from newly released documents and studies that investigate the impact of the Allies breaking enemy ciphers and reading radio messages, the so-called “Ultra,” for Ultra Secret. In the Atlantic both the Germans and the British read each other’s mail, at least in the beginning, but continued British exploitation of the German Enigma ciphers proved decisive in defeating the U-Boat threat. In the Pacific, code-breaking was virtually all one-way, with the Americans able at times to use broken Japanese naval and diplomatic messages to enormous advantage. Cued in spring 1942 by Ultra, the US Pacific Fleet overcame superior Japanese numbers and inferior lines to win critical victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway that regained the initiative in the Pacific.

War At Sea also provides useful sketches of many important personalities and their relationships. There was the exuberant Winston Churchill, always seething with wild schemes, and his passive yet stubborn First Sea Lord Dudley Pound. Adolf Hitler, with his continental outlook, was woefully ignorant of sea power and

wavered until it was too late between the views of Erich Raeder, the traditional navalist, and the maverick Karl Dönitz and his U-Boats. Ever eager to accommodate Churchill in his war in Europe, Franklin D. Roosevelt nevertheless entrusted the US Navy to fierce Ernest King, a peerless strategist always suspicious of his allies. In the Pacific, the beloved Chester Nimitz and his supercilious US Army rival Douglas MacArthur vied for strategic control, while their most talented opponent, Isoroku Yamamoto, still remains an enigmatic figure. The principal battle commanders also get their due, such as Andrew Cunningham in the Mediterranean, and William Halsey and Raymond Spruance in the Pacific. The reader is likewise introduced to many of the lesser stars of the naval war. For once, Frank Jack Fletcher, the US Navy’s favorite scapegoat, is treated somewhat more fairly than usual.

Where *War At Sea* falters slightly is in its spare discussion of Japan, Italy, and the USSR — naval powers whose history is not readily available in English-language sources. Like the proverbial survey course, Miller understandably covers the earlier events far more comprehensively than those in 1944 and 1945, which are severely compressed as he ran low on space. There are some errors of fact, such as “Lipscombe Bay,” for the USN escort carrier *Liscome Bay*, sunk off Makin in November 1943. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the Japanese carrier commander at Pearl Harbor, was not rusticated after his defeat at Midway, but led his flattops at Guadalcanal. However, such minor lapses certainly do not detract from the true usefulness of the book.

Nathan Miller’s *War at Sea* is warmly recommended for anyone wishing for a thorough, accurate, and eminently enjoyable introduction to World War II naval history.

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CAPTAIN WALTER W. JAFFEE, *The Track of the Golden Bear: The California Maritime Academy Schoolships*. Palo Alto: Glenn Cannon Press, PO Box 341, Palo Alto, CA 94302, 1996. 224 pages, illustrations. ISBN 0-9637-5868-3. \$40.00.

In his introduction, Walter W. Jaffee tells the reader what *The Track of the Golden Bear* is, and also what it is not: "This is not a yearbook. This story is about the training ships. Perhaps some future author will tell the story of the school." Basically, it is the remembrances of twenty-seven graduates of classes from 1933 to 1995, plus histories of the five ships that provided housing, work, and study areas for the enrolled cadets. In an appendix you will find the names of the Academy Superintendents and the Schoolship Masters. The appendix also lists the years in which training cruises were held and the ports of call.

The recorded remarks of the twenty-seven cadets who were interviewed provide most of the stories of the activities you would expect to find in a merchant marine schoolship. Unfortunately, there is much repetition, a lot of which was about the chow that was served and the Line Crossing ceremonies. On two facing pages, the reader learns in three different places that the ship was a turboelectric drive vessel. On another page, you are told three times when reveille was.

The story is about the ships. With the exception of the inboard profile of one of the five ships, there are no other profiles or deck plans of any of the ships. Plans would help the reader follow the remarks of the cadets.

It is not the story of the school, but Jaffee does provide much information about the school's formation, locations, and administrative matters.

Although not a yearbook, which would probably be boring to anyone not a graduate of the school, it would be nice to know something about the accomplishments of some of the cadets interviewed. Some of these persons have achieved fame not only in the United States, but internationally. This would be of interest to any reader.

The book is expensive, and the price should entitle the reader to some color photographs. Unfortunately, the photo reproduction is of very poor quality, with the photo on page 154 being totally useless.

Jaffee is to be commended for tackling this subject, which will hopefully initiate the development of a complete history of the California Maritime Academy as well as a series of histories of the various United States Maritime Schools. It is a subject that should be part of the recorded maritime history of this country.

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CAPTAIN WYMAN H. PACKARD, USN (RETIRED), *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1996. xxi + 498 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-945274-25-4. \$42.00.

The big *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence* tackles the ambitious subject of US Navy intelligence from the time an office was initially organized in the early 1880s to the 1970s. The founding of the Office of Naval Intelligence was closely linked to the launching of the modern, steel-built, steam-powered US fleet. The new agency was responsible for administering a small number of naval attachés who were appointed to European capitals to gather technical information from the world's leading navies. Management of attachés remained the primary activity for nearly sixty years. In a close reflection of American isolationism, the intelligence function lacked both resources and professional status. That changed with the United States' entry into World War II, which of course featured a government-wide intelligence failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Change, however, was piecemeal and chaotic.

Fundamental reform and the sustained commitment of substantial resources came only after the outbreak of the Korean War, in which the lack of warning about the North Korean

invasion echoed the Pearl Harbor intelligence debacle. At least half of the book is devoted to the years 1950 to 1975. This was a period of relentless technological change and organizational expansion and shuffling. The intelligence fiefdoms of each of the armed services lost a good deal of their autonomy. Important elements of their traditional resources and roles were integrated at the Department of Defense or national level, as in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. At the same time, the services exploited new technologies specific to their particular environments. Maritime initiatives included the collection of acoustic signatures of world shipping and the development of carrier-borne, multisensor intelligence gathering aircraft.

The new capabilities spawned additional research and analysis centers at service headquarters, and also an expansion of resources in commands, notably in the establishment of Fleet Intelligence Centers. These virtually replicated the Washington naval intelligence command in the interest of both rapid response and the survival of command and control facilities in the event of nuclear war. It is noteworthy, although Packard does not underscore the point, that during World War II US naval intelligence was most successful in those organizations hurried into existence at the fleet level.

Readers familiar with the British Commonwealth experience might well be struck by how quickly during World War II the USN absorbed and further developed advanced intelligence techniques at the fleet level, but, like other US agencies, did so only fitfully at the interdepartmental level. Interestingly, Packard quotes a recommendation in 1939 by the director of naval intelligence that the government should follow the British model of government-wide intelligence integration that had developed since the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence at the beginning of the century. In essence, this is what happened, but not until the 1950s, when the deepening Cold War thrust the United States into military leadership of the Western powers. It was also true, as Packard suggests in chapters on electronic, acoustic, and

aerial intelligence gathering, that new information technology had become so costly that only superpowers could afford to maintain a global capability.

Packard's goal was to provide a reference book, and he has succeeded. In some respects, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence* is reminiscent of the best of the very good manuscript "administrative histories" produced by US Navy commands at the end of World War II. Like them, it focuses on practicalities: organization, mandates, interrelationships with other agencies, and the personnel and physical resources available (or not) to get on with the job. There are full reference notes, lists of incumbents in key appointments, and liberal quotations from basic organizational documents of the sort that are in every good staff officer's working file but often miserably difficult to find in archives.

These similarities with the administrative histories are not surprising, for the book originated as an internal navy publication. Packard, a regular officer who saw combat during World War II and served in intelligence billets from 1946–1965, expanded the work to its present form as a retirement project.

The benefits of such an insider's view — indeed, one intended to help intelligence personnel more fully grasp the nature of their profession — is that it embraces the full range of intelligence activities, including essential but mundane chores that seldom receive proper attention from scholars interested in grand themes and interpretation. His experience also enables him to explore subtle aspects of the craft with clarity and precision. See, for example, the masterful treatment in Chapter 18 of the rise of almost instantaneous "operational" intelligence with the communications revolution during World War II, and the cultural, organizational, and technical challenges it posted.

This book is not self-congratulatory in tone, like so many branch or corps histories. Rather, the text presses home the ageless, fundamental problem of intelligence, whether the sources are press clippings or satellite images: to detect patterns in material that, although often over-

whelming in volume, is missing many of the key pieces. Packard explains that his own awareness of this basic issue was sharpened by the process of historical research, an experience which brought him a sense of kinship with academics in their struggles with the relativism of knowledge. This frankness makes the book especially valuable for anyone with an interest in naval or intelligence history, as well as for those whose profession is intelligence.

A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence may be ordered from Superintendent of Documents, PO 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954; cite GPO Stock Number 008-046-00174-0.

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SHORTER NOTICES

PAUL KEMP, *U-Boats Destroyed: German Submarine Losses in the World Wars*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 288 pages, glossary, bibliography, general index, indices of U-boats and U-boat commanders. ISBN 1-55750-847-X. \$32.95.

For students of German submarine warfare in either of the World Wars, this volume will prove an invaluable reference tool. Essentially, it is a detailed listing of the 178 U-boats sunk in World War I, and the 784 lost in World War II. Entries are made by year, with cross-listings by vessel number and commander. In each case, data on type, launch, and commission dates is supplied along with the date, location, and cause of loss, together with the number of casualties and survivors, if any. In most cases, short but fascinating appended paragraphs supply details of each boat's final confrontation with her foe. Although a useful bibliography of primary and secondary sources is provided, specialists may regret the fact that some economical means was not found to identify the source of each entry.

JACK SWEETMAN, ED., *The Great Admirals: Command at Sea, 1587-1945*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. xxvi + 534 pages,

notes on contributors, select bibliography, index. ISBN 0-87021-229-X. \$49.95.

Nineteen papers by as many authors grace this comprehensive wide-ranging collection focused upon those admirals who actually held command of a battle fleet in combat at sea. This limitation excludes many famous admirals, but reduces potential choices into a workable total: as Jack Sweetman points out in his introduction, the actual number of fleet confrontations at sea through history is not great. The choices range from the sixteenth century to the twentieth. Britain has the greatest number (Drake, Blake, Hawke, Nelson, Jellicoe, Cunningham), with the United States next (Farragut, Dewey, Spruance, Halsey); the Japanese and the Dutch each have two (Togo, Yamamoto; Romp, de Ruyter), while Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Greece merit a single entry each (respectively, Tegethoff, Juel, Suffren, Scheer, and Miaoulis). The panel of expert authors is equally international, although American representation (eight) is by far the strongest. Sweetman has organized the work into six chronological sections, and provides a useful survey of each era. Each selection is furnished with both notes and a "note on sources." Finally, an illustration of each admiral, together with many interesting illustrations and thirty-one clear

maps and charts, make this altogether a superior entry in the increasingly popular collections genre.

CAPTAIN NIELS PETER THOMSEN, *Voyage of the Forest Dream and Other Sea Adventures: A Memoir*. Vancouver: published by the author, (19222 Olympic View Drive, Edmonds, WA 98020), 1997. 167 pages, index, glossary, photographs. Softcover. ISBN 0-9631-2326-2. \$25.00 postpaid from the above address.

The five-masted barkentine *Forest Dream* sailed from Seattle in 1925, intending — on her way to the Indian Ocean — to smuggle one hundred cases of White Horse scotch whiskey into Prohibition-ruled California. The US Coast Guard disrupted the rendezvous, and the *Forest Dream* made for Mauritius with the booze still on board, in addition to a young sailor named Niels Peter Thomsen. The officers did their best to consume the cargo, and the result was a nightmare voyage of fourteen months and eventual sale of the vessel in Australia. Capt. Thomsen puts original diaries to use in recalling this and other adventures in the last days of long-distance commercial sail in a lively memoir, unusual in featuring the West Coast rather than the East. The book is available directly from the author, ninety years young as of 1997.

BRIAN T. KELLEHER, *Drake's Bay: Unraveling California's Great Maritime Mystery*. Cupertino, CA: Kelleher & Associates, 1997. xvi + 399 pages, maps, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-9657-6090-1. \$50.00.

Brian Kelleher, an environmental engineer, believes that Drake landed at Campbell Cove in California's Bodega Bay. By no means will all Drake researchers agree (currently, "Drake's

Estero" on Point Reyes Peninsula some miles to the south is favored). In making his case, however, Kelleher has assembled in this oversize work a mass of material, including many photographs, to illustrate not only his own arguments but also a useful survey of the landfall debate overall. Available from the author at PO Box 850, Cupertino, CA 95014 (add \$7 for postage).

HORST FRIEDRICH MAYER AND DIETER WINKLER, *Als Die Schiffe Tauchen Lernten: Die Geschichte der k.u.k. Unterseeboot-Waffe*. Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 1997. 188 pages, photographs, bibliography, index. ISBN 3-7046-1091-7. DM 69.

This interesting study — freely translated, "When Ships Learned to Swim Underwater" — offers a profusely illustrated history of some two dozen Austro-Hungarian submarines from their inception to the end of World War I. It should be remembered that Robert Whitehead, inventor of a workable self-propelling torpedo, had his factory in the then Austrian port of Fiume, where his tomb is still to be found. With Whitehead's help, Austria got off to a good start, and her two dozen submarines (a few of which were ex-German) certainly won the respect of her Mediterranean enemies. As with other works in German on Austrian naval history from this press, the book is handsomely produced, particularly valuable for the numerous rare photographs — including one of Whitehead's daughter Augusta, who married a submarine commander named George von Trapp: after the war, the children became famous as a family chorus.

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